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WALL, BEVERLY C., Ph.D. Supreme Court Rhetoric: Explorations 
in the Culture of Argument and the Language of the Law. 
(1992) Directed by Dr. Walter H. Beale. 230 pp. 
Perhaps nowhere in American life is the intersection of 
language, argumentation, and politics more intense, complex, 
and dynamic than in the written opinions issued by the United 
States Supreme Court. This study analyzes a small set of 
Supreme Court opinions in order to explore, from a rhetorical 
perspective, the genre of the Supreme Court opinion and the 
culture of argument as it is realized or symbolized in the 
texts. The analysis is grounded in the theoretical model of 
discourse developed by Walter H. Beale, as well as drawing 
eclectically on a variety of insights from figures such as 
Aristotle, Kenneth Burke, Michael Oakeshott, Richard M. 
Weaver, and James Boyd White. 
In Part One, Chisholm v. Georgia (1793) and McCulloch v. 
Maryland (1819) are examined as early examples of multiple-
text and single-text opinions, respectively. The two cases 
suggest the range of generic possibilities in the writing of 
Supreme Court opinions. They also reveal the parameters of a 
rhetorical problem that has persisted throughout the Court's 
history: the conflict between the functions of the texts as 
deliberative forums and governmental instruments, between the 
individual roles of justices and their collective 
institutional identity, and between the justices' multiple 
voices and the Court's single judicial voice in a culture of 
argument. 
In Part Two, the texts of four modern cases are 
analyzed: Brown v. Board of Education (1954) and United 
States v. Nixon (1974) are examined as examples of the 
Marshall-style single opinion "of the Court"; New York Times 
Co. v. United States (1971) and Regents of the University of 
California v. Bakke (1978) are examined as examples of 
virtually seriatim opinions. The opinions suggest that 
argument can fail—indeed, the Supreme Court's entire culture 
of argument can disintegrate—in moments of textual unity as 
well as multiplicity. 
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INTRODUCTION 
THE GENRE OF THE SUPREME COURT OPINION 
In "Language Is Sermonic" Richard M. Weaver formally 
positions rhetoric "at that point where literature and 
politics meet, or where literary values and political 
urgencies can be brought together" (225). Perhaps nowhere in 
American life is the intersection of literary values and 
political urgencies more intense, complex, and dynamic than 
in the written opinions issued by the United States Supreme 
Court. The politics of these opinions, both their 
"urgencies" and consequences, have been chronicled, analyzed, 
interpreted, and debated for approximately 200 years; indeed, 
as Alpheus Thomas Mason and D. Grier Stephenson, Jr. attest, 
the accumulated bibliography is "well—nigh boundless" 
(xiii).1 Curiously, however, and despite fifteen years of 
work in what Richard A. Posner calls the "law and literature 
field," little of this monumental bibliographic material 
contributes significantly to our understanding of the 
literary values of Supreme Court opinions. Neither does it 
explore the implications of Weaver's rhetorical intersection 
for the language of the law or for the "culture of 
argument"—to use James Boyd White's provocative 
expression—as that culture has developed in our society. It 
is just such an exploration that I wish to pursue in this 
study. 
Representative democracies are by necessity cultures of 
argument, but the term argument itself always holds in 
tension at least two potential clusters of meaning. It 
suggests, on the one hand, positive notions of reasoned 
debate, of the obligation to explain and persuade, of orderly 
and logical processes by which competing viewpoints are 
supported and consensus or agreement is eventually achieved. 
The term may also evoke, on the other hand, negative images 
of conflict and division, the bad faith of dispute and 
confrontation, of discordant and contentious voices engaged 
in bickering, wrangling, and quarreling. In the 
institutional context of the United States Supreme Court, the 
tension between these two possibilities, which might best be 
thought of as two extremes at either end of a continuum, is 
embodied dramatically in the structure of the Court, the 
procedures used to decide cases, and the very shape and 
substance of the opinions themselves. Some sort of 
resolution is enacted, a stand taken somewhere along the 
continuum, each time a case is decided and the 
opinion-writing process takes its course. 
My intention in this study is to conduct a close 
analytical reading of a small set of Supreme Court opinions 
in order to examine, from a rhetorical perspective, the 
culture of argument as it is realized or symbolized in the 
texts. I attempt to make connections between my examination 
and the larger province of the language of the law, with some 
attention to the vexing linguistic and textual questions 
raised by critical legal studies and the law and literature 
movement.2 While I hope that this study makes a useful 
contribution to the ongoing contemporary debates in the legal 
community, I make no claims to speak with the authority or 
special expertise of a legal academician or legal 
professional. I speak as a rhetorician in the classical and 
humanist tradition, as a student of the central art of 
discourse and a practical critic who is interested, as Walter 
H. Beale describes, in "the rhetorical contexts in which 
forms, processes, literary traditions, and cultural knowledge 
come together in discourse performances" (170—71). I take 
the rhetorician's central and pluralist viewpoint to be a 
strength, rather than a weakness, in the interdisciplinary 
realm in which this study operates. 
Law is obviously and deeply embedded in language, and 
lawyers demonstrate, to use Brenda Danet's phrase, a strong 
"preoccupation with language qua language" (288). Yet, 
paradoxically, the notion of Supreme Court opinions as texts 
or, more generally, of law as rhetoric is strange and oddly 
unsettling to most lawyers and legal scholars. The legal 
arena has long been filled with conventional wisdom and 
unexamined assumptions about the nature of language itself 
and about the rhetorical processes by which texts are 
actually generated and interpreted. In The Marble Palace, 
for example, John P. Frank evaluates the accumulated volumes 
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of United States Supreme Court Reports: 
This mighty pile is, from the literary standpoint, 
explored approximately as much as Mount Everest. 
English-composition classes pass it by, not with 
ashudder, but with indifference. Anthologies of 
American writing, except for an occasional passage by 
Justice Holmes, include no product of these labors. 
This is no enormous oversight by the compilers, no 
prodigious ignorance of the critics which can be 
corrected by sensational revelation of untold treasures. 
The critics are right. The treasures are rare. What 
appears to be a great literary wasteland is just that 
(130). 
The confident bravado and stylistic zestfulness make Frank's 
attack enjoyable to read, but the picture that emerges of 
Supreme Court justices as incompetent writers or as willfully 
obscure and cantankerous in their rhetorical performances is, 
in the long run, puzzling and grim. To dismiss Supreme Court 
opinions gleefully, as Frank does, as a "literary wasteland" 
is ironic because few, if any, pieces of discourse have a 
more profound or pervasive influence on American life than 
the written opinions of the United States Supreme Court.3 
As a continuously evolving set of texts in a changing 
society, Supreme Court opinions apply and interpret the 
meaning of a single, history—bound text—the United States 
Constitution. The language of the Constitution, as James 
Madison well knew, is a "cloudy medium," its laws "more or 
less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated 
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[made liquid] and ascertained by a series of particular 
discussions and adjudications" (Federalist No. 37). This 
process, both instrumental and deliberative, incorporates a 
fascinating range of human behavior in speech and writing. 
As a vital and distinctive body of literature, the opinions 
reflect the successful development over almost 200 years of 
multiple, interrelated communication acts. Indeed, the 
elegantly simple models developed by communication theorists 
appear simplistic when applied to the interrelated encoders, 
shifting channels, and multiple decoders of these opinions. 
Because of their complex and dynamic features, Supreme Court 
opinions provide an especially fertile ground for examining 
the production and interpretation of human discourse. A 
rhetorical study of Supreme Court opinions thus has dual 
potential for contributing to our understanding of the 
Supreme Court as a political institution and to the field of 
discourse theory and rhetoric. 
The ever increasing verbosity of the justices, for 
example, is a popular, volatile issue for debate among 
lawyers, legal scholars, political scientists, and Court 
watchers of all types.4 Preservationists defend judicial 
writing practices, pointing to the values of tradition and 
maintaining consistency in conventional usage. Reformists, 
on the other hand, complain about the "long-windedness" of 
majority opinions and the proliferation of concurring and 
dissenting opinions (too many, too long), while 
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characterizing preservationists as elitists committed to the 
obfuscation of the language of the law. The problem, 
undeniably real, is often approached as a bureaucratic matter 
calling for institutional guidelines and readability formulas 
to simplify and clarify the message of the Court. But such 
an approach may be dangerous: not because it disrupts some 
notion of tradition, but because it may involve serious 
misunderstandings of how the writing activity of the Supreme 
Court functions, of the dynamic negotiation of texts, and of 
the instrumental and deliberative dimensions of the written 
opinions themselves. The opinions serve both as specific 
short—term instruments for conducting human affairs and as 
general long—term forums for interpreting the Constitution 
and hammering out the fundamental rights and political values 
of society in a culture of argument. 
What happens when current—traditional approaches to 
rhetoric and discourse are applied to Supreme Court opinions? 
The justices' opinions constitute a genre of discourse that 
conventional theories apparently cannot handle very well. 
Conventional models of discourse tend to ignore judicial 
opinions entirely or to classify them as oddities, even 
grotesques, in the orderly universe of rhetorical modes. 
Equally problematic, but for quite different reasons, are the 
contemporary applications of the critical legal studies 
movement, involving essentially the refracted rhetoric of 
poststructuralist literary criticism, and the growing 
attention given to "legal discourse" by social scientists, 
linguists, and sociolinguists interested in discourse 
analysis.5 Interesting and at times useful observations 
about the language of the law have emerged from both camps, 
but on the whole both practice a reductive and ultimately 
futile or impoverished kind of criticism. One approach turns 
legal texts into black holes, the other into laboratory 
specimens. Thus, a central theme running through this study 
is an exploration—to put it most simply—of how best to talk 
about Supreme Court opinions. Which paradigms or theories or 
approaches are most valuable to our understanding of the 
massive generation and interpretation of these culturally 
significant texts? 
I work from the assumption that the written opinions of 
the Supreme Court are not prose oddities, but have become 
fully developed, successful, and central pieces of discourse 
in American life. They constitute fully developed discourse 
performances, possessing the qualities of extension, unity, 
design, publicity, and completedness.® They are quite 
obviously extended pieces of discourse, some classifiable as 
full—length "books." Separate opinions, whether majority or 
minority, create a sense of unity—of a hierarchical ordering 
of statements all focused purposefully on a shared question 
or set of questions. The design or arrangement of parts is 
deliberate, even at times ritualistic in following the 
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conventions of past performances of the genre. They 
demonstrate a highly sophisticated, multifaceted sense of 
publicity or conscious accommodation to an incredibly diverse 
array of audiences. And, finally, there is a sense of 
completedness, of a comprehensive "opinion" with distinct 
conventions of opening and closing, even when concurring and 
dissenting opinions create the more complicated interaction 
of "wholes-within-wholes" (Beale 85). 
As fully developed discourse performances, Supreme Court 
opinions have functioned successfully, despite times of 
intense controversy, throughout the nineteenth and most of 
the twentieth centuries. Their success makes it all the more 
difficult to understand why they have been ignored for so 
long by discourse theorists. In A Theory of Discourse, to 
take one major example, James Kinneavy makes only general 
references to "legal pleadings," apparently all gathered 
under the umbrella of persuasive discourse, and 
"constitutions of clubs or countries," oddly categorized as 
examples of expressive discourse. Neither typological 
application is very helpful in dealing with Supreme Court 
opinions. Kinneavy works from the notion that in successful 
pieces of discourse one aim usually dominates all others. 
When other aims are not properly subordinated, the result is 
"overlap" interference—resulting in distortion, impairment, 
spoilage, or failure of intent (62). This notion of overlap 
interference is useful, perhaps essential, to the purposes of 
Kinneavy's theory, but its application to Supreme Court 
opinions as a litmus test of their success or failure tends 
to trivialize rather than clarify. A pragmatic, Aristotelian 
study of the texts suggests that, while hierarchies of aims 
can be frozen at various points, they shift in kaleidoscopic 
fashion from one angle of observation to another. Yet these 
overlaps, rather than causing interference, are in fact 
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reflective of the successful historical evolution of a rich, 
highly specialized set of discourse functions. 
Supreme Court opinions are not rare or singular 
instances, but central examples of the possibilities of 
discourse in American nonfiction prose. They have a long 
history of normal achievement and successful overlap, to use 
Kinneavy's terms, as pieces of discourse. Kinneavy does 
concede occasional instances of successful overlap, but 
characterizes these instances as "rare" and speculates 
further: "It might be questioned if any great excellence in 
one aim can be normally achieved in coordination with another 
or several aims" (62). While Supreme Court opinions might be 
characterized as unusual in their dynamic embodiment of 
multiple communication acts, they represent a continuously 
evolving culmination in print of the expression of over 100 
authors. They constitute a major, legitimate de facto genre 
of nonfiction prose. Any comprehensive theory of discourse, 
any "rules" formulated, genre mapping, or system of category 
markers should be able to take these opinions into account as 
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important examples of the possibilities of form and meaning 
in the writing of our culture. 
My discussion of Supreme Court opinions draws 
eclectically from the insights of a number of rhetorical 
theorists, including Aristotle, Kenneth Burke, Chaim 
Perelman, Stephen Toulmin, Richard M. Weaver, and James Boyd 
White. Some interesting notions from the 
social—constructionist lore of "conversation" are also 
applied, metaphorically at least, without allegiance to the 
entire program. My own theoretical compass, both for 
individual analysis of texts and for the larger critical 
debate is taken from Walter H. Beale's A Pragmatic Theory of 
Rhetoric. In a reassertion and extension of Aristotelian 
rhetorical theory, Beale creates two comprehensive, 
multidimensional frameworks—one formalistic, one 
semiotic—for understanding "what human beings do with 
discourse" (1). The formalistic framework, or "Hierarchy of 
Discourse Categories," establishes an orderly yet 
nonreductive system for dealing with concepts such as aim, 
genus, strategy, and mode as they relate to the formal 
structures of discourse. The semiotic framework, or 
"Motivational Axes," draws on the work of Kenneth Burke, J. 
L. Austin, and John R. Searle to establish a more significant 
semantic and cultural "system of placement," again orderly 
yet nonreductive, for the analysis of discourse in terms of 
motivation, meaning, and substance. The two frameworks 
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together allow Beale to develop a rich, responsive approach 
to the idea of genre: 
The crucial point of interchange between these 
frameworks, and the ultimate focus of this book, lies 
in the notion of "genre," a concept which in itself 
denotes a particular coalescence of characteristic 
meanings/purposes and characteristic forms/strategies 
in discourse. (15)7 
In the "genre" of the Supreme Court opinion, what are 
the characteristic meanings and purposes of the justices? 
What characteristic forms and strategies can be identified in 
the texts? How do these distinctive features of 
discourse—including questions of subject or field, 
author—audience relation, successconditions, and occasion and 
context—interpenetrate or coalesce in particular cases? 
Keeping well in mind in this study the irony of the 
hermeneutic circle, I attempt what might best be described as 
an exploratory excursion into the "judicial thicket," an 
excursion to begin the analytical process of generic 
description/definition or definition/description. 
The following descriptive points are offered as a 
preliminary orientation to understanding modern Supreme Court 
opinions as discourse performances: 
1. They are "negotiated" texts. After a detailed, 
highly rule—governed procedure of selecting cases, studying 
legal briefs (or law clerks' summaries of legal briefs), and 
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hearing oral arguments, the justices of the modern Supreme 
Court meet together—without law clerks or other supporting 
personnel present—in a "case conference" to discuss the 
issues and take an initial vote. Based on this tentative 
vote, an assignment to write the majority opinion, or opinion 
for the Court, is made, again by a rule—governed procedure. 
An opinion for the Court is, in essence, an argument: a set 
of statements intended to support (explain, justify, and so 
forth) the decision of the justices. The detailed, 
sentence—by—sentence elaboration of the reasoning which 
supports a particular conclusion of the Court is crucial to 
its interpretation and application. After the initial vote 
and opinion-writing assignment, the deliberative process 
among the justices may continue anywhere from three or four 
weeks to several months, largely through a dynamic 
negotiation of languageand texts—the majority opinion and 
any concurring or dissenting opinions that justices may 
choose or threaten to generate. The Court's "decision" in a 
case is never final until the "opinion" is actually published 
or handed down. 
The entire process may involve a complex interactive 
series of communication acts: preliminary language composed 
by law clerks, justices' draft opinions, counter—drafts, 
composite counter—drafts, memoranda of all types going back 
and forth, proposals for alternative sections or subsections, 
caucuses of two or three justices in factions, strategy 
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sessions of justices' law clerks in various combinations. 
Personal notes scribbled in margins can be important. Even a 
unanimous ruling such as United States v. Nixon, the 1974 
"Watergate Tapes" case, can be deceptive in its public 
appearance of united resolve, as the justices purportedly 
"negotiated" line—by—line every detail of legal reasoning to 
be included or excluded (Friedman; O'Brien 219—22). 
2. Thev serve fundamentally instrumental purposes. The 
genteel term opinion is in one sense misleading. We all, of 
course, tend to have opinions about matters of importance to 
our culture and community. But even the President of the 
United States can express an opinion about abortion or 
affirmative action, for example, without in effect doing what 
the Supreme Court does when it issues a majority opinion. In 
the justices' fundamental pronouncements, the opinions for 
the Court do not advise or suggest, but rather they govern 
and control. They are instruments of government, and their 
official utterance performs an institutional "speech act" of 
real consequence for millions of American citizens. 
The reality of power, of language used not to reflect 
but actually to shape and direct experience, adds an 
interesting dimension to the Aristotelian notion of ethos. of 
the character of the speaker and the sense of "probity" 
created or projected by the text (Rhetoric 1.2). In contrast 
to a President's opinions or to the oral arguments put 
forward by attorneys before the Court, no matter how 
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credible, an opinion expressed by a Supreme Court justice 
carries a special kind of authority. Note the sense a reader 
must bring to an interpretation, say, of Justice Blackmun's 
performative utterance in the 1973 abortion case Roe v. Wade; 
"For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first 
trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be 
left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's 
attending physician." And note, in particular, the 
collective force and operational implications of Chief 
Justice Warren's "opinion" in the unanimous 1954 Brown v. 
Board of Education (first case): "We conclude that in the 
field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but 
equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are 
inherently unequal." 
3. Thev provide public forums for ongoing debate. 
While Supreme Court opinions are fundamentally instrumental 
or performative (in the sense of performing an action), there 
is also a strong deliberative character both in the immediate 
interplay of majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions 
within a single case and in the long—term historical 
evolution of various cases and the consideration of 
precedents. Concurring opinions, despite their name, can be 
just as combative as dissenting opinions since justices, 
although they may "concur" with the majority in the general 
decision, may choose to attack some aspect of the legal 
reasoning or emphasis in the wording of the majority opinion. 
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The 1971 "Pentagon Papers" case, New York Times Co. v. United 
States. is a striking example of this interplay. An 
extremely short, perfunctory opinion was issued per curiam 
(an unsigned opinion "by the court"), which upheld the New 
York Times' First Amendment right to publish the Pentagon 
Papers without prior governmental restraint. Along with the 
per curiam opinion, the bitterly divided justices produced 
the following array of nine separate opinions: (1) Justice 
Black, joined by Justice Douglas, concurring; (2) Justice 
Douglas, joined by Justice Black, concurring; (3) Justice 
Brennan, concurring; (4) Justice Stewart, joined by Justice 
White, concurring; (5) Justice White, joined by Justice 
Stewart, concurring; (6) Justice Marshall, concurring; (7) 
Chief Justice Burger, dissenting; (8) Justice Harlan, joined 
by the Chief Justice and Justice Blackmun, dissenting; (9) 
Justice Blackmun, dissenting. 
The 1978 reverse discrimination case, Regents of the 
University of California v. Bakke. is another important 
example of multiple opinions, "concurring in part and 
dissenting inpart." There was no majority opinion: Justice 
Brennan, joined by Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun, 
wrote an opinion of 55 pages upholding the special admissions 
program at the University of California at Davis and denying 
Allan Bakke, a white male, admission; Justice Stevens, joined 
by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, 
issued a 13-page opinion overturning the Davis program for 
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minority applicants and ordering that Bakke be admitted; 
Justice Powell, in a separate opinion of 55 pages, cast a 
fifth vote to each side, approving some general consideration 
of race in admissions programs but ordering Bakke admitted in 
the specific instance. Additional separate opinions, written 
by Justices White, Blackmun, and Marshall (of 8, 6, and 15 
pages, respectively), swelled the Bakke opinion to a total of 
156 pages, including the introductory summaries and 
headnotes. Although such opinions—and the strategic 
processes of deliberation which are captured by their 
appearance in print—cannot alter the decision in the 
specific case, they may become influential in future cases as 
the Court and society change. 
4. Thev intermix written and oral traits. Opinions 
contain an interesting, significant mixture of what E. D. 
Hirsch (extrapolating from Basil Bernstein) designates as the 
context—free "elaborated code" of written speech and the 
context—tied "restricted code" of oral speech (21—32).® For 
example, in Reynolds v. Sims, the 1964 climax of a series of 
one-man one—vote cases, Chief Justice Warren begins his 
majority opinion with a situational orientation appropriate 
to written speech: 
Involved in these cases are an appeal and two cross-
appeals from a decision of the Federal District Court 
for the Middle District of Alabama holding invalid, 
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal 
Constitution, the existing and two legislatively 
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proposed plans for the apportionment of seats in the 
two houses of the Alabama Legislature . . . ." 
In contrast, Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Baker v. 
Carr. the landmark 1962 redistrieting case, begins: 
Between 1901 and 1961, Tennessee has experienced 
substantial growth and redistribution of her 
population. In 1901 the population was 2,020,616, of 
whom 487,380 were eligible to vote. The 1960 Federal 
Census reports the State's population at 3,567,089, of 
whom 2,092,891 are eligible to vote. 
These statements are context—tied in Hirsch's terms because 
they only make sense if the reader brings to the opening 
lines a well—developed understanding of the background or 
external situation. 
Justice Brennan's example is not unusual. The absence 
of reader cues may relate to the oral tradition of the law; 
indeed, the first public announcements of decisions are still 
delivered orally in court, and justices summarize their 
opinions, sometimes choosing to read aloud all or part to the 
litigants, reporters, and tourists gathered in the courtroom. 
Paradoxically, there may also be an awareness of and 
dependence on the Reporter of Decisions and various other 
textual editors of Supreme Court opinions who will 
"intervene" with syllabi, summaries, headnotes, footnotes, 
and so on, to establish the needed context on the printed 
page. 
18 
5. Thev address a non—hierarchical multiplicity of 
audiences. One of the most difficult aspects of Supreme 
Court opinions to analyze is the extent and complexity of the 
relationships between authors and their audiences, all 
interacting with the same discourse performance. For 
example, in the 1955 Brown v. Board of Education (second 
case), Chief Justice Warren accepted Justice Frankfurter1s 
famous, subsequently controversial emendation—"with all 
deliberate speed"—in issuing guidelines for ending the 
segregation that the Court had ruled unconstitutional in the 
first Brown. What audience did Frankfurter have in mind for 
this special phrase? How did Warren's substitution of "with 
all deliberate speed" for the original wording, "at the 
earliest practicable date," change his own crafting of 
author-^audience relationship? How many different 
interpretations of this phrase were made by various audiences 
(some factions in the South, for example, reading it as a 
signal permitting "indefinite delay")?9 
The sheer number of potential audiences that justices 
must consider is remarkably large. Even an undergraduate 
political science textbook, Dynamics of American Politics, 
lists seven categories of audiences: (a) the two litigants; 
(b) othersimilarly situated persons and their lawyers; (c) 
lower courts and administrators; (d) law teachers and other 
Court watchers; (e) the other participants in the lawmaking 
process; (f) the publics; and (g) the justices themselves 
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(Wolfinger 502). But simply to list these various groups of 
readers does not provide a satisfactory reflection of the 
dynamic, fluctuating complexity of Supreme Court audiences; 
neither does it capture the continuously shifting, vortical 
relationship between authors and audiences as linguistic and 
textual choices are made. 
In the chapters that follow, I focus on a close, 
detailed reading of six specific cases. In Part One, two 
early examples, Chisholm v. Georgia (1793) and McCulloch v. 
Maryland (1819), are presented as establishing the parameters 
of a rhetorical problem which has persisted throughout the 
Supreme Court's history. The problem centers on the dilemma 
of an evolving new genre in a culture of argument: What forms 
or strategies are best for embodying the conflicting purposes 
and meanings of Supreme Court opinions? 
The early justices assumed that multiple—text opinions 
were the appropriate generic form. The 1793 text of Chisholm 
v. Georgia, the first significant written opinion delivered 
by the Supreme Court, is composed of five separate opinions. 
Following the custom of the King's Bench of Great Britain, 
Chief Justice John Jay originated the practice that all 
justices write separate or seriatim opinions for each case, a 
practice which has remained a possible, if not necessarily 
favored, option for individual justices. The multiple voices 
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heard in Chisholm would seem appropriate to the deliberative 
dimension of the Court as a public forum for ongoing debate 
and, indeed, the language of the separate opinions expands 
with the "spaciousness" of old oratory, to use Weaver's apt 
phrase. But multiple voices can also create confusion and 
conflict, complicating the need for opinions to function as 
effective instruments of government. Chisholm failed 
significantly, in fact, as a performative utterance intended 
to serve the instrumental purposes of government. The State 
of Georgia, the losing party in the case, simply refused to 
accept the majority vote of the Court (refused, in fact, to 
appear before the Court at all), and the highly charged issue 
resulted eventually in the ratification of the Eleventh 
Amendment, overturning the Court's decision. 
An early solution to the rhetorical dimensions of this 
problem was fashioned after 1801 by Chief Justice John 
Marshall, who aggressively urged justices to join 
collectively in single or unanimous opinions. McCulloch v. 
Maryland provides a particularly eloquent, significant 
example of Marshall's single institutional voice "expounding" 
the Constitution. But Marshall's style of opinion-writing, 
while an effective solution to the "babble" of voices 
possible in seriatim opinions, could not permanently resolve 
the very real tensions inherent in Supreme Court 
opinions—between their deliberative and instrumental 
functions, between the justices' individual and institutional 
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roles, between multiple and single voices in a culture of 
argument. Although the preference that Marshall set for the 
Court's single judicial voice worked well throughout the 
nineteenth and into the twentieth centuries, it is not 
surprising that those inherent tensions have reasserted 
themselves, with the number of plurality opinions and 
separate, concurring, and dissenting opinions rising 
dramatically since the middle of the twentieth century 
(O'Brien 262-75). 
Here is the question that interests me most about the 
rhetorical nature of the modern Supreme Court: Is the modern 
return to multiple voices a healthy re-emergence of argument 
as reasoned debate and deliberation in a mature but 
increasingly complex and complicated society? Or, to ask the 
question from a different perspective, is the return to 
multiple—text opinions symptomatic of a breakdown, of a loss 
of national identity and ofconsensus in our culture and 
community, resulting in a rising "babble" of conflicting 
voices engaged in bickering and dispute? I attempt in Part 
Two to offer some responses to these questions in the limited 
but significant contexts of four specific cases: (1) the 1954 
landmark opinion of this century, the school segregation 
cased decided as Brown v. Board of Education: (2) the 1971 
Pentagon Papers case, New York Times Co. v. United States: 
(3) the 1974 Watergate Tapes case, United States v. Nixon: 
and (4) the 1978 reverse discrimination case, Regents of the 
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University of California v. Bakke. 
There are, of course, many interesting opinions in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries which would illuminate the 
development of Supreme Court rhetoric. My intention in this 
study, however, is not to construct a history of the genre 
but to contribute to our critical and theoretical 
understanding of the modern Supreme Court opinion: how it 
comes into being, how it functions, and what informs its 
rhetorical and stylistic variations. Each of the four modern 
cases is an important case in its legal and historical 
effects, but also a quite "difficult" case to analyze from a 
rhetorical perspective. On the surface, the single—text 
opinions of Brown and Nixon are in Marshall's rhetorical 
tradition; the Court speaks with a single judicial voice. 
The multiple—text opinions of New York Times and Bakke. on 
the other hand, are virtually seriatim in their form; all of 
the justices speak individually. But that, of course, is not 
the whole story. If we can understand how each came into 
being in rhetorical terms, in what senses they are triumphs 
of consensus or competition, or failures of conformity or 
confrontation, then we will be in a better position to 
understand the opinions themselves and the culture of 
argument they constitute. 
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Notes 
The Genre of the Supreme Court Opinion 
1 While the bibliography related to the United States 
Supreme Court is immense, a fairly good general sense of the 
field can be acquired from the following sources: 
Primary Sources 
Texts of the written opinions of the United States 
Supreme Court are available in the following primary forms: 
(a) United States Reports. Washington, D. C.: 
Government Printing Office. This source is the official 
edition of the written texts of opinions. Opinions reported 
through 1874 are cited by volume number, the name of the 
reporter (usually abbreviated), and initial page number, with 
the year often included in parentheses. 
Example: Chisholm v. Georgia. 2 Dall. 419 (1793) 
The names of the reporters run chronologically as follows: 
1789-1800 Dallas (Dall.) 
1801-1815 Cranch (Cr.) 
1816-1827 Wheaton (Wheat.) 
1828—1842 Peters (Pet.) 
1843-1860 Howard (How.) 
1861-1862 Black (Bl.) 
1863-1874 Wallace (Wall.) 
Opinions reported since 1875 are cited as U.S., beginning 
with the 91st volume. 
Example: United States v. Nixon. 418 U.S. 683 (1974) 
(b) United States Supreme Court Reports. Lawyers' 
Edition. Rochester: Lawyers* Cooperative Publishing Company. 
This source, cited as L.Ed., includes texts of some related 
materials and provides annotated commentary on the written 
opinions of the justices. 
(c) Supreme Court Reporter. St. Paul: West Publishing 
Company. This source, cited as S.Ct., is similar to the 
Lawyers' Edition. 
There are countless secondary reprintings of the texts 
of written opinions, in whole and in part, in sources such as 
newspapers, monograph studies, and constitutional law 
textbooks. 
Secondary Sources 
The extensive bibliographic maze of secondary sources 
includes general constitutional histories; constitutional law 
and public policy studies; specific analyses and histories of 
single issues or single cases in both books and periodicals; 
biographies of justices; autobiographies, letters, memoirs, 
commentaries, and speeches by justices and others involved 
with the Court, and so forth. The following sources, listed 
alphabetically by author, make for a good nonspecialist's 
introduction to the nature and range of this material (full 
citations are given in the Bibliography): Abraham, The 
Judicial Process: Berkson, The Supreme Court and Its Publics: 
The Communication of Policy Decisions: Bickel, The Least 
Dangerous Branch: Brigham, The Cult of the Court: Cardozo, 
The Nature of the Judicial Process: Congressional Quarterly's 
Guide to the U.S. Supreme Court: Corwin, The "Higher Law" 
Background of American Constitutional Law: Edelman, The 
Symbolic Uses of Politics: Frank, Marble Palace: The Supreme 
Court in American Life: Friedman and Israel, The Justices of 
the United States Supreme Court 1789—1978: Their Lives and 
Major Opinions: Gilmore, The Ages of American Law: Hamilton, 
Madison, and Jay's Federalist Papers: Hughes, The Supreme 
Court of the United States: Jackson, The Supreme Court in the 
American System of Government: Kelly, Harbison, and Belz, The 
American Constitution: Its Origins and Development: Levi, An 
Introduction to Legal Reasoning: Levy, Original Intent and 
the Framers' Constitution: Lewis, Gideon's Trumpet: Mason and 
Stephenson, American Constitutional Development: McLaughlin, 
A Constitutional History of the United States: Miller, The 
Supreme Court: Myth and Reality: O'Brien, Storm Center: The 
Supreme Court in American Politics: Rohde and Spaeth, Supreme 
Court Decision Making: Schwartz, The Unpublished Opinions of 
the Warren Court: Stone et al., Constitutional Law: 
Sutherland, Constitutionalism in America: Origin and 
Evolution of Its Fundamental Ideas: Warren, The Supreme Court 
in United States History: Westin, The Anatomy of a 
Constitutional Law Case: Woodward and Armstrong, The 
Brethren: Inside the Supreme Court. 
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2 For two excellent surveys of critical legal studies 
and the law and literature field, respectively, see Mark 
Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies (Cambridge: Harvard 
UP, 1987) and Richard A. Posner, Law and Literature; A 
Misunderstood Relation (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1988). 
3 Frank's words appeared over thirty years ago, but his 
attitude is still current. Richard A. Posner, writing in 
1988, comments that the field of law and literature is "still 
largely unknown to the legal profession, including the legal 
prof essoriat11 (21). 
^ The long-continuing (and long—suffering) "Plain 
English" movement as it relates to legal language has been a 
major force in this debate. For an historical perspective, 
see David Mellinkoff, fthe Language of the Law (Boston: 
Little, Brown, 1963). An interesting update is provided by 
Tom Goldstein, "Drive for Plain English Gains Among Lawyers," 
New York Times 19 February 1988: B7. 
5 For a survey of this approach and a useful list of 
references, see Brenda Danet, "Legal Discourse," Handbook of 
Discourse Analysis, vol. 1, ed. Teun A. Van Dijk (London: 
Academic Press, 1985) 273—91. 
6 The criteria for discourse performances are taken from 
Walter H. Beale, A Pragmatic Theory of Rhetoric (Carbondale: 
Southern Illinois UP, 1987) 83—86. 
7 Beale places "majority decisions of the Supreme Court" 
in a category he designates as "instrumental deliberation." 
My analysis will expand on this and explore some questions in 
Part Two. 
® See Basil Bernstein, "Elaborated and Restricted 
Codes," The Ethnography of Communication, ed. J. Gumperz and 
Dell Hymes, 55—69. 
® For a full account, see Bernard Schwartz, The 
Unpublished Opinions of the Warren Court (New York: Oxford 
UP, 1985) 445-70. 
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PART ONE 
TWO EARLY CASES 
1. Chisholm v. Georgia (1793): 
A Babble of Voices and Rhetorical Problems 
In "Constituting a Culture of Argument: The 
Possibilities of American Law," James Boyd White claims that 
the Constitution of the United States is "in a literal sense 
a rhetorical constitution: it constitutes a rhetorical 
community, working by rhetorical processes that it has 
established but can no longer control. It establishes a new 
conversation on a permanent basis" (When Words 246). White's 
notion of a conversational process is an interesting way of 
thinking metaphorically, if not literally, about the 
interaction of justices as writers and about the structural 
and substantive dynamics of the texts of Supreme Court 
opinions. The metaphor of a "conversation" taking place on 
the printed page, like Bakhtin's voices and the speech acts 
of Austin and Searle, provides us with a rich and expanded 
set of possibilities for investigating and coming to some 
understanding of the rhetorical characteristics of the 
Court's opinions as they have developed.* It is important to 
emphasize, however, that the justices who were initial 
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participants in this conversational exchange had no clear 
sense of a rhetorical genre—of what the new conversation was 
to be or how it should be conducted to be successful; neither 
did they approach their newly created judicial roles with any 
confident feelings of permanence. 
Indeed, listening as we do at the end of the twentieth 
century, we sometimes need to remind ourselves of just how 
experimental and tentative the new "Union" of American states 
actually was in the late 1700s. This tentative quality can 
be seen in the very titles of the early volumes of the United 
States Reports recorded by Alexander J. Dallas: Volume I is 
entitled "Reports of Cases Ruled and Adjudged in the Courts 
of Pennsylvania, Before and Since the Revolution," and the 
volumes that follow contain cases adjudicated in the "Several 
Courts of the United States and of Pennsylvania, Held at the 
Seat of the Federal Government." It is only with the 
nineteenth century that the volumes become, simply, reports 
of cases argued "in The Supreme Court of the United States." 
The 1793 case of Chisholm v. Georgia. 2 Dallas 419, is 
generally considered to be the first significant written 
opinion delivered by the United States Supreme Court.^ From 
political and historical perspectives, however, the 
significance of the Chisholm case was a negative one, lying 
chiefly in the failure of the Court either to command respect 
for its proceedings or to establish the authority of its 
decision. It was not to be, to say the least, an auspicious 
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start for the first justices. The issue before the Court was 
one of federalism—of working out one of the many 
controversial details concerning the division of power and 
authority between state governments and the new federal 
government in what James Madison called the "compound 
republic of America" (The Federalist No. 51). 
It is by no means surprising that in 1793 numerous 
aspects of federalism had yet to be resolved. The debate 
over federalism, as Jack Rakove explains, had as recently as 
the mid—1780s been limited to "prosaic" and "narrowly drawn" 
arguments relating to reforming the Articles of 
Confederation. By 1787, a dramatic transformation of the 
debate had occurred, with participants like James Madison and 
Alexander Hamilton moving the newly independent states "from 
one agenda to another," from a concentration on more limited 
concerns to "more complex and open—ended questions about 
republican government in general" (80—84). Gordon S. Wood 
points out that many of these questions focused on checking 
potential abuses of the legislative branch, which Federalists 
had come to view as a particular threat (550—551). The 
judicial branch, in contrast, was described by Alexander 
Hamilton as the "least dangerous" of the three divisions of 
power: 
The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over 
either the sword or the purse; no direction either of 
the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can 
take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be 
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said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely 
judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the 
executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments 
(Federalist. No. 78). 
Just a short time later, imagine the consternation of 
Georgia officials upon finding their sovereign state summoned 
to defend itself before the new justices of this least 
dangerous branch, the Supreme Court of the United States. 
The case, in sum, involved an attempt by a private 
citizen of South Carolina to collect an unpaid debt from the 
state government of Georgia. Georgia refused to recognize 
the jurisdiction of the new federal judiciary in the suit, 
and the Court was thus faced with this specific question: 
Could the "sovereign" state of Georgia be sued in the United 
States Supreme Court by a private citizen of another state? 
The language of the recently ratified Constitution seemed to 
suggest that such a suit was possibles Article III, Section 
2, states that the "judicial Power" extends to controversies 
"between a State and Citizens of another State" and that the 
Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in all cases "in 
which a State shall be Party." As Charles Warren describes, 
the highly sensitive, suspicious, and volatile state 
governments were willing—so long as they were acting as 
plaintiffs—to be parties to suits in the newly created 
federal courts, but the states were apparently quite 
unwilling to be made defendants in such situations (1: 
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91—123). Critics of the new Constitution had been assured 
during the ratifying debates that the sovereignty of states 
would not be affected by the wording of Article III, Section 
2. Alexander Hamilton, for example, had explicitly insisted 
in 1788 that, under the proposed Constitution, a sovereign 
state would not be "amenable to the suit of an individual 
without its consent"; he added, perhaps with an ironic twist, 
that the states would retain "the privilege of paying their 
own debts in their own way, free from every constraint but 
that which flows from the obligations of good faith" (The 
Federalist No. 81).^ 
On February 18, 1793, with intense public interest 
focused on the Chisholm case and many similar cases 
threatening, the justices ruled four—to-one that Georgia 
could indeed be sued in their newly constituted and untested 
Supreme Court. "The decision," according to Warren, "fell 
upon the country with a profound shock" (1:96). 
Declarations, threats, and proposals to amend the 
Constitution were made, and the political controversy 
generated by the justices' ruling continued to swirl, 
remaining unresolved until 1798 when Chisholm was in effect 
overturned by the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment to 
the Constitution: 
The Judicial power of the United States shall not 
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, 
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United 
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States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens 
or Subjects of any Foreign State. 
Rather than the Court functioning as the calm at the 
center of the political storm, as later characterized by 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., it appeared in the 1790s to be in 
early danger of disintegrating in the swirling winds of the 
storm itself.^ 
From a rhetorical perspective, the written text of the 
Chisholm opinion provides a seminal example of an evolving 
new genre of constitutional discourse in a culture of 
argument. Following the practice of England's Courts of 
King's Bench and Chancery, the justices at that time all 
formulated separate or seriatim opinions (Marcus et al. 1: 
203, 582).5 They delivered their opinions one after another 
in a series determined by reverse seniority. Thus, the 
Chisholm "opinion," heard and decided by Chief Justice John 
Jay and four of the Court's first Associate Justices, is 
actually a composite of five separate voices participating in 
an extraordinary kind of high—stakes conversation—one that 
can easily fail or degenerate into a "babble" of 
contradictory premises and unresolved claims. It is a 
process of public argument which, to be successful, must both 
command and persuade: The text must function simultaneously 
as an authoritative instrument of government and as a 
deliberative forum which wins the respect of its readers. 
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How can we best understand and evaluate the complex 
nature of the rhetorical conversation in Chisholm v. Georgia? 
What kind of "culture of argument," as James Boyd White uses 
the term, is enacted by the Court? And what possibilities 
are envisioned in this conversation and culture, what values 
sanctioned, for public interaction and relationships within 
the community we call the United States? Some viable answers 
to these questions are best established through practical 
description, a close rhetorical analysis of the texts 
themselves (call it my "working" or "workable" reading, if 
you will). What might be important to know, to use Beale's 
set of questions, about the occasion and context to which the 
opinion as a whole responds? How does each justice define 
his purpose and deal with problems of subject matter and the 
relation between author and audience? Given especially the 
fluid nature of a newly developing genre, one in the process 
of defining itself, what assumptions does each justice appear 
to make concerning the conditions he must meet in order to 
produce a successful piece of discourse? What choices are 
thus made in language and strategy? And how do these 
distinctive features of discourse interpenetrate or coalesce 
in the five separate texts which make up the Chisholm 
opinion? 
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In human terms, the Chisholm case was originally about 
money and bad faith in the context of war. It began in 1777 
during the Revolutionary War, as Doyle Mathis relates, when 
the Executive Council of Georgia sought to purchase cloth, 
clothing, and blankets for American soldiers who were 
quartered near Savannah. Two Georgia agents, Thomas Stone 
and Edward Davies, contracted with Robert Farquhar, a 
merchant in nearby Charleston, South Carolina, to purchase 
the supplies: Farquhar agreed to provide cloth, thread, silk, 
handkerchiefs, coats, jackets, and blankets for the sum of 
$169,613.33.® The deal was struck on October 31,1777, with 
the arrangement that Farquhar would deliver the supplies and 
be paid by December 1. Farquhar lived up to his part of the 
contract, delivering the supplies on November 3, but 
apparently never received payment for his merchandise, 
despite repeated attempts to collect the money. 
Twelve years later, in 1789, Farquhar was dead, having 
drowned in a boating accident in 1784, but his claim against 
the state of Georgia, now part of the newly formed United 
States of America, was very much alive for three peoples 
Alexander Chisholm, also a merchant in Charleston, South 
Carolina, and the executor of Farquhar's estate; Farquhar's 
principal heir, his daughter Elizabeth, who had been only ten 
years old when her father died; and Peter Trezevant, who in 
1789 married Elizabeth Farquhar, then aged fifteen. 
Elizabeth's marriage to Peter Trezevant apparently 
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precipitated a series of attempts by her husband and 
Alexander Chisholm to collect the money owed to Farquhar's 
estate. They petitioned the Georgia legislature in that 
year, but failed to win any relief. Georgia refused to pay 
the claim because, according to the determination of a 
legislative committee, the state had given Farquhar's payment 
(in continental loan office certificates) to the agents 
Thomas Stone and Edward Davies. Chisholm and those he 
represented apparently felt that nothing would be gained by 
suing the former agents, especially as Davies by that time 
had died insolvent, and so they decided to sue the state of 
Georgia in the new federal courts (Mathis 21—22). 
In early 1790, what had begun as a wartime business 
transaction became Farouhar's Executor v. Georgia, a suit for 
payment and damages in the recently formed United States of 
America's Circuit Court for the District of Georgia. At this 
level Georgia was a predictable victor, the case being 
decided in the state's favor in 1791 at Augusta, Georgia, by 
two judges: the Georgian Nathaniel Pendleton, a judge of the 
United States District Court for Georgia, and—quite 
interestingly—the North Carolinian James Iredell, a justice 
of the United States Supreme Court who was fulfilling his 
duty to "ride circuit" in the periods between the February 
and August terms of the Supreme Court. Iredell characterized 
the case as "very important business" in a letter to his wife 
Hannah (Marcus et al. 2: 225; qtd. in Mathis 23). 
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The Circuit Court's ruling was very unacceptable 
business to Chisholm, of course, who decided in 1792 to try 
his luck in the equally new United States Supreme Court, then 
only in its third year. Chisholm's suit, first appearing in 
the Court's records of August 11, 1792, was listed by the 
clerk Samuel Bayard as "Alexr. Chisholm. Exor. of Robt. 
Farquhar. deed, v The State of Georgia" (Marcus et al. 1: 
360). The suit, now to be heard in the federal government's 
capital of Philadelphia rather than in the local arena of 
Augusta, Georgia, asked for $500,000 from the state 
government for the unpaid debt and damages (Mathis 23). 
Whatever actually happened to Robert Farquhar's money in 
the late 1770s, a true accounting of which we will probably 
never have, the case was transformed into something quite 
different and dramatic, a controversy of broad significance 
on a national scale, once it had entered the federal court 
system of the newly constituted United States of America. 
What had been merely a detail of geography in the story—the 
fact that Chisholm and, originally, Farquhar were citizens of 
South Carolina and not of Georgia—became a crucial issue in 
the case. The shift in context would have a profound effect 
on the dynamics of the argument. Essentially local questions 
of fact (what happened to Farquhar's money) and of 
responsibility (who, if anyone, should be held accountable 
for the failed business transaction) would be superseded by 
highly charged national questions of federalism—of the 
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sovereignty of states and the jurisdiction of the federal 
judiciary—and of constitutional interpretation. 
The first mention of the case in the Supreme Court's 
records immediately brings to the foreground the new 
dimensions of the argument. Georgia's governor and attorney 
general had been served with a summons requiring the state to 
appear as a defendant in the case that August, but the state 
vehemently refused to do so, despite the fact that the state 
as plaintiff was simultaneously pursuing another case, 
Georgia v. Brailsford, in the very same court (an irony not 
lost upon the justices). In a draft order, Samuel Bayard 
recorded, then marked out, that Georgia officials "were 
solemnly called, but came not"; the clerk, perhaps nervous, 
decided to settle for something less dramatic and more 
bureaucratic in "the original summons in thiscause [having 
been?] served . . . [and no appea?]ranee being now entered in 
behalf of the said state" (Marcus et al. 1: 479). Keep in 
mind that the solemnity of the Supreme Court was not enhanced 
in 1792 by the symbolic surroundings of a marble temple or 
palace, let alone its own building. The justices, variously 
wearing English—style wigs and colored robes (Warren 1: 48), 
were commanding feisty Georgia officials to appear as 
defendants in the modest Mayor's Court Room at the Old City 
Hall in Philadelphia.7 
The private counsel for the plaintiff Alexander Chisholm 
was, of course, present. Chisholm had hired the doubt—filled 
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and debt—ridden Virginian Edmund Randolph, who was at the 
same time serving as our reluctant first Attorney General of 
the United States (Reardon). Julius Goebel, Jr. suggests 
that Chisholm's cause, rather than other similar suits in the 
new federal system, was "pressed with vigor" because Edmund 
Randolph needed the money so badly (726). Whether this was 
the case or not, Randolph's participation produced an odd 
confusion of his roles as private counselor and public 
official. Addressed as "the Attorney General" throughout, 
Randolph moved that the Court rule in Chisholm's favor—a 
judgment by default—and award a writ of inquiry of damages 
unless the state of Georgia, provided with reasonable notice, 
appear in court by the next term or "shew cause to the 
contrary" (Marcus et al. 1: 205). The justices postponed 
even the consideration of this motion to the next term in 
order, according to Dallas, to "avoid every appearance of 
precipitancy, and to give the state time to deliberate on the 
measures she ought to adopt" (419). 
Six months later on Monday, February 4, 1793, the 
Supreme Court opened its term with five justices present: 
Chief Justice John Jay and Associate Justices William 
Cushing, James Wilson, John Blair, and James Iredell. The 
attorney general Edmund Randolph was also present and 
waiting, as private counsel for Chisholm, to argue his motion 
for a judgment by default. Pennsylvania lawyers Jared 
Ingersoll and Alexander J. Dallas (also the reporter of court 
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opinions) were also there in the courtroom as counselors for 
Georgia in Georgia v. Brailsford, but they had been 
instructed not to participate in "arguing the question" in 
the Chisholm case. They did present the justices with "a 
written remonstrance and protestation on behalf of the state, 
against the exercise of jurisdiction in the cause" (2 Dall. 
419). The justices agreed to hear Randolph's oral argument 
the next day and moved on to the Brailsford case and other 
business. 
The next day, Tuesday, February 5, Randolph spoke for 
two-and—a—half hours before the justices. His oral argument 
has been preserved for us by Dallas, who included a full text 
of the speech in reporting the Chisholm case. In fact, 
Randolph's speech arguing the plaintiff's position oddly 
occupies the first ten pages of the sixty-page text of 
Chisholm v. Georgia (419—429). Why did Dallas include 
Randolph's argument? Did he admire the speech as legal 
oratory or was he making a confusedassumption that the 
attorney general's words would have an official status 
commensurate with the justices' opinions, even though 
Randolph was in this case serving as a private counsel? 
Randolph himself may have contributed to such confusion, 
claiming that it would be "official perfidy" for him to argue 
against the Court's jurisdiction in this suit (on behalf of a 
client who had hired him exactly to argue for it). Whatever 
the reason, the inclusion reflects the sense of contributors 
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to a new genre casting about in different directions, 
sometimes awkwardly, attempting to work out and establish a 
new form. And it does effectually allow Edmund Randolph to 
participate to some degree, although unable to vote, in this 
first Supreme Court conversation. His voice is heard along 
with the five justices, and the text thus casts an ironic 
rhetorical shadow on Georgia's strategy of courtroom 
silence.® 
Randolph's argument, while not a Supreme Court opinion, 
does contribute to our understanding of choices made by the 
justices in writing their opinions (especially as Randolph 
becomes the primary audience for at least one justice). 
Randolph lays out four questions that had been posed by the 
Court in August: 
1st. Can the state of Georgia, being one of the 
United States of America, be made a party-defendant 
in any case, in the supreme court of the United States, 
at the suit of a private citizen, even although he 
himself is, and his testator was, a citizen of the state 
of South Carolina? 
2d. If the state of Georgia can be made a party 
defendant in certain cases, does an action of 
assumpsit9 lie against her? 
3d. Is the service of the summons upon the governor 
and attorney general of the state of Georgia, a 
competent service? 
4th. By what process ought the appearance of the 
state of Georgia to be enforced? 
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The first question had, of course, become the principal issue 
in the case, and Randolph's answer to it accordingly takes up 
nine of the ten pages. The second question involved a 
technical issue of legal practice (although Iredell would 
argue otherwise), as did the third. The fourth question was, 
paradoxically for the newly formed federal government, both 
technical and apocalyptic in its implications. 
On the principal question of jurisdiction Randolph 
argues, in sum, that the language of the Constitution and the 
"judicial act" passed by Congress (the Judiciary Act of 1789) 
support Chisholm's right to sue the state of Georgia in the 
United States Supreme Court. States as "parties" can be 
defendants as well as plaintiffs. Randolph unfolds his 
constitutional interpretation first by examining the "letter" 
and then the "spirit" of the document, a textbook strategy of 
forensic discourse at least as old as Ciceronian rhetoric.10 
For background and context, he appeals to the intentions of 
the "framers of the constitution" and to the recent history 
which had produced a "new order of things" in the relation of 
states to the federal government: "... there is nothing in 
the nature of sovereignties, combined as those of America 
are, to prevent the words of the constitution, if they 
naturally mean, what I have asserted, from receiving an easy 
and usual construction. He surveys possible analogies 
from the history of confederacies, drawing on what Goebel 
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calls "the well—fingered chestnuts of the pamphleteers" 
(728). And he concludes his main argument by considering 
possible consequences of policy and the problem of executing 
a judgment, closing with a gothic—style warning of the threat 
of violence in the "wide and gloomy theatre" and the fear of 
the "federal arm uplifted": "Scenes like these are too full 
of horror, not to agitate, not to rack, the imagination." 
The second, third, and fourth questions are given 
extremely brief treatment. In a paragraph on the second 
question, Randolph claims that an action of assumpsit can be 
brought against a state as a state can make a promise, being 
"an assemblage of individuals, who are moral persons." In 
another short paragraph on the third question, Randolph 
simply affirms as common sense the appropriateness of serving 
the summons upon Georgia's governor and attorney general, and 
he includes an ironic reference to the governor's willing 
representation of the state in the concurrent Brailsford 
case. And, on the volatile fourth question of how to make 
Georgia appear in court, Randolph spendsa paragraph talking 
in a circle and saying, perhaps wisely, virtually nothing. 
Finally, Randolph closes his entire argument with a 
return to the initial confusion between his public and 
private roles. He makes an ethical appeal, an appeal to the 
credibility of his own character as a speaker addressing "the 
world," in an interesting example of an a fortiori argument 
or argument "from the stronger" case (Aristotle 2.23). To 
42 
those who might view his "purely legal" argument as a 
political attempt to "consolidate" the power of the national 
government, Randolph makes a strong personal claim that if 
he, as a well—known champion of states' rights, can argue 
Chisholm's case with confidence that no harm will be done to 
state sovereignty, then others should also feel confident 
that the states "need not fear an assault from bold ambition, 
or any approaches of covered stratagem." With Randolph's 
oral argument concluded, as the clerk Samuel Bayard relates, 
the justices invited counter—arguments, expressing "a wish to 
hear any gentleman of the Bar who might be disposed to take 
up the gauntlet in opposition to the Attorney General" (qtd. 
in Warren Is 95).^ No one responded to this invitation, 
despite the fact that Georgia counselors Ingersoll and Dallas 
were apparently there, silent, in the courtroom. And so the 
justices held Chisholm v. Georgia "under advisement" and 
moved on to the case of Georgia v. Brailsford and other 
matters. 
Thirteen days later, on Monday, February 18, 1793, the 
justices delivered their opinions to a "numerous and 
respectable audience," according to Bayard, with James 
Iredell speaking first for about one—and—a-quarter hours 
(qtd. in Warren Is 95). It is important to note here the 
sense of a speech occasion, of language spoken in front of 
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actual people at a formal event, a factor reflecting the oral 
tradition that has always been a strong component of the 
language of the law (Mellinkoff). It is discourse as 
performance, spoken discourse at the center of a public or 
institutional act. Each justice, thinking naturally in terms 
of this speech occasion, begins his opinion with embedded or 
context—tied language that is typical in a text of 
transcribed speech: 
"This great cause comes before the court ...." 
(James Iredell) 
"In considering this important case, I have 
(John Blair, Jr.) 
"This is a case of uncommon magnitude." 
(James Wilson) 
"The grand and principal question in this case is ...." 
(William Cushing) 
"The question we are now to decide ...." 
(John Jay) 
To understand the antecedents of these references—what is 
"this case," who are "we," when is "now"—the reader must 
bring to the text an outside understanding of occasion and 
context. 
But the text of Chisholm v. Georgia is not simply a 
collection of transcribed speeches; it is also written 
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discourse. We know that Iredell and the other justices 
composed their opinions in writing beforehand, so that the 
words spoken in court were also words read aloud (all or in 
part). And there is evidence to suggest that the justices 
not only wrote their opinions beforehand, but they developed 
their arguments without formal consultation or negotiation. 
It is difficult to believe that no informal discussion took 
place, but the justices apparently did not formally discuss 
the Chisholm case together before writing their separate 
opinions, in contrast to the modern practice of holding case 
conferences. At least one justice, John Blair, indicates 
clearly in his opinion that he is unaware, as he writes, what 
the outcome of the case will be.^ 
The linguistically rich and complex event that we 
designate as the text of Chisholm v. Georgia is further 
complicated by the obscurity of early publication. While 
some of the justices may have had morie general and distant 
audiences in mind, distant in terms of time as well as place, 
their rhetorical efforts were not immediately or widely 
distributed. Most of the newspapers of the day published 
short summaries of the justices' opinions, but not the 
complete texts. Warren quotes at length from a letter in the 
National Gazette of August 10, 1793, complaining about the 
limited publication of the full reasoning of the justices in 
the Chisholm case: 
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Good policy would have induced an unlimited 
publication, but a more effectual mode could not have 
been adopted, than the one chosen, to prevent these 
important opinions from being read by the great body of 
the people: a large pamphlet, price 50 cents, was made 
of them and claimed as a copyright, in order to prevent 
their being republished in the gazettes, whereas they 
ought to have been public property, that they might be 
published in a six penny pamphlet and in all the 
newspapers, in order that the great body of citizens 
might be informed of the great principles of this 
important decision (1: 98). 
The general assumption, quite the contrary, was that the 
"great body of citizens" would not be a part of the 
prospective audience for these first Supreme Court opinions 
and that interest in the full texts would be found only or 
primarily among legal, technical, and professional readers. 
Even legal professionals, however, had trouble securing 
the full texts of the opinions; the second volume of Dallas, 
containing the five opinions reported in Chisholm v. Georgia, 
was not published until 1798 (Goebel 665). Dallas' leisurely 
pace of publication was not unusual in the context of the 
times and of the legal profession. As David Mellinkoff 
comments, judges had given oral opinions for centuries in the 
English tradition, and the "casual" reporting of court 
decisions had been historically "an avocation, born of a 
lawyer's notes for the refreshment ofhim and his friends" 
(267). Mellinkoff marks the late 1700's as the beginning of 
a crucial American transition from oral to written opinions, 
a transition that "loosed the floodwaters of precedent" and 
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"soon overwhelmed writer, reporter, and reader" in the 
rapidly expanding United States of the nineteenth century: 
"The race of the reports was on, continuing from state to 
territory to state, from supremest court to town court, from 
bureau to board, on into reports of unreported cases" 
(267—68). Chisholm might be described as positioned at the 
starting line of this race, the justices looking both back to 
an older oral tradition and forward to a thoroughly "written" 
medium of professional discourse. 
All of these factors contribute to a dynamic 
interweaving and compounding of oral and written traits in 
Chisholm v. Georgia. This intriguing intermix may help to 
explain what appear to modern readers to be enormous prose 
oddities in the written opinions of the justices. The "dead 
letter" quality of the text, especially after 200 years, is 
reinforced graphically by closely printed pages with no 
titles or highlighted demarcations as the reader moves from 
one justice's opinion to another. A close look is needed to 
discern even the basic divisions of the fifty pages of 
opinions which follow Randolph's oral argument. The justices 
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The explicit rules for "turn—taking" in this strange seriatim 
conversation had been prescribed beforehand: Each justice 
would write an opinion, regardless of the vote or the 
dynamics of substance or purpose, in a set order based on the 
principle of reverse seniority. Thus, all who are entitled 
to speak in fact do so in this judicial conversation, but 
they are not necessarily fulfilling any institutional goal or 
talking in response to each other. We do get a fascinating 
judicial rehearsal of a variety of possible roles and generic 
structures for this new community of argument, but the final 
result is a text filled with five voices neither instrumental 
nor deliberative in their effect. 
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1. The Justice as Traditionalist and Amateur Historian 
Unintended consequences of the set structure undermine 
ironically, almost amusingly, the rhetorical force of 
Chisholm v. Georgia from the very beginning. As the Court's 
most junior member, Associate Justice James Iredell speaks 
first. As the one justice already familiar with the case 
from the Circuit level, and as a garrulous and prolific 
writer by habit, he also happens to speak the longest, by 
far, of the five justices. His opinion accounts for 42 per 
cent of the justices' text (21 of 50 pages). Yet, by odd 
coincidence, Iredell's opinion is the one dissent in the 
justices' four—to—one vote supporting the right of ChisHolm 
to sue the state of Georgia in the United States Supreme 
Court. Iredell's dissent is not, however, a radical 
document; quite the contrary, it is filled with the language 
of prudent moderation and moral balance, of pragmatic concern 
and ethical consideration. Iredell reaches out 
extensively—one might even say lovingly—to make connections 
with the long history and tradition of the English common 
law, both as context for the case and as criterion for 
deciding the argument. 
For Iredell and his peers in the newly formed United 
States, connections with the common law tradition of England 
were, in one sense, natural and inevitable; but, as Grant 
Gilmore explains, decisions about the nature and extent of 
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such connections were extraordinarily complicated and 
problematic (19—40). In the new conversation begun by these 
first Supreme Court justices, who would be allowed to speak? 
What voices would be included in the texts of opinions? What 
kinds of testimony and evidence would be considered valid and 
relevant to the case? It is not surprising that James 
Iredell, consistent with his background, would choose to look 
back before 1783, indeed before 1776, and to include voices 
he considered "material" from the tradition of English common 
law. 
The junior justice from North Carolina was, as Fred L. 
Israel describes, the only one of the five justices hearing 
Chisholm actually born in England. In 1768, at age 17, 
Iredell had been sent by his merchant family to Edenton, 
North Carolina, to establish a career for himself as a King's 
officer. Unlike the other justices, Iredell did not attend 
an American college, but he had been well—schooled in England 
and was clearly an intelligent, hard working, and ambitious 
young man with, as Israel points out, the "Episcopalian" 
outlook and tastes of Carolina's coastal aristocracy and 
conservative planter culture. He studied law as an 
apprentice with the highly respected Samuel Johnston, married 
Johnston's sister Hannah, and devoured issues of the Tatler; 
Guardian, and Spectator—his favorite reading being "Mr. 
Addison's Discourses on Fame," which he found "incomparably 
elegant and sublime" (qtd. in Israel 122). 
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Like most of the other justices, Iredell had originally 
been a reluctant revolutionary. Once committed, however, he 
became a strong supporter of the American cause in North 
Carolina and a public advocate for the new Constitution. 
Iredell conducted asuccessful private law practice and 
briefly held positions as superior court judge and attorney 
general of North Carolina, but his real arena of political 
action was in writing. "Although not an effective public 
speaker as he tended to lisp," according to Israel, "Iredell 
nevertheless entered actively into political affairs through 
an extensive correspondence with the leading Carolina 
politicians—his letter file was so extensive that one friend 
described him as 'the letter writer of the war'" (123). 
Iredell wrote not only letters, but also numerous essays and 
addresses; and, in leading the ratification fight for the new 
Constitution in North Carolina, he composed a 
Federalist—style paper (using the pen name "Marcus") which 
won him national recognition. 
Iredell's talent for rhetorical copiousness—Erasmus's 
"golden stream"—is a defining feature of his text in 
Chisholm v. Georgia. His special brand of fullness of 
expression is slow, contextually broad, and endlessly 
/ expansive. The audience is invited figuratively to settle 
into a comfortable chair for a long, leisurely deliberation. 
In the first paragraph of the text, Iredell opens his 
argument by suggesting that the "attorney general" Edmund 
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Randolph is attempting to move too quickly on such an 
"important question," and that the justices must do what is 
"proper," examine the suit carefully, and be "fully 
persuaded" the Court has authority to act. Weaving terms 
such as "propriety," "duty," and "warrant" throughout the 
text, Iredell speaks what Michael Halloran calls the 
"neoclassical rhetoric ofmoral commitment," a way of speaking 
and writing in an "oratorical culture" that would remain 
dominant in America into the nineteenth century.^ 
Like a highly civilized and courteous participant in the 
gentleman's—club conversation envisioned by Michael 
Oakeshott, Iredell will not make his audience guess about his 
intentions. In his introduction or exordium he seeks first 
to establish a sense of continuity and to widen the 
historical context for considering the issues by referring to 
the "compromise" of an earlier Maryland case, similar to 
Chisholm in its question, about which he had had doubts 
(i.e., the Chisholm case is not unique and should not be 
judged in isolation).^ Then, in the very second paragraph, 
following a classical or anti-climactic scheme of 
arrangement, he states his central proposition or key 
judgment—the claim or thesis he will support in the argument 
to follow: 
Those doubts have increased since, and, after the 
fullest consideration, I have been able to bestow on 
the subject, and the most respectful attention to the 
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able argument of the attorney general, I am now 
decidedly of opinion that no such actions as this 
before the court can legally be maintained" 
(emphas is added). 
Note that the language and syntax of this long, 
compound-complex sentence encapsulate several of the 
characteristics that pervade Iredell's text. The slow, 
winding, carefully qualifiedclaim with its personal use of 
"I" and passive punch line suggests a deliberate and 
deliberative thinker who is in no hurry to rush to judgment 
and who sees himself as playing an individual role in a 
larger drama—one among multiple voices. Iredell1s ethos, 
the authorial voice he constructs and projects in the text, 
suggests what Walter Beale calls the character type of the 
statesman: "a generalist, a 'normal' personality, 
gregarious, and accustomed to hearing and negotiating a 
variety of points of view" (78—79). For this character, the 
key value is "balance": "Historically, it is this type that 
reveals the greatest affinity for mixed, at least partially 
consensual forms of government and for pluralism in the 
social sphere" (79). Often referred to as a "states' rights 
Federalist," Iredell tries in Chisholm to strike a careful 
balance not only between state sovereignty and the new 
"general government," but also between the powers granted to 
the judicial and legislative branches of the new federal 
union. - •=-
Iredell's primary audience, oddly enough, is Edmund 
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Randolph in his public identity as the attorney general. 
Iredell says that he has given "the most respectful attention 
to the able argument of the attorney general," but it turns 
out to be a kind of attention that may have made Randolph 
wince. The justice takes great pains to critique Randolph's 
argument, refuting the Virginian's points again and again 
with polite but dismissive counter-arguments (refutation. 
Warren gives us some insight into Randolph's feelings about 
Iredell and others in the following quote from Randolph's 
scornful letter to James Madison in 1792 concerning the 
Brailsford case: 
It [an injunction] was granted with a demonstration to 
me of these facts; that the Premier (Jay) aimed at the 
cultivation of Southern popularity; that the Professor 
(Wilson) knows not an iota of equity; that the North 
Carolinian (Iredell) repented of the first ebullition of 
a warm temper; and that it will take a score of years to 
settle, with such a mixture of Judges, a regular course 
of chancery" (1: 104). 
The verbal duel between "the North Carolinian" Iredell and 
"the Virginian" Randolph is great fun to follow, but it 
contributes little to resolving the question in the case or 
to any effective judicial conversation among the justices. 
Iredell chooses to focus the heart of his argument on 
the technical question of assumpsit (Latin for "he undertook" 
or "he promised"), the second question in Randolph's list of 
four and a question that Iredell himself had specifically 
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posed in August, 1792. In nonspecialist terms, the question 
is essentially this: Can a state be sued for failing to carry 
out an informal contract or promise made to a person—in this 
case, an agreement to pay Robert Farquhar for his goods? 
The question seems at first to have been an odd choice, in 
that the others participating in the conversation, some with 
much more experience on the bench than Iredell, either ignore 
the question or do not know what to make of its significance. 
Randolph's first question, involving the national issues of 
state sovereignty and jurisdiction of the new federal 
judiciary, would seem to supersede the smaller question of 
assumpsit. But Iredell cautions against "taking too large a 
view," wishing to anchor his practical reasoning in the 
concrete and the historical and feeling decidedly 
uncomfortable with broad, sweeping issues of political 
philosophy, national identity, and the nature of sovereignty 
in the newly formed United States. This "particular question 
before the court," the issue of assumpsit, was obviously a 
strategic choice for the North Carolinian, taking him where 
he wanted to go in constructing his argument. 
With assumpsit as the central question of the case, 
Iredell proceeds to arrange or unfold his text as an extended 
and exhaustive search for an authoritative answer, first, in 
the United States Constitution and, second, in the long 
history of English common law. If an action of assumpsit 
will "lie against a state," Iredell reasons, its authority 
55 
must come from the Constitution and the Judiciary Act of 
1789. He uses what Kenneth Burke calls a "proportional 
strategy of interpretation," an inclusive approach that 
involves the complex weighing and assessing of all 
potentially relevant constitutional language I Grammar 
380—84). Iredell concludes that these texts are explicit 
about what parties, but not about what kinds of 
controversies, except for the Judiciary Act's addition of the 
term "civil," a qualification which the justice believes 
"every reasonable man will think well warranted." The 
question is thus modified to the following: What civil 
controversies can be maintained against a state by individual 
citizens? 
To answer this question, Iredell offers a classical 
argument by division, reminiscent of James Madison's strategy 
in The Federalist No. 10, guiding his audience through a 
carefully crafted either/or choice to his final conclusion. 
If Alexander Chisholm's suit can be maintained against the 
state of Georgia, then authority for the action, where the 
Constitution is not explicit about what kinds of 
controversies, will be found either (1) in congressional laws 
or (2) in the common law. Iredell argues that the "framers 
of the constitution" intended that we look either to laws 
passed by Congress to carry the Constitution into effect or 
to "antecedent laws for the construction of the general words 
they use."16 
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With regard to the first option, Iredell reasons that 
Congress has the power to pass all "necessary and proper" 
laws to carry the Constitution into effect, a power granted 
by Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, but the 
legislators have not spoken on this issue. Thus, no laws yet 
cover this type of suit, and the Supreme Court's duty is 
"only to judge." Ironically, Iredell makes a special plea 
for judicial restraint in a case cited by Leonard W. Levy as 
"exhibit number one" of "a rampaging judicial activism" among 
the Court's early decisions (56). The theme of judicial 
restraint appears again and again in the North Carolinian's 
text: he insists that the Court cannot fill legislative gaps 
"by making new laws for new cases"; he declares that the 
justices "have no right to constitute" themselves an "oficina 
brevium": he commends Congress for helping "to guard against 
that innovating spirit of courts of justice"; he cautions 
against turning courts into "makers of a new law, instead of 
being (as certainly they alone ought to be) expositors of an 
existing one"; he asserts that "the application of law, not 
the making of it, is the sole province of the court"; and, in 
the midst of a series of asides or obiter dicta, he amusingly 
advises that "it is of extreme moment that no judge should 
rashly commit himself upon important questions, which it is 
unnecessary for him to decide." 
With regard to the second option, Iredell dismisses the 
"particular" state laws of Georgia and argues that the 
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appropriate "antecedent laws," those "principles and usages 
of law already well known" and common to all the states, can 
be found only in the tradition of English common law. 
Iredell searches that tradition, finding the sole remedy 
against sovereignty ("the Crown") to be the "petition of 
right," a recourse that depends upon "grace" rather than 
"compulsion." By analogy, a sovereign state of the United 
States can only be petitioned with its "express consent," the 
outcome depending upon the "discretion and good faith of the 
legislative body." (Note, here, how Iredell begs the 
question of the nature of state sovereignty in the newly 
formed republic.) Thus, no authority can be found in "the 
old law" for this suit. 
With his search for authority in the English common law, 
Iredell in effect invites a host of traditional voices to 
join in this new American judicial conversation. In the 
voluminous citations and quotations, there is much 
talk—rather strange to us after 200 years—of the King and 
of princes and barons, of subjects and freeholds, of 
Westminster Hall and Lord Chief Justice Mansfield, of 
Carnarvon castle and the case of Yerward de Galeys, of 
Blackstone's Commentaries and soit droit fait al partie 
(Iredell translates as "let right be done to the party"). We 
hear testimony not only from the popular English legal. 
scholar Sir William Blackstone, but also from a long list of 
legal reporters, expositors, and philosophers: Comyns, 
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Theloall, Finch, Freeman, Skinner, Puffendorf, Stamford 
(Staundfort), and Hargrave. Iredell is particularly 
interested in Hargrave's "case of the Bankers" during the 
reign of Charles II, quoting over two pages from the 
"celebrated argument" of Lord Somers. While Iredell's search 
is a long performance of "book learning," as Goebel calls it 
(730), it is not so much the learning of a legal 
professional. It suggests more the temper of an amateur 
historian, of one in love with original source materials, 
long quotations, and the sheer accumulation of facts and 
details.17 
Like a well—trained orator, Iredell concludes the 
presentation of his main argument (confirmation by 
summarizing his points and restating the central proposition: 
"The consequence of which, in my opinion, clearly is, that 
the suit in question cannot be maintained, nor, of course, 
the motion madeupon it be complied with." Unfortunately, 
however, he does not stop there. The garrulous North 
Carolinian writes so fully and extensively, in fact, that he 
develops almost comic problems in concluding his remarks—he 
cannot seem to stop, keeps saying that it is unnecessary to 
speak further, and then proceeds to do so. Unable to exit 
gracefully, Iredell leaves his audience with a conclusion or 
peroratio comprised of "extra—judicial" one—liners, policy 
comments, and a final parting shot at the "attorney general" 
Edmund Randolph. While judicial restraint may have been an 
important theme for Iredell, it was apparently not a 
principle he could practice comfortably when it came to 
writing this judicial opinion. 
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2. The Justice as Legal Technocrat 
The contrast could not be more explicit or striking for 
readers who turn from James Iredell's long, garrulous, and 
sometimes rambling opinion to the short, laconic, tightly 
constructed opinion of Associate Justice John Blair, Jr. of 
Virginia. The differences suggest the classic distinction 
between the "open hand" of rhetoric and the "closed fist" of 
logic. Iredell's copious and inclusive deliberation—21 
pages denying Chisholm's suit—looks verbose and overblown 
next to the plain—style presentation of Blair's three crisp 
pages (actually only two paragraphs—one long, one short) in 
support of Chisholm's right to sue Georgia in the United 
States Supreme Court. Like Iredell, Blair saw Chisholm v. 
Georgia as an "important case," but the highly educated and 
experienced judge from Virginia obviously had quite different 
notions about the purpose, audience, and composition of 
judicial opinions. Directive rather than deliberative in his 
overall tenor, Blair writes as the consummate professional 
insider; his ethos suggests what Walter Beale calls the 
character type of the technician (78), in this case a legal 
technocrat concerned largely with formulating simple, 
abstract procedures for effective problem-solving and 
institutional operations. 
Blair's background distinguishes him as one of the most 
experienced and highly trained judges among the Supreme Court 
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justices hearing Chisholm v. Georgia. Born into a 
landed,aristocratic Virginia family with extensive wealth and 
a tradition of public service, as Fred L. Israel describes, 
"Gentleman" John Blair received what was at the time the best 
available American education and English training in the law. 
He graduated with honors in 1754 from the College of William 
and Mary, a major institution in colonial times whose 
students read Latin and Greek classics, studied the medieval 
trivium of rhetoric, logic, and grammar, and defended theses 
before large public crowds at Commencement (Walsh). After 
studying law in the professional inner sanctum of London's 
Middle Temple, Blair returned to Williamsburg to a successful 
law practice and to what would turn out to be a substantial 
lifetime of public service. 
Like Iredell, Blair was a cautious, conservative thinker 
who, once committed to the American revolutionary cause, 
became an important contributor to the formation of the new 
nation. Before being appointed by Washington to the United 
States Supreme Court, Blair served Virginia in a number of 
different positions, accumulating 12 years of experience as a 
judge at the highest levels. To summarize briefly a very 
long list of credentials, Blair served as a representative in 
Virginia1s House of Burgesses, Clerk of the Governor's 
Council, delegate to the Virginia Convention of 1776, one of 
five judges and then Chief Justice of the General Court in 
Virginia's newly constituted judiciary, judge on Virginia's 
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first Court of Appeals, Chancellor of Virginia's High Court 
of Chancery, delegate to the Constitutional Convention at 
Philadelphia and subsequently signerof the newly drafted 
Constitution in 1787, delegate to the Virginia ratifying 
convention in 1788, and one of five judges chosen for 
Virginia's reorganized Supreme Court of Appeals in 1789. 
In the Chisholm case, Blair speaks only to the immediate 
audience of legal professionals and interested parties. 
There is no setting of the case in context or elaboration of 
the occasion or related actions, no accommodation to a wider 
or more distant audience of the general public. There is no 
translation of legal jargon or terms of art such as the 
argument ab in utile or coram non iudice. While Iredell 
generates an expansive rhetoric of moral commitment grounded 
in an oratorical culture, Blair practices what Halloran calls 
a rhetoric of "expertise" based on a "professional culture" 
that values notions of objectivity, neutral logic, and the 
criterion of sufficiency in persuasion. Blair's opinion 
becomes, thus, "the construction of a knowledge-bearing 
object, a mechanism by which professional expertise can be 
made available for use" (169).*® 
How does Blair construct this mechanism? In contrast to 
Iredell's proportional strategy, Blair uses what Burke calls 
an "essentializing strategy," reducing the dynamics of 
constitutional interpretation to one or two simple and 
efficient questions: "'It all boils down to this'" I Grammar 
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382). After a one—sentence dismissal of Randolph's analogies 
with European confederations as irrelevant, Blair establishes 
his warrant orauthority for deciding the principal question 
of the case: 
The Constitution of the United States is the only 
fountain from which I shall draw; the only authority to 
which I shall appeal. Whatever be the true language of 
that, it is obligatory upon every member of the 
union; for no state could have become a member, but by 
an adoption of it by'the people of that state. 
Where the pragmatic Iredell sees in the Constitution an 
unavoidable multiplication of "interpretive crises" in need 
of complex negotiation and resolution, Blair is confident in 
his ability to reduce the politically—charged issues to a 
single, simple question of textual analysis and to find a 
compelling answer in the "true language" of the document.19 
Blair never mentions Iredell's question of assumpsit, 
but neither does he cast the argument in broad terms of 
political philosophy, national identity, or the nature of 
sovereignty. For the justice from.Virginia, the issue is 
primarily a professional one of the Supreme Court's 
jurisdiction. The steps Blair takes to resolve the issue 
suggest the orderly, well—defined "algebraical exercises" 
that he was fond of doing (qtd. in Israel 115). In a spare, 
linear, chain—like sequence, he builds his text by rogatio, a 
classical rhetorical strategy of reasoning by question and 
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a n s w e r . W h a t  ca n  b e  f o u n d  i n  t h e  " t r u e  l a n g u a g e "  o f  t h e  
Constitution, Blair asks, "requiring the submission of 
individual states to the judicial authority of the United 
States?" His answer, quite simply, is to cite Article III, 
Section 2, which extends the Court's jurisdiction to 
controversies between a state and citizens of another state. 
The next logical question for Blair is the classical forensic 
issue of definition—quid sit (what it is): "Is then the case 
before us one of that description?" With the reply, 
"Undoubtedly it is . . . ," Blair's argument is essentially 
over, only seven sentences into his opinion. 
In the remainder of his long first paragraph, Blair 
takes up three counter—arguments—the word-order argument, 
the argument ab in utile, and the petition of right—refuting 
each in turn in the same laconic question-and—answer style 
and with the same sense of certainty ("I have no doubt," 
"surely," "To me it seems clear"). While counter—arguments 
suggest the presence of other voices in the conversation, 
Blair handles his refutatio in an oddly sterile and 
disassociated manner. No names are mentioned, no personal 
voices heard. The arguments are simply there, disembodied, 
as opposing points to be raised and defeated in quick, 
utilitarian fashion. 
To the word-order argument—the claim that Article III, 
Section 2 intends states to be plaintiffs (because appearing 
first) but not defendants—Blair appeals to common sense, 
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stating that a "dispute between A. and B. is surely a dispute 
between B. and A." Randolph had made a similar point in his 
oral argument, but Blair makes no reference to this. Blair 
also cites other places in the text of the Constitution where 
states could bedefendants. He cautions that it is the "duty" 
of the justices to insist upon their jurisdiction, to play 
their proper role in the federal government as established by 
the Constitution, but his admonition suggests more a 
professional and institutional concern than Iredell's moral 
and personal sense of duty and propriety. To the argument ab 
in utile—based on the claim that Congress has yet to pass 
laws covering execution of this type of suit (obviously one 
of Iredell's points, although Blair does not mention Iredell 
by name)—Blair refers to the "clear and positive directions" 
of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and the Constitution. He 
suggests that the justices should simply play out their 
institutional role, allowing consequences to develop as they 
may, and hinting that a judgment "possibly may be in favor of 
the state." And to the petition of right—Iredell's argument 
based on English common law (again, Iredell is not mentioned 
by name)—Blair simply dismisses as invalid the analogy 
between British sovereignty and the state of Georgia: "... 
when a state, by adopting the constitution, has agreed to be 
amenable to the judicial power of the United States, she has, 
in that respect, given up her right of sovereignty." 
In the second of his two paragraphs, Blair concludes his 
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opinion by briefly addressing Randolph's third and fourth 
questions. With regard to the third question, Blair finds 
the service of the summons to the governor and attorney 
general of Georgia to be "as proper as any which could be 
devised," especially given the similarity to Georgia v. 
Brailsford (yet another ironic reference). The fourth 
question, how to make Georgia appear before the Court, is for 
the legal technocrat Blair an unnecessary question to decide 
at this point. In a comment suggesting the justices' lack of 
consultation, certainly the absence of a preliminary vote 
among the justices before the writing and handing down of the 
Chisholm opinions, Blair expresses his version of judicial 
restraint: "If the opinion which I have delivered . . . 
should be the opinion of the court, it will come in course to 
consider, what is the proper step to be taken for inducing 
appearance, none having been yet entered in behalf of the 
defendant." Blair then ends his opinion (still in the same 
second paragraph) without any concluding remarks or 
conventional summary or peroratio. His opinion, a mechanism 
or instrument for doing the business of government, simply 
comes to a halt with a practical suggestion for the wording 
of the "order" to be issued by the Court. 
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3. The Justice as Scholar and Poet-Orator 
The third official opinion rendered in Chisholm v. 
Georgia. the 13—page text of Associate Justice James Wilson 
of Pennsylvania, provides yet another distinctive voice in 
the Supreme Court's new conversation. Like James Iredell, 
Wilson felt it appropriate to view the case "from every 
possible point of sight." For "Professor" Wilson from the 
College of Philadelphia, however, this judicial duty meant an 
expansive inclusion not only of a variety of legal 
perspectives, but also of voices from the widest imaginable 
spectrum of western civilization, from Demosthenes to Bacon 
to Frederic of Prussia. A justice who had never been a 
judge, Wilson was one of the most unusual of the first 
Supreme Court justices, a man of many talents who aspired to 
be, in his own words, "the scholar, the philosopher, and the 
patriot" of his age (not to mention the wealthiest of land 
speculators). He agreed with John Blair that Alexander 
Chisholm had the right to sue Georgia in the United States 
Supreme Court, but the judicial opinion crafted by Wilson, 
quite unlike Blair's utilitarian instrument, is a grand—style 
oration worthy of first prize in any literary or debating 
society contest. It is a set piece with the contradictory 
effects of a well-made play, admirable in its structural 
perfection yet somehow ultimately unsatisfying in its 
too-perfect, self—conscious artifice. 
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James Wilson's entire life is puzzling in the same odd, 
contradictory way. Born into a poor Scottish farming family, 
as Robert G. McCloskey relates, Wilson was sent with a 
scholarship to the University of St. Andrews to study for the 
ministry. But he left school after his father died and 
immigrated to America in 1765 at the age of 23 (three years 
before James Iredell). In a surprisingly short time, Wilson 
established himself as a tutor at the College of Philadelphia 
(now the University of Pennsylvania), served a legal 
apprenticeship with the prominent lawyer John Dickinson, and 
began his own practice of the law. With extensive knowledge 
of political philosophy and jurisprudence and a "taste for 
syllogisms and intellectual leaps," Wilson found himself 
drawn into pamphlet writing and the swirling political 
debates of the late 1760s and early 1770s (McCloskey 83). 
Unlike either Iredell or Blair, Wilson jumped headfirst 
into the intellectual excitement of the American Revolution, 
becoming one of only a few famous citizens to sign both the 
Declaration of Independence and the final draft of the 
Constitution. He is often cited as playing a major role, 
next to James Madison, in the Constitutional Convention of 
1787. As the first Professor of Law at the College of 
Philadelphia (while simultaneously serving as Associate 
Justice of the Supreme Court), Wilson wrote and lectured 
extensively on his ideas of a new American jurisprudence. 
But he also remained throughout his life a close friend of 
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many prosperous Pennsylvania conservatives, such as his 
mentor John Dickinson, and gained a negative reputation as an 
elitist and an "opponent of the popular cause" (McCloskey 
85). Wilson opposed the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, 
defended Quaker Tories and other wealthy clients in court, 
wrote a pamphlet defending the charter of a bank to which he 
owed a lot of money (he was also the bank's attorney and on 
the board of directors), and left Philadelphia in a hurry in 
1779, his house the "scene of a bloody siege" when "an 
anti—profiteering mob attacked his residence in which his 
friends and clients had sought refuge" (Morris, "Jay Court" 
167). 
To his eventual undoing, Wilson found himself 
compulsively attracted to a high—stakes world of money, 
privilege, and extraordinary adventures in land speculation. 
According to McCloskey, Wilson invested wildly in an 
evergrowing number of questionable land deals and business 
ventures, all of which made him for a time incredibly 
wealthy, but would eventually bankrupt him. Wilson would 
spend the last years of his life trying to avoid angry 
creditors. Indeed, while still a Supreme Court justice 
riding circuit, he was put in jail, bailed out, and then 
pursued to Iredell's Edenton, North Carolina, where he was 
again jailed. McCloskey concludes that Wilson "wanted too 
many things, and he seemed congenitally unable to choose 
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between them, or even to believe that choice was necessary" 
(95). 
As Wilson had presumed to suggest himself to President 
Washington for the Chief Justice's position, his appointment 
as Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court was, 
ironically, a disappointment to this odd, intellectually 
gifted man. And Chisholm v. Georgia turned out to be, as 
McCloskey comments, "the only case that gave Wilson a fair 
chance to show his mettle" (94). Having had to settle for 
less than he wanted, Wilson seems determined in Chisholm. 
which he describes as "a case of uncommon magnitude," to 
demonstrate the perfect judicial opinion. Wilson's opinion 
is thus a curious mixture of intelligence, insight, and 
hyper-conscious compositional posturing. From the very first 
appearance of the opinion, the foregrounding of rhetorical 
and literary elements seems to have had a strong effect on 
conventional readers of the law. In a letter to James 
Iredell, for example, contemporary William Davie comments on 
Wilson's opinion that "perhaps, notwithstanding the tawdry 
ornament and poetical imagery with which it is loaded and 
bedizened, it may still be very 'profound'" (qtd. in Goebel 
731). Davie also characterizes Wilson's definition of state 
sovereignty as "more like an epic poem than a Judge's 
argument" (qtd. in Monaghan 321). 
If Wilson did intend to create an epic poem, it turned 
out to have a strong didactic flavor. The Professor cannot 
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help but lecture his students, an audience of present and 
future citizens, on everything from what he terms the 
"politically correct" way to toast the new people's union to 
the ultimate nature of the United States as a nation. He 
also gives his readers a simultaneously running commentary on 
how his argument is being developed and directions on how to 
read his text. Every text has some amount of what Joseph M. 
Williams calls metadiscourse or "writing about writing," 
words that are used to signal "our own thinking and writing 
as we think and write" and to help readers understand the 
structure of texts and arguments (40, 125).21 when Iredell 
declares "I am now decidedly of opinion" and Blair refers to 
"the argument ab in utile." they are using metadiscourse 
(perhaps the term "meta-argument" would be useful here). 
Wilson obviously loves the language of rhetoric and 
argumentation as only an academic can, weaving through his 
text innumerable references to rhetorical and logical terms 
of arts "genus and species in logic," "by example the most 
splendid, and by authority the most binding," "an argument a 
fortiori," "a more particular illustration," "anecdote" and 
"maxim," the "inference, which necessarily results," "fair 
and conclusive deductions," "so many trains of deduction." 
Indeed, the Professor's judicial opinion becomes 
hyper—saturated with such terms and running commentary: 
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Having thus avowed my disapprobation of the purposes, 
for which the terms, state and sovereign, are frequently 
used, and of the object to which the application of the 
last of them is almost universally made? it is now 
proper that I should disclose the meaning which I 
assign to both, and the application, which I make of the 
latter. In doing this, I shall have occasion incidently 
t o  ev i n c e  . . . .  
Here he has reached, even for the patient 18th-century legal 
reader, the point of the ridiculous. 
Wilson's sense of his text as text is extraordinarily 
strong, at times obviously excessive; he wants his judicial 
opinion to be, if not an epic poem, a literary creation of 
some sort, like a well—formed oration. To this end, Wilson 
cannot be bothered with Randolph's second, third, and fourth 
questions. They are never mentioned, never allowed to 
clutter the clean lines of his judicial plot structure. The 
first question, the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary 
over the state of Georgia, is recast to make it more 
"conspicuous and interesting": 
The question to be determined, is, whether this state, 
so respectable, and whose claim soars so high, is 
amenable to the jurisdiction of the supreme court of the 
United States? This question, important in itself, 
will depend on others, more important still; and, may, 
perhaps, be ultimately resolved into one, no less 
radical than this—"do the people of the United States 
form a nation?" 
Imagine Iredell's reaction to such a large and dramatic 
rendering of the central issue. For Wilson, everything must 
73 
be at stake and must be stated. The Pennsylvanian thus makes 
explicit an underlying political question—quite real and 
thus very dangerous—that the other more circumspect justices 
knew well but refrained from expressing directly. 
To answer his explosive question, Wilson sets up an 
ambitious proportional strategy that goes beyond matters of 
constitutional interpretation. He proposes a three-part 
examination by (1) "the principles of general jurisprudence," 
(2) "the laws and practice of particular states and 
kingdoms," and "chiefly" (3) "the Constitution of the United 
States." In supporting Chisholm's right to sue Georgia in 
the United States Supreme Court, Wilson shares with Blair the 
advantage of being able to claim an "easy and usual 
construction" of the language of Article III, Section 2, of 
the Constitution. But Blair's single authoritative 
"fountain" becomes for Wilson "that valuable instrument," a 
legal text of primary importance, of course, but not the only 
legitimate source for analyzing the case and presenting a 
convincing argument to a widely varied, potentially hostile, 
and in some cases dangerous audience. In this respect, 
Wilson shares with Iredell the pragmatic character of a 
statesman, of one who understands the need for persuasion and 
consensus—building in the real world and who values an 
inclusive, comprehensive approach to solving problems. 
Paradoxically, however, there is also a sense in which 
Wilson is simply showing off, his comprehensive approach a 
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virtuoso exercise, a performance intended to display his 
rhetorical artistry, intellectual powers, and substantial 
learning. His deliberate attempt at artfulness can be seen 
in the almost perfect, indeed almost too perfect, dramatic 
structuring of the opinion. Wilson crafts an overarching 
structure that delays his main statement or judgment until, 
quite literally, the last sentence of the last pages "From 
all, the combined inference is, that the action lies." The 
key sentence itself is constructed to suspend full meaning 
until the very last word. The justice may have arranged his 
opinion in this order, in what Richard Whately calls an 
investigative structure, because in part it was a 
conventional option of forensic rhetoric or because he was 
trying what Beale calls a "dispositional strategy" to keep 
hostile readers reading.^2 But something more seems to be 
going on here. The opinion's investigative or climactic 
structure is also mirrored in each of Wilson's three 
subdivisions or areas of examination. In three successive, 
interconnected sequences, we are invited to enjoy (and to 
admire) an exploratory narrative of Wilson's mind at work, 
considering each question in turn, tying and untying the knot 
of inquiry, and building artfully toward a grand conclusion 
of the whole. 
In the first subdivision of the opinion, an examination 
of the question by "the principles of general jurisprudence," 
Wilson begins his argument by focusing on the definitions of 
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two key terms—state and sovereign. To choose a strategy of 
definition, particularly stipulative definition, according to 
Richard Weaver, is to engage ethically in "the highest order 
of appeal" (212—13). For Wilson, the choice suggests 
paradoxically both a compulsive display of academic pedantry 
(he can't help himself) and an important understanding of the 
role of language in shaping ideas and of the need to 
establish new meanings for old terms,especially if the 
"radical" goal of a new national identity is to be 
successfully pursued. With both terms, state and sovereign. 
Wilson insists upon definitions which view "the people" 
collectively—not state by state—as the "supreme or 
sovereign" governmental power: 
(1) By a state I mean, a complete body of free 
persons united together for their common benefit, to 
enjoy peaceably what is their own, and to do justice to 
others. It is an artificial person. ... we should 
never forget, that, in truth and nature, those who think 
and speak and act, are men. 
(2) Suffice it at present to say, that another 
principle . . . forms, in my judgment, the basis of 
sound and genuine jurisprudence; laws derived from the 
pure source of equality and justice must be founded on 
the consent of those, whose obedience they require. The 
sovereign, when traced to his source, must be found in 
the man. 
Wilson reasons that "the people," including the people of 
Georgia, ratified the United States Constitution and that 
Georgia is thus not a sovereign state when "the purposes of 
the union" are involved. 
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To build the definitions in this first section, which 
' Goebel calls nothing more than an "essay in political 
science" (731), Wilson cites for praise and blame an array of 
voices, including Francis Bacon, Thomas Reid, Cicero, 
Henault, William the Conquerer, and William Blackstone. He 
also indulges himself in an academic's critical and 
rhetorical feast, lecturing his audience on the philosophy of 
mind, the feudal systems of France and England, and the 
limitations of Blackstonian jurisprudence. Here are just two 
examples of his obvious delight in words and the making of 
texts. In reference to the absence of the word sovereign in 
the Constitution, Wilson claims a special kind of 
significance: "For, in an instrument well drawn, as in a poem 
well composed, silence is sometimes most expressive." And in 
an analysis of the king's power in the system of English 
sovereignty, Wilson uses antimetabole. a rhetorical figure 
that neatly repeats words in inverted grammatical structures: 
"While it vested him with jurisdiction over others, it 
excluded all others from jurisdiction over him." 
In the second section, an examination of the question by 
"the laws and practice of different states and kingdoms," 
also termed an irrelevant "essay in political science" by 
Goebel, Professor Wilson ignites a pyrotechnic display of a 
fortiori arguments. Each example points to successful 
situations of "subjects instituting and supporting suits 
against those who were deemed their own sovereigns." If such 
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examples can be demonstrated, Wilson claims, then surely 
Chisholm (not a "subject" but a "citizen") has the right to 
sue Georgia in the United States Supreme Court: "These 
instances are stronger than the present one; because between 
the present plaintiff and defendant no such unequal relation 
is alleged to exist." Wilson's a fortiori examples range from 
the "ancient Greece" of Isocrates to the courts of Frederic 
of Prussia, a king who "disdained to mount upon the 
artificial stilts of sovereignty." Along the way, the 
audience is treated to mini—lectures on Columbus and his son 
Don Diego; the Ephori of Sparta and the constable of France; 
the Spaniards of Arragon as described "by the famous 
Hottoman, in his book entitled Francogallia"; and the Saxon 
government, with another critical jab at Blackstone (a 
running theme for Wilson) and a complex of branching 
allusions to the "Mirror of Justice," Sir Edward Coke, Edward 
I, Bracton, Henry III, and the judge of the high court of 
admiralty. For the Scottish farmer's son, his life literally 
remade by education and scholarship, all of these voices and 
texts belong in the new conversation begun in the United 
States Supreme Court. They belong there because he 
considered them an integral part of his own identity, his 
mature understanding of life and the law, and the process by 
which his judicial decisions were made. 
The third and last of Wilson's three "touchstones," an 
examination of the question by the United States 
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Constitution, is presented as a dramatic climax to the 
unfolding inquiry. Here the justice's large—scale strategy 
of dividing the question is repeated in miniature, 
elaborated, refined, and over—refined. The third question is 
immediately divided into two parts: "1. Could the 
Constitution of the United States vest a jurisdiction over 
the state of Georgia? 2. Has that constitution vested such 
jurisdiction in this court?" With the first subdivided 
question, Wilson takes up again his theme of the sovereignty 
and "majesty of the people." Using historical examples, he 
mounts excited attacks on the "despotic governments" of 
France (Louis XIV and L'Etat) and especially of England, with 
yet another jab at Blackstone combined with a Shakespearean 
flourish from The Tempest; "The parliament form the great 
body politic of England! What then, or where, are the 
people! Nothing! No where! They are not so much as even 
the 'baseless fabric of a vision!' From legal contemplation 
they totally disappear!" Wilson continues a marked 
transition from the middle to the grand to the swollen 
style2^ as he addresses an ode to "classically more correct" 
Athens, Homer, Troy, and Demosthenes, then shifts without 
quotation in and out of the language of the preamble to the 
Constitution, with a critical addition: 
In order, therefore, to form a more perfect union, 
to establish justice, to ensure domestic tranquillity, 
to provide for common defense, and to secure the 
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blessings of liberty, those people among whom were the 
people of Georgia. ordained and established the present 
constitution. By that constitution legislative power 
is vested, executive power is vested, judicial power is 
vested. (emphasis added) 
With a few more deliberate twists and variations on the 
phrase, "the people of Georgia," Wilson finally answers his 
first subdivided question, dramatically proclaiming that, 
yes, the people's Constitution can vest such a jurisdiction 
over the state government of Georgia. 
With the second subdivided question ("Has the 
constitution done so?"), Wilson again divides this question 
into two further sub-questions: (1) what can be deduced from 
the people's intentions? and (2) what are the Constitution's 
"direct and explicit declarations"? Even conventional 
readers of the law must shake their heads when the justice 
next divides his first question concerning "deductions" (the 
first question in the second subdivided question of the third 
area of examination) into three separate considerations of 
the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, along with 
an investigation of the "declared objects" and the "general 
texture" of the Constitution. Wilson's cleverness has by 
this point become tiresome, his use of rhetorical questions 
increasingly strident, his posturing and dramatic ethos so 
far removed from the traditional values of a James Iredell or 
the professional values of a John Blair as to verge on the 
comic. 
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The effect is a shame because it is just at this point 
that the Professor answers the larger question he had begun 
with, concluding that "the people of the United States 
intended to form themselves into a nation for national 
purposes." For the times, it was a "radical" statement, and 
it would prove to be prophetic. Wilson then ends his opinion 
where Blair began and ended, with a confirmation of the 
Court's jurisdiction over Georgia in "the strictest legal 
language" of the Constitution. The last paragraph is a 
metadiscursive summary of his approach to the case and the 
final resolution of his argument: 
I have now tried this question by all the touchstones, 
to which I proposed to apply it. I have examined it by 
the principles of general jurisprudence; by the laws 
and practice of states and kingdoms; and by the 
constitution of the United States. From all, the 
combined inference is, that the action lies. 
His opinion now ended, Wilson withdraws, leaving his audience 
to contemplate the dramatic, perhaps at times melodramatic, 
effects of the text he has created. 
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4. The Justice as Journeyman 
If the composite text of Chisholm v. Georgia were to be 
interpreted as a literary work in the same spirit that James 
Wilson envisioned his single opinion, the rising action would 
reach its turning point at the third complete sentence on 
page 467, 48 pages into the full 60 pages of text. At that 
point Associate Justice William Cushing of Massachusetts, the 
fourth voice to speak in the seriatim unfolding of opinions, 
announces his judgment in favor of Chisholm's right to sue 
Georgia in the United States Supreme Court. In the linear 
sequence of opinions, Cushing's judgment provides the third 
and conclusive vote for Chisholm from among the five justices 
hearing the case; Chief Justice John Jay's subsequent opinion 
will lend additional but not necessary weight to the outcome. 
But the modest text composed by the "Brahman" William Cushing 
cannot bear such a dramatic burden. Nor did Cushing have any 
such intent. Cushing's three-page opinion, described as a 
"journeyman's job" by Goebel (731), provides readers with a 
strikingly similar repetition of John Blair's professional 
treatment, but without Blair's confidence, tight logic, or 
instrumental crispness. 
William Cushing shared with the Virginian John Blair 
backgrounds of old, socially prominent families with long 
traditions of public service and the best educations for 
their sons. But Cushing was by no measure an accomplished 
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legal technocrat. He seems to have struggled hard all of his 
life to perform successfully in his professional career, with 
his judicial appointments, according to Herbert Alan Johnson, 
coming more as "a result of the accident of birth than 
because of his natural abilities" (57). Johnson paints an 
odd picture of a very limited man who nonetheless worked hard 
and showed personal courage (or at least doggedness) in 
fulfilling his judicial duties. Cushing studied classics at 
Harvard from 1747 to 1751, taught for a year, studied law 
with noted Boston lawyer Jeremy Gridley, and began his own 
practice in 1755. His law practice, both in Massachusetts 
and later in Maine, was barely adequate. When "a matter was 
to be argued on appeal at the bar of the Superior Court," 
Johnson comments, "his clients removed it from Cushing's care 
or insisted that he accept co-counsel in the presentation of 
the case" (61). 
In 1772, the man who needed co-counsel to argue a case 
was made an Associate Justice of the Superior Court, 
replacing his father on the highest court in Massachusetts. 
Cushing worked steadfastly through the 1770s as Massachusetts 
and the other colonies transformed themselves, his position 
toward the American Revolution described as "ambivalent" and 
his judicial duties interrupted for only one month in 1775 
(Johnson 59). He served as Chief Justice of the Superior 
Court (1777—1780) and the renamed Supreme Judicial Court 
(1780—1789), accumulating 17 years of judicial experience 
83 
before being named to the United States Supreme Court, the 
most of any of the five justices hearing Chisholm. There are 
comic anecdotes of outrageous judicial wigs and shopping 
lists doodled by the bored Cushing in the midst of historic 
constitutional debates, but there are also impressive stories 
of the justice doggedly holding court in the face of real 
personal danger in western Massachusetts, including during 
Shay's Rebellion in 1786. Cushing did demonstrate firm 
support for the newly proposed Constitution, serving as 
vice—president of the Massachusetts ratifying convention and, 
as a member of the first Electoral College, voting for George 
Washington in 1788. Warren notes that President Washington's 
selection of Cushing for the United States Supreme Court was 
a surprise to many who had expected another Massachusetts 
judge, John Lowell, to be appointed. A letter writer 
complained cryptically in 1789 that Cushing "now 56 years of 
age, cannot long be an active member of the Court, and he has 
new habits and new modes of legal decision to acquire" (qtd. 
in Warren 1: 39). For better or worse, Cushing would in fact 
end up spending 20 years on the Court, the longest of any of 
Washington's original appointments. 
Cushing's text in Chisholm v. Georgia is almost 
identical in its basic structure to Blair's opinion. Without 
background or context, Cushing starts immediately with the 
"grand and principal question" to be answered: "whether a 
state can, by the federal constitution, be sued by an 
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individual citizen of another state?" With the same 
essentializing strategy used by Blair, Cushing establishes 
the language of the Constitution as his single warrant. 
Although he does allow that the question "may be in some 
measure elucidated" by English common law, he finds that "the 
point turns" in particular upon the constitutional language 
of Article III, Section 2. He quotes the key passage and, 
six sentences into his opinion, delivers his judgment: "The 
case, then, seems clearly to fall within the letter of the 
constitution." But unlike Blair, Cushing hedges somewhat 
with the word "seems" and produces for the most part a kind 
of amorphous, bureaucratic prose that is difficult to follow 
and has no discernible audience. Where Blair quickly and 
clearly establishes his own authoritative role in the process 
("I have thought it best," "I shall draw," "I shall appeal"), 
Cushing generally constructs a passive world devoid of agents 
("It is declared that," "It may be suggested that it could 
not be intended," "But still it may be insisted").^4 
Again like Blair, Cushing finds his early and easy 
answer self—evident and devotes the rest of his opinion to 
refuting counter—arguments. But Cushing does not handle his 
refutatio in the same tightly logical, procedurally focused 
manner. Rather, he briefly throws in everything but the 
kitchen sink, giving quick treatments of serious and complex 
issues related to the nature of state sovereignty and the 
suability of the United States. He touches upon the 
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intentions of the framers, policy arguments for "managing the 
great affairs of peace and war,11 the danger of "the sword," 
the rights of individuals, and states as corporations. 
Except for a collective reference to "the framers" of the 
Constitution, Cushing makes no allusions, no references to 
the testimony of other texts or voices, in distinct contrast 
to the arguments crafted by Iredell and Wilson. In passing, 
Cushing characterizes the Supreme Court as a "national 
tribunal," a "disinterested civil tribunal," and a "common 
umpire," all well-worn expressions of the times and quite 
beside the point, if not misleading, as far as the state 
representatives of Georgia were concerned. 
His handling of counter—arguments amounts, in sum, to 
two claims: (1) states have had their powers "abridged" for 
the "greater indispensable good of the whole"; and (2) it is 
unlikely that the United States can also be sued in this 
manner, although it is unnecessary to decide that question in 
this case. Interestingly, Cushing does make the only 
reference among all five opinions to what, in fact, will 
actually happen to the Chisholm decision: "If the 
constitution is found inconvenient in practice in this or any 
other particular, it is well that a regular mode is pointed 
out for amendment." Cushing concludes his main argument by 
restating his judgment, with somewhat less certainty than he • 
began: "Upon the whole, I am of opinion, that the 
constitution warrants a suit against a state by an individual 
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citizen of another state." He then follows with two brief 
paragraphs on Randolph's second and third questions—whether 
an action of assumpsit will lie and whether the summons was 
properly served. The answer to both is yes. No mention is 
made of Randolph's fourth question. With neither the open 
hand of rhetoric nor the closed fist of logic, Cushing 
extends to readers what might best be described as a limp 
handshake by a well-meaning but intellectually limited 
technician. 
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5. The Justice as Vir Bonus Dicendi Peritus 
The fifth and final opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia was 
delivered, according to the seriatim order of reverse 
seniority, by John Jay of New York, the Court's first Chief 
Justice. The Chief Justice had been an eloquent, though 
limited, contributor to The Federalist Papers and brought to 
the Court a solid reputation as a statesman and diplomat of 
wisdom and high moral principles. The "Premier," as Randolph 
called Jay, was certainly not cultivating Southern popularity 
in ruling that Alexander Chisholm of South Carolina could sue 
the state of Georgia in the United States Supreme Court. Jay 
could barely control his anger at what he saw as the 
hypocritical behavior of Georgia officials in simultaneously 
challenging the Court's jurisdiction in Chisholm and seeking 
advantage from the Court's justice in Georgia v. Brailsford. 
With the exception of one short section, however, the 
ten-page text of Jay's opinion is not a document filled with 
the language of contempt or disdain. Like Marcus Cato's 
ideal orator, vir bonus dicendi peritus. "a good man skilled 
in speaking," Jay uses the writing of his judicial opinion as 
a vehicle to articulate the "great moral truth" of justice 
and the "leading principles of a free and equal national 
government." Strongly deliberative rather than directive, he 
speaks to inform and influence a wide audience of new 
citizens or "joint tenants" who have, as he sees, an 
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extraordinaryopportunity to establish a new kind of community 
with different values and different definitions for terms 
such as sovereignty. 
With his credentials as a "Founding Father," John Jay 
remains for us today the most well—known of the five justices 
who heard the Chisholm case.25 Like Blair and Cushing, Jay 
was born into an old colonial family of wealth, connections, 
and education. Of devoutly religious French Huguenot and 
Dutch descent, as Irving Dilliard explains, Jay learned 
English, Latin, and French as a child in Rye, New York, 
studied the classics at King's College (now Columbia 
University), and served as an apprentice to prominent New 
York lawyer Benjamin Kissam. Frank Monaghan describes Jay's 
education as including an "extensive reading" of Plato and 
Montesquieu, along with Aristotle, Isocrates, Virgil, Seneca, 
Livy, Plutarch, several of Shakespeare's plays, Dr. Johnson's 
Dictionary. Locke's Essay on Human Understanding, papers from 
The Spectator, and 21 volumes of Cicero (23—40). The 
influence of Cicero, in particular, can be seen in Jay's 
argument in Chisholm v. Georgia. Especially concerned as a 
student about his ability to speak and write well, Jay 
practiced before a mirror each day, studied John Holmes's Art 
of Rhetoric made easy . . . and Thomas Sheridan's Course of 
Lectures on Elocution, and participated actively in the Moot, 
a debating club of the New York bar. To prepare for "an 
English essay" while in college, according to Monaghan, Jay 
89 
"placed paper and pencil by his bedside that he might record 
ideas and phrases that came to him during the night" (27—28). 
It is important to note that Jay did not, in fact, 
accumulate a great deal of experience as a lawyer or as a 
judge. Before being appointed the first Chief Justice of the 
United States Supreme Court in 1789, he had actually 
practiced law for about six or seven years, from 1768 to the 
mid—1770s, and had served for two years, from 1777 to 1779, 
as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New York. What he 
did accumulate before 1789 was experience as a public servant 
in a wide—ranging number of roles: he was a member of the New 
York Committee of Correspondence; he served as delegate to 
the First Continental Congress (1774) and the Second 
Continental Congress (1775); he worked on New York's new 
state constitution; he served as president of the Continental 
Congress in 1778, described by Dilliard as "the chief 
civilian post in the rebelling colonies" (3); he became a 
foreign diplomat as Minister to Spain for the Continental 
Congress; he went to Paris in 1782 to negotiate, with John 
Adams and Benjamin Franklin, the Treaty of Paris; he was 
elected by the Continental Congress to be Secretary for 
Foreign Affairs and Secretary of State during the 1780's; 
and, in late 1787 and 1788, he contributed to the crucial 
writing of The Federalist Papers, along with Alexander 
Hamilton and James Madison.^6 
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Richard B. Morris calls Jay "a prudent revolutionary" 
(Jav 3), an amusing yet telling description which is 
particularly applicable to the Chief Justice's approach to 
the newly formed Supreme Court. It was Jay in his 
administrative role who set the Court's practice, including 
the writing of seriatim opinions, to follow the British 
custom (Marcus et al. Is 203, 582). Conservative and 
cautious in temperament, Jay was similar to James Iredell and 
John Blair in his concern for the details of the law and the 
orderly processes of government. In the Chisholm case, 
however, Jay reasons more like James Wilson, with a touch of 
the visionary and the philosopher as he expounds upon the 
history of the new nation and the general principles of what 
he hoped would be its justice. But Jay's opinion, unlike 
Wilson's academic and artfully self-posed text, explicates 
broad issues with the ethos of a genuine voice speaking, of a 
man who was a close personal friend and advisor to George 
Washington, of an insider who would later relate to James 
Fenimore Cooper the secret anecdote for The Spy, of a 
careful, meticulous, hard-working diplomat who had earned his 
generalizations and his vision. 
We hear the clear thought and deliberative character of 
this voice from the very beginning of Jay's text. For Jay, 
as for Wilson, Randolph's first question is the only serious 
one to be decided: "Is a state suable by individual citizens 
of another state?" With the question simply stated, the 
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Chief Justice gives voice, in neutral rather than loaded 
language, to Georgia's, position: "It is said, that Georgia 
refuses to appear and answer to the plaintiff in this action, 
because she is a sovereign state, and therefore not liable to 
such actions." Of all five justices, Jay seems to have 
understood best the need for the Court to establish a 
rhetorically healthy and ethical kind of conversation, or 
dialogue, or debate. What Jay desired, in brief, was to 
foster a culture of argument with the Ciceronian combining of 
sapientia and eloauentia. honesturn and u t i l e . i n  h i s  
"Address to the People of the State of New York," written at 
the same time as The Federalist Papers. Jay offers what I 
take to be his definition of an effective argument or good 
conversation in a representative democracy: 
While reason retains her rule, while men are as ready to 
receive as to give advice, and as willing to be 
convinced themselves as to convince others, there are 
few political evils from which a free and enlightened 
people cannot deliver themselves (Correspondence and 
Public Papers 3: 295). 
Note, however, that Jay is not able in his seriatim opinion 
to give voice to or refute Iredell's dissenting argument. 
(Iredell's argument was not the same as Georgia's position, 
of course, although the immediate effect would have been if 
Iredell's judgment had prevailed.) Neither, in these five 
intersecting monologues, do we find Jay representing or 
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responding to the various points of reasoning used by Blair, 
Wilson, and Cushing. 
Jay establishes the overall structure for his text as a 
three—part examination of Georgia's claim or "objection" to 
appearing before the United States Supreme Courts 
In order to ascertain the merits of this objection, let 
us enquire, 1st. In what sense Georgia is a sovereign 
state.' 2d. Whether suability is incompatible with such 
sovereignty. 3d. Whether the constitution (to which 
Georgia is a party) authorizes such an action against 
her. 
In his approach to writing this judicial opinion, Jay 
obviously shares with both Iredell and Wilson what Beale 
calls the character type of the statesman—contextually 
oriented, pluralistic, ethical/pragmatic—"accustomed to 
hearing and negotiating a variety of points of view" (78—79). 
But while Jay shares their comprehensive and proportional 
strategy in his approach to judging constitutional questions, 
he cites no authors—legal or otherwise—to support his 
argument. There are no long quotations from Lord Somers, no 
defenses or critiques of Sir William Blackstone, no 
Shakespearean flourishes from The Tempest. His reasoning is 
grounded rather in the historical and political context, in 
the here—and—now of his own eyewitness experiences. 
Jay also shares with Wilson an investigative or 
climactic structure, delaying the key statement of his 
judgment to the end of the text. But while Wilson's 
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three—part plot structure narrates the justice's mind at 
work, examining the central question from three different 
"touchstones" or warrants, Jay's three-part disposition 
focuses on the subject with a logical progression of 
sub-questions, each one building upon the other in attempting 
to answer the central question. With the first 
sub-question—"determining the sense in which Georgia is a 
sovereign state" in the newly formed United States—Jay 
addresses the core problem of definition. Like Wilson, Jay 
seems to have understood the need for new meanings for old 
terms, for a revolution of language as well as of politics 
and armed conflict. But unlike Wilson's academically staged 
definitions, Jay's persuasive strategy is contextual and 
pragmatic. He seeks to define "the whole people" as 
sovereigns of the new nation by a thematic retelling of his 
audience's recent history and by comparing this new concept 
of sovereignty with European feudalism, a system obviously 
and unfavorably familiar to his audience. 
Goebel quite misses the point when he criticizes Jay for 
his "hand—tailored history" and the "lamentable standards of 
American judicial historiography" (732). Jay is contributing 
here to a special kind of national mythmaking, weaving 
throughout the text variations on his central claim that "the 
sovereignty of the nation is the people of the nation." To 
use Richard Weaver's categories, the "ultimate" or "god" term 
for Jay is the people; the "devil" terms are feudal system. 
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aristocracy, the crown, the prince and his subjects. As Jay 
reconstructs the "political situation we were in, prior to 
the revolution" and the "political rights which emerged from 
the revolution," he refers again and again to "one people," 
"the people already united for general purposes," "the 
people, in their collective and national capacity," and "the 
people acting as sovereigns of the wholecountry." Richard B. 
Morris concurs with Monaghan and George Pellew in identifying 
Jay's nationalist argument as a precursor to Chief Justice 
John Marshall's "classic finding" (Jay 57) in the 1819 case 
of McCulloch v. Maryland: "The government of the Union, then 
(whatever may be the influence of this fact on the case), is, 
emphatically, and truly, a government of the people." 
Jay also uses his devil terms to good effect in 
contrasting this "new" popular sovereignty, in which all the 
people are "joint tenants" of government and "sovereigns 
without subjects," with the "old" nature of sovereignty in 
the governments of Europe, where "feudal ideas run through 
all their jurisprudence, and constantly remind us of the 
distinction between the prince and the subject."^ Without 
explicitly naming Georgia or Georgia officials, Jay 
attributes Georgia's objection to appearing in the United 
States Supreme Court to a confusion about the state's new 
nature and status and about the two kinds of sovereignty: 
"There is reason to suspect that some of the difficulties 
which embarrass the present question, arise from inattention 
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to differences which subsist between them." Modulating his 
prose to a markedly plain style, Jay seeks to explicate these 
differences, offering his audience some simple definitions, a 
stark comparison, and a relational analogy: 
Sovereignty is the right to govern; a nation or 
state-sovereign is the person or persons in whom that 
resides. In Europe the sovereignty is generally 
ascribed to the prince; here it rests with the 
people;there, the sovereign actually administers the 
government; here, never in.a single instance; our 
governors are the agents of the people, and at most 
stand in the same relation to their sovereign, in which 
regents in Europe stand to their sovereigns. 
Of course, both Jay and Georgia officials knew well that 
Chisholm v. Georgia was not a matter resulting from confusion 
or "inattention," but rather a particular arena where the 
bright lines of power had yet to be drawn and competing ideas 
of community and identity were being tested. 
Having established his definition of the nature of 
Georgia's sovereignty, Jay turns to the second sub-question: 
"whether suability is compatible with state sovereignty." 
With this structural turn, Jay also shifts his pace and 
style, moving into a brisk sequence of questions and answers, 
similar to Blair's use of rogatio. Jay divides this section 
into two general sets of questions: (1) "Suability, by whom?" 
and (2) "If there be any such incompatibility as is 
pretended, whence does it arise? In what does it consist?" 
With the first question of agency, Jay works his way through 
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a hypothetical example involving suits between the city of 
Philadelphia (40,000 citizens) and the state of Delaware 
(50,000 citizens). He attempts to show that, where all are 
sovereign and equal, the argument of incompatibility cannot 
be supported by size or numbers: "In this land of equal 
liberty, shall forty odd thousand in one place be compellable 
todo justice, and yet fifty odd thousand in another place be 
privileged to do justice only as they may think proper?" 
With the questions of the origin and nature of Georgia's 
"pretended" incompatibility, Jay shifts his tone to sarcasm 
and momentarily loses the high ground. He points to the 
"strong undeniable fact" that states may sue and be sued by 
other states in the new Supreme Court, and he concludes that 
it cannot be the fact of having to appear or the process of 
suing to which Georgia objects. Indeed, as Jay drives home, 
Georgia finds it "no degradation" at all to sue others, even 
an "inferior" number of citizens in Georgia v. Brailsford: 
". . . the truth is, that the state of Georgia is at this 
moment prosecuting an action in this court against two 
citizens of South Carolina." We can sense the Chief 
Justice's disdain as he strips away the final "remnant" of 
what he sees as hypocrisy in Georgia's willingness to be a 
plaintiff but not a defendant in his court. With an 
interesting combination of the plain style and a Wilson—like 
use of antimetabole. Jay concludes this section: "That rule 
is said to be a bad one, which does not work both ways; the 
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citizens of Georgia are content with a right of suing 
citizens of other states; but are not content that citizens 
of other states should have a right to sue them." 
The Chief Justice returns to the high ground with the 
third sub-question: "Whether the constitution (to which 
Georgia is a party) authorizes such an action against her." 
Jay announces that he will divide the question into an 
examination of (1) the "design" of the Constitution and (2) 
the "letter and express declaration in it." To establish 
context and background, he turns again to his thematic 
narration, focusing in this section on the historical and 
political reasons for creating a "common" or "national 
tribunal"—the United States Supreme Court. We hear about 
the problems associated with the Articles of Confederation, 
the potential "animosities" and "hostilities" among the 
separate states, and the need to respond appropriately and 
collectively to the "laws of nations." The Court, according 
to Jay the statesman and foreign diplomat, was created from 
"motives both of justice and of policy" in order to establish 
what the Chief Justice valued so strongly—"a stable, sedate, 
and regular course of judicial procedure." Imagine his 
consternation at Georgia's refusal even to appear or 
participate in the process. 
Jay's treatment of the design of the "people's" 
Constitution is a loving recitation of its components. He 
quotes all six of the objectives declared in the preamble and 
then appears to draw a line based 
appropriate to the writing of his 
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on his sense of what is 
judicial opinion: 
It would be pleasing and useful to consider and trace 
the relations which each of these objects bears to the 
others; and to shew that they collectively comprise 
every thing requisite, with the blessing of Divine 
Providence, to render a people prosperous and happy: on 
the present occasion such disquisitions would 
be unreasonable, because foreign to the subject 
immediately under consideration. 
In effect, Jay has it both ways, perhaps more. He makes his 
point, without in fact tracing the interconnections, and he 
is simultaneously the clever orator and the genuine patriot. 
The rhetorical technique, paralipsis. is an old form of 
irony, where the speaker pretends to pass over a subject and 
in doing so draws attention to it. Yet the ethical appeal of 
Jay's text is so strong that we cannot help but believe the 
sincerity of his claim. While resisting the temptations of 
the preamble, Jay does proceed to elaborate upon all ten 
types of cases listed in Article III, Section 2, with special 
attention to "controversies between a state and citizens of 
another state." The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is 
important in this type of case, Jay concludes, if we want to 
preserve "the tranquility, the equal sovereignty, and the 
equal right of the people." 
Finally, Jay narrows his examination to the "letter" of 
the Constitution, the specific language of Article III, 
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Section 2, dealing with "controversies between a state and 
citizens of another state." Jay again gives neutral voice to 
Georgia's position: "It is contended, that this ought to be 
construed to reach none of these controversies, excepting 
those in which a state may be plaintiff." He is able to 
argue easily against Georgia's claim, calling upon the 
"ordinary rules for construction" and finding—like Blair, 
Wilson, arid Cushing—that the direct meaning of the words is 
quite clear.^ Note, however,that Jay the contextualist and 
co-^author of The Federalist Papers makes no mention of the 
ratifying debates on these very words, nor of Alexander 
Hamilton's assurances to the contrary in The Federalist No. 
81. Neither does Jay stop there. Not only does he find that 
the "obvious, plain, and literal sense of the words" makes 
states suable as defendants, but he insists, slipping back 
into larger and morally-weighted questions of constitutional 
design or "spirit," that Georgia's construction of the 
language is "repugnant" to the Constitution: "The exception 
contended for, would contradict and do violence to the great 
and leading principles of a free and equal national 
government, one of the great objects of which is, to insure 
justice to all." Indeed, Jay the visionary concedes "fair 
reasoning" to the counter—argument that the United States 
might also be sued (but does not see it as a question 
necessary to decide in this case): 
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I wish the state of society was so far improved, and the 
science of government advanced to such a degree of 
perfection, as that the whole nation could in the 
peaceable course of law, be compelled to do justice, and 
be sued by individual citizens. 
His three sub-questions answered, Jay has trouble, like 
James Iredell, in bringing his text to conclusion. The 
effect in this instance, however, is engaging rather than 
comical. As Jay winds down his opinion and approaches the 
key statement of his judgment, he shifts the tone and the 
focus of his remarks, deliberately breaking off the logical 
flow of the text in what Beale calls a "shattering of 
discursive presentness" (38). The paradoxical illusion of a 
real voice speaking, broken and reconstituted, is strong and 
personal: 
As this opinion, though deliberately formed, has been 
hastily reduced to writing between the intervals of the 
daily adjournments, and while my mind was occupied and 
wearied by the business of the day, I fear it is less 
concise and connected than it might otherwise have been. 
Jay then comments metadiscursively on what does not appear in 
his opinion: he includes no precedents because he knows "of 
none that are not distinguishable from this case"; and he 
rejects arguments padded by the testimony of authorities, in 
contrast to Iredell and Wilson. Complimenting his imagined 
audience, Jay finds it unnecessary "to show that the 
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sentiments of the best writers on government and the rights 
of men" are in accord with his judicial principles because, 
"to the honor of the United States, it may be observed, that 
in no other country are subjects of this kind better, if so 
well, understood." 
In the penultimate paragraph, Jay conveys a sense of his 
personal convictions concerning the Chisholm case, repeating 
some of his previous points and driving home the larger view 
of what he feels is at stake and what he hopes will be valued 
by the new nation's "sovereigns." The argument, without 
question, is one of policy, combining Jay's special vision 
and pragmatic statesmanship. Jay asserts that federal 
jurisdiction over Georgia in this controversy makes for good 
policy: it is "wise, because it is honest, and because it is 
useful." It is honest, in Cicero's sense of honestum. 
because it "performs the promise which every free government 
makes to every free citizen, of equal justice and 
protection." It is useful, in Cicero's sense of utile, 
"because it is honest" and because, among a long and eloquent 
list of reasons, it "recognizes and strongly rests on this 
great moral truth, that justice is the same whether due from 
one man or a million, or from a million to one man."30 The 
effect Jay creates is not based on an artistic use of 
original or unique language; quite the contrary, his words 
are taken from the popular and political materials of his 
time. Despite this (or perhaps ironically because of this), 
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Jay's text reads as an eloquent and heartfelt speech. 
Indeed, the Chief Justice is at his rhetorical best here, a 
Ciceronian statesman-orator who combines wisdom and eloquence 
as he spins out the collective dream of a new political 
fiction. 
Unfortunately for any aesthetic considerations he may 
have had, Jay must add one more paragraph because he has yet 
to make the key statement of his judgment in the 
investigative structure of his text. Although the 
accumulated points of his deliberative argument obviously and 
strongly suggest his judgment, the instrumental dimension of 
the judicial opinion calls for an explicit statement. Thus, 
Jay attempts to meet this need, and in doing so he appears to 
fall, surprisingly and awkwardly, into a new consideration of 
legal points and technical limitations: 
For the reasons before given, I am clearly of opinion, 
that a state is suable by citizens of another state: but 
lest I should be understood in a latitude beyond my 
meaning, I think it necessary to subjoin this caution, 
viz.: That such suability may nevertheless not extend to 
all the demands, and to every kind of action; there may 
be exceptions. 
Jay then ends his opinion on an example, citing "bills of 
credit issued before the Constitution" as a possible 
exception and suggesting his anticipation of future legal 
questions for a particular audience. We hear a different 
kind of judicial opinion in these long, muddy sentences, a 
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hint of what Mellinkoff calls an "appalling deposit of 
judge's-words—for—lawyers" (269). 
Chisholm v. Georgia continued in slow motion from docket 
to docket, while the rest of the country moved toward passage 
of the Eleventh Amendment negating all such suits. The state 
of Georgia in fact settled with Peter Trezevant on December 
9, 1794, obtaining a release from the claims of Farquhar's 
estate for "eight audited certificates for the sum of just 
over £7,586" (Mathis 27). Elizabeth Farquhar Trezevant—who 
as orphaned daughter and young wife linked Robert Farquhar, 
Alexander Chisholm, and Peter Trezevant—remains virtually 
invisible to us today. John Jay, disappointed with many 
aspects of the new Supreme Court, turned his attention back 
to foreign affairs and resigned as Chief Justice in 1795 to 
become Governor of New York. When Jay was reappointed Chief 
Justice in late 1800, he rejected the invitation to resume 
circuit riding with these words to John Adams: 
I left the Bench perfectly convinced that under a system 
so defective it would not obtain the energy, weight, and 
dignity which was essential to its affording due support 
to the national government; nor acquire the public 
confidence and respect which, as the last resort of the 
justice of the nation, it should possess (qtd. in 
Warren: 1: 173). 
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In a surprise move, Adams then nominated John Marshall of 
Virginia, a Chief Justice of extraordinary rhetorical skills 




Chisholm v. Georgia 
* In "The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of 
Mankind," Michael Oakeshott presents an often—cited 
formulation of the idea of discourse as conversation (see 
Rationalism in Politics 197—247). Oakeshott defines 
"conversation" (his positive, most civilized of all terms) 
over and against "inquiry" and "argument" (less interesting, 
more limited terms). I find his distinction disappointing as 
it appears to be based on a reductive concept of argument, a 
term which is both simple and, at the same time, complex, 
rich, evocative, and wonderfully ambiguous. (For a revealing 
attempt to pin down the term, see Robert C. Rowland, "On 
Defining Argument," Philosophy and Rhetoric 20 (1987): 
140-59.) 
Despite this reservation, Oakeshott's general 
approach to discourse as conversation is a useful and 
powerful tool for rhetorical analysis. The approach has ties 
both with some very old notions of discourse (from classical 
rhetoric) and with some fairly modern ones (from the 
discourse theories of J. L. Austin and John R. Searle, M. M. 
Bakhtin, Kenneth Burke, and Walter H. Beale, for example). 
It captures the sense that to write a Supreme Court opinion 
is as much a matter of doing something as it is of saying or 
making something; it is as much to take an action—to engage 
in a "discourse performance," as Beale terms it—as it is to 
create a monologic document or to make a discourse product. 
And when justices take such actions, they are joining in and 
responding to an ongoing series of similar actions and 
counter—actions by other writers and a vast array of 
potential voices and audiences. While this constitutional 
dialogue or conversation is more formalized than the 
gentleman's club atmosphere of Oakeshott, it is still very 
much a "meeting—place" filled with the playfulness, diversity 
of voices, and the "unrehearsed intellectual adventure" that 
Oakeshott so admires (197—98). 
Two applications of Oakeshott's idea can be seen in 
Richard Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature and 
Donald N. McCloskey's The Rhetoric of Economics. For a short 
overview of social constructionist theory as it relates to 
writing and notions of conversation, see Gregory Clark, 
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Dialogue. Dialectic, and Conversation. Another interesting 
approach to conversation can be found in H. P. Grice, "Logic 
and Conversation," Syntax and Semantics 3t Speech Acts, ed. 
Peter Cole and Jerry L. Morgan. 
2 See, for example, Friedman and Israel 1:23; Goebel 728; 
Haines 133; Mathis 19; McLaughlin 301; and Pfeffer 50. 
My main sources for the history of Chisholm v. Georgia 
are Marcus et al., eds., The Documentary History of the 
Supreme Court of the United States. 1789—1800. vols. 1 and 2; 
Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History, vol. 1; 
Goebel, History of the Supreme Court of the United States, 
vol. 1; and Mathis, "Chisholm v. Georgia; Background and 
Settlement," Journal ofAmerican History 54 (1967): 19—29. 
Other sources include Friedman and Israel; Haines; Kelly, 
Harbison, and Belz; Levy; McLaughlin; Morris; Pfeffer; 
Sutherland. 
3 James Madison and John Marshall gave similar assurances 
to the state of Virginia (Haines 135). For some views on the 
Supreme Court from the anti—federalist side of the ratifying 
debates, see The Anti—Federalist Papers and the 
Constitutional Convention Debates, ed. Ralph Ketcham. 
4 In fact, the decisions of the Supreme Court have been 
reversed by constitutional amendments on only four occasions 
in two-hundred years, despite thousands of proposed 
amendments (O'Brien 313; Rohde and Spaeth 74). 
5 According to Black's (1226) and Rothenberg in The 
Plain—Language Law Dictionary (315), the Latin term seriatim 
as used in this context means "one by one"—severally, 
separately, individually in a sequence or series. 
® Richard B. Morris reports the sum as "$69,613.33" 
(John Jav 49). 
7 The Mayor's Court Room in Philadelphia's Old City Hall 
was only one of several courtrooms that the justices would 
use over the years until the completion in 1935 of their own 
government building in Washington, D. C. 
8 Georgia was by no means silent outside of the 
courtroom. See Warren and Mathis. 
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® Assumpsit (Latin for "he undertook" or "he promised") 
is a promise or agreement made (but not under seal) "by one 
person to do something or pay a certain sum to another 
person." An "action of assumpsit" is in legal practice "a 
suit to recover damages for failure to carry out a contract" 
of this sort (Rothenberg 27). See also Black's for a longer 
definition (112). Keep in mind, however, that dictionary 
definitions—even extended definitions from specialized legal 
dictionaries—have a limited usefulness. Like literary 
terms, legal terms such as assumpsit have complex histories 
and context—sensitive associations. 
See Cicero's De Oratore and the anonymous Rhetorica 
ad Herennium of the first century B.C.E. See also Vickers 
(27). While not literally "catalogued" in textbook fashion, 
the strategy can be found even earlier in Aristotle (1.15). 
H For a view of the rules of construction or 
interpretation of a legal text in the eighteenth century, see 
Blackstone's Commentaries (1: 59—61). 
12 Bayard's romantic words appeared in an account issued 
to the newspapers. His entry in the official "fine minutes" 
of the Supreme Court reads as follows: 
The Court proceeded to hear the Attorney General in 
support of his motion in this cause but considering 
that no appearance had been entered on the part of the 
State of Georgia and regarding the question involved in 
the suit as highly important suggest to the Counsellors 
of the Court that if any are disposed to offer their 
sentiments on the subject now under Consideration the 
Court are willing to hear them (Marcus et al. 1: 209). 
13 John Blair writes, "If the opinion which I have 
delivered respecting the liability of a state to be sued in 
this court, should be the opinion of the court, it will come 
in course to consider . . . ." Goebel suggests that there 
are "hints" of an absence of consultation in two of the 
opinions, but does not specify (728). A number of indirect 
references in all five opinions could be interpreted as 
showing that no case conference took place. 
1^ For a short presentation of Halloran's fruitful 
ideas, see "From Rhetoric to Composition: The Teaching of 
Writing in America to 1900," in A Short History of Writing 
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Instruction. ed. James J. Murphy (151—82). Halloran notes 
(161) that he takes the notion of an "oratorical culture" 
from Gerald Graff's Professing Literature and expands upon 
it. 
15 Goebel relates that the Maryland case "was an action 
of assumpsit by the Amsterdam bankers Nicholas and Jacob Van 
Staphorst against the state of Maryland, February term 1791 
.... No case papers remain in the Maryland case although 
a declaration, plea and replication were filed. We know also 
that a summons was returned and that Luther Martin appeared 
for the state. At the next term the Court, apparently 
relying upon section 30 of the Judiciary Act, and on motion, 
ordered a commission to take testimony issue. The cause was 
continued until August 6, 1792, when it was ordered that the 
action be discontinued, the matter having been compromised" 
(724). 
Iredell in fact announces these options in reverse 
order from the order in which he then develops them. 
My characterization of Iredell as an "amateur 
historian" in the handling of supporting material is not the 
same as Philip Bobbitt's typological category of "historical 
argument" in Constitutional Fate. Bobbitt defines his 
category as "argument that marshals the intent of the 
draftsmen of the Constitution and the people who adopted the 
Constitution" (7). 
Halloran describes the rhetoric of "professional 
expertise" as something that gradually developed during the 
nineteenth century. Perhaps Blair was an early example of a 
phenomenon that later became predominant; or perhaps, at 
least in the area of legal writing, Halloran's developmental 
sequence needs a closer look. 
For an interesting discussion of the "fountain of 
power" and James Wilson's "pyramid of power" as popular 
metaphors in the second half of the eighteenth century, see 
Michael Kammen, Sovereignty and Liberty. 
In Doing What Comes Naturally. Stanley Fish ascribes the 
desire to reduce interpretive crises to legal interpreters 
and the desire to multiply interpretive crises to literary 
critics (137). 
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20 it is interesting to ask whether roqatio is, in 
Beale's terms, a dialectical strategy or a stylistic 
strategy. Chief Justice Jay shifts to roqatio in one section 
of his opinion, then shifts back to other syntactic styles. 
For Blair's rhetoric of professionalism, the question is 
probably beside the point. 
^ I do not intend the term metadiscourse in its 
strictly technical sense as used by linguists and discourse 
analysts. For citations to the technical literature and a 
good practical discussion for nonspecialists, see William J. 
Vande Kopple, "Some Exploratory Discourse on Metadiscourse," 
CCC 36 (1985): 82-93. 
22 See Whately on investigative vs. deductive structures 
and Beale's comments (52, 117—118). 
2^ In the Rhetorica ad Herennium. the author cautions 
against misuse of the plain, middle, and grand styles: 
But in striving to attain these styles, we must avoid 
falling into faulty styles closely akin to them. For 
instance, bordering on the Grand style, which is in 
itself praiseworthy, there is a style to be avoided. 
To call this the Swollen style will prove correct. For 
just as a swelling often resembles a healthy condition 
of the body, so, to those who are inexperienced, turgid 
and inflated language often seems majestic—when a 
thought is expressed either in new or in archaic words, 
or in clumsy metaphors, or in diction more impressive 
than the theme demands .... Most of those who fall 
into this type, straying from the type they began with, 
are misled by the appearance of grandeur and cannot 
perceive the tumidity of the style. 
2^ To be fair, Cushing does refer at points to his own 
participation in deciding the case and drafting his argument 
("two other clauses I have remarked upon," "But I conceive 
the reason of the thing," "I doubt the consequence," "I am of 
opinion"). But these few examples of metadiscourse do not 
set the dominant impression. For the most part, readers 
encounter a soft, hazy, slightly out—of—focus text where 
governments are designed, courts are instituted, arguments 
are made, and intentions float free. 
1 
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25 Background sources for John Jay include 
Correspondence and Public Papers, ed. Johnston; Dilliard; 
Monaghan; Morris, "The John Jay Court: An Intimate Profile" 
and John Jav, the ITation, and the Court: and Pellew. 
26 Jay wrote five of The Federalist Papers (nos. 2—5 and 
64); his contributions were limited, according to Dilliard, 
because of illness, "perhaps the dyspepsia which troubled him 
throughout his life" (8). Morris attributes Jay's illness to 
arthritis and an "unfortunate accident" in 1788: 
On a Monday afternoon in mid—April, Jay and General 
Clarkson came to the rescue of a group of city doctors 
who had taken refuge in the New York city jail to 
protect themselves from a mob objecting to the 
allegedly sacrilegious autopsy activities of the 
medical profession. When Jay reached the jail, near 
the present site of City Hall, he was struck on the 
forehead by a stone and fell inert. For a time it was 
thought that he had suffered permanent brain injury, 
but he evidently recovered some time that spring 
. . . .  (29 ) .  
2^ For an excellent discussion of Ciceronian rhetoric 
and the relationship of honesturn and utile, in particular, 
see Thomas O. Sloane, Donne. Milton, and the End of Humanist 
Rhetoric. 
2® Here is the passage that follows Jay's discussion of 
"feudal ideas": 
No such ideas obtain here: at the revolution, the 
sovereignty devolved on the people; and they are truly 
the sovereigns of the country, but they are sovereigns 
without subjects (unless the African slaves among us may 
be so called) and have none to govern but themselves; 
the citizens of America are equal as fellow citizens, 
and as joint tenants in the sovereignty (emphasis 
added). 
Jay was an early and lifelong opponent of slavery, and his 
sons became leading abolitionists (Morris 14). While I take 
Jay's comment here to be commendably ironic, it is perhaps 
more ironic to note how completely invisible women were, even 
to a loving husband and highly principled man such as Jay, in 
this country of "sovereigns without subjects." 
Ill 
29 See p. 108, note 11. 
30 Sloane argues that the direct translations of 
honesturn as "honest" and utile as "useful" do not convey 
fully what these terms meant to Cicero: honestum includes 
aspects of moral goodness or rightness, public virtue, and 
honorable behavior; and utile suggests more "Isocratean" 
notions of what is advantageous rather than utilitarian 
calculations. "Cicero's master stroke," Sloane concludes, 
"was to equate utile with honestum and so to bring the 
statesman's process of making decisions into alignment with 
his public, moral character. The equation is Cicero's 
version of finding rhetorical 'advantage' in the Isocratean 
sense: argumentative efficaciousness becomes the skillful 
means of advancing causes in the public good" (113). 1 have 
no way of knowing if John Jay, as a student of Cicero, 
understood the Latin rhetorician in exactly this way, but I 
find that Sloane's analysis of honestum and utile illuminates 
precisely and beautifully the use that Jay makes of "honest" 
and "useful"—in a passage that is otherwise strange to read. 
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2. McCulloch v. Maryland (1819): 
An Early Rhetorical Solution 
On March 6, 1819, Chief Justice John Marshall of the 
United States Supreme Court delivered the unanimous opinion 
of the justices in McCulloch v. Maryland, a landmark decision 
of long—lasting political and historical significance. 
Unlike Chisholm v. Georgia, which turned out to be a dead-end 
case for the early Court, McCulloch v. Maryland still lives 
as perhaps the most famous opinion of the Court's most famous 
Chief Justice. In the twenty—six years between 1793 and 
1819, between the failure of Chisholm and the success of 
McCulloch. the Supreme Court's national standing improved 
dramatically and its institutional and rhetorical practices 
changed radically. John Jay, in refusing a second 
appointment as Chief Justice in late 1800, had warned 
President Adams that the Court would never thrive nor gain 
the public's "respect and confidence" under "a system so 
defective" (qtd. in Warren: 1: 173). But Jay's gloomy 
prophecy did not hold true, despite the fact that circuit 
riding continued to be a major problem for the justices. 
Indeed, perhaps ironically because of Jay's refusal, the 
Court's power and stature were gradually established and its 
rhetorical dynamics were successfully transformed by John 
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Marshall of Virginia, Adams' subsequent choice for Chief 
Justice.1 
John Marshall appears to have understood the rhetorical 
problems of an evolving new genre of judicial opinions: the 
inherent tensions between the deliberative dimension of the 
Supreme Court as a public forum for ongoing debate and the 
instrumental function of its opinions as vehicles for 
carrying out the purposes of government; the persistent 
conflict between justices' individual roles and their 
collective institutional identity; and the significant 
contrast between multiple and single voices in a culture of 
argument. While the justices who participated in Chisholm v. 
Georgia had no clear sense of what the new judicial 
conversation was to be or how it should be conducted to be 
successful, Marshall recognized all too well the 
institutional weaknesses of seriatim opinions. He feared 
their potential for disarray, for public displays of judicial 
wrangling and bickering, for the confusion of conflicting 
premises and unresolved claims, and he felt strongly the 
administrative need to establish a different form. 
Under Marshall's long—term leadership, the justices thus 
shifted in the years following 1801 from the general practice 
of writing seriatim opinions to a preference for single 
opinions "of the Court.with a clear sense of how he 
wanted the new conversation to be conducted, the Chief 
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Justice worked successfully to fashion a rhetorical genre 
emphasizing the instrumental function of the Court, the 
justices' collective institutional identity, and the unified 
effect of a single public voice. Marshall's particular 
rhetorical brilliance was in the nature of that voice. We 
usually think of instrumental discourse—at least the 
rhetoric of bureaucracy—as dull, ugly, and impersonal. But 
when Marshall spoke for the Court, as he often did, he made 
it interesting, beautiful, and charged with the personal 
energy of his own ethos, despite his use of the collective 
institutional "we." 
Where did John Marshall acquire such extraordinary 
rhetorical skills? For a figure so important to American 
history, politics, and law, the biographical evidence is 
oddly ambiguous and inconclusive. While the "frontiersman" 
lore of Marshall's origins has been appropriately revised, as 
Herbert Alan Johnson explains ("Marshall" 302), the 
meagerness of Marshall's formal education remains a mystery, 
a puzzle similar to Ben Jonson's description of Shakespeare's 
"small Latine and lesse Greek." Marshall was born in the 
western part of Virginia to a respected and comfortable, but 
not wealthy, farming family (his mother was related to Thomas 
Jefferson, his father a close friend of George Washington). 
He was taught at home by his parents until the age of 
fourteen and subsequently received two years of formal 
education—one as a classmate of James Monroe in a Virginia 
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clergyman's school, and one as the tutee of a young Scottish 
Episcopalian deacon, newly ordained, who was contracted to 
live with the Marshalls.3 During this period, Albert J. 
Beveridge reports that Marshall loved novels and poetry, 
especially Pope's "Essay on Man," and was first introduced to 
Blackstone's Commentaries (Is 44—45, 56). Marshall's legal 
education later amounted to a few weeks of George Wythe's law 
lectures at the College of William and Mary. At the time 
formal legal studies were not the rule, but the absence of 
any sort of apprenticeship with a practicing lawyer was 
unusual. 
If John Marshall's rhetorical expertise did not come 
from formal education, then we can only speculate that he was 
self—taught, developing his special skills in the course of 
his adult experiences and through his personal preferences in 
reading. Marshall actually fought in the Revolutionary War, 
serving first as a "citizen soldier" in Virginia's Battle of 
Great Bridge and later as a deputy judge advocate and close 
member of Washington's inner circle at Valley Forge. All of 
Marshall's biographers, whatever their perspective or 
particular axe to grind, draw a generous picture of a smart, 
sociable, and well—liked young man, an athlete who loved to 
compete in footraces (for which he was nicknamed 
"Silverheels"), and a respected officer who led by example. 
After the war, as Herbert Alan Johnson relates, Marshall 
built a successful law practice in Richmond, held a number of 
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local and state offices in Virginia during the 1780s, and 
played an important role in defending the newly proposed 
Constitution at Virginia's ratifying convention. Among the 
many book purchases in Marshall's "Account Book" during this 
period, Beveridge lists "Blair's Lectures," "Dionysius 
Longinus on the Sublime," "The Orations of Aeschines and 
Demosthenes on the Crown," "Blackstones Commentaries," 
Montesquieu's "Spirit of Law," "Mason's Poems," and "Works of 
Nicholas Machiavel" (1: 184—86). 
In 1796 Marshall argued and lost Ware v. Hvlton in the 
United States Supreme Court, appearing before Associate 
Justices James Wilson, William Cushing, James Iredell, 
William Paterson, and Samuel Chase. Two years later, most 
likely because of financial problems, he refused a nomination 
to the Court as Associate Justice. He did subsequently serve 
the new federal government as Minister to France (he was 
involved in the XYZ Affair), as a member of the House of 
Representatives from Virginia, and as Adams' Secretary of 
State. With Marshall's appointment as Chief Justice in 1801 
and the decision in Marburv v. Madison soon after in 1803, 
the Supreme Court and the nation, as so many commentators 
have remarked, would be dramatically transformed. Marshall's 
encouragement of single opinions of the Court, called by 
Jefferson a "dangerous engine of consolidation," would help 
to drive that transformation (qtd. in Warren 1: 655). 
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In the promotion of this shift to single opinions of the 
Court, Marshall was a master of what Kenneth Burke calls 
"administrative" rhetoric. In an intriguing discussion of 
Machiavelli1s The Prince, Burke situates administrative 
rhetoric in the world of politics and bureaucracy, a context 
where "administrative acts themselves are not merely 
'scientific' or 'operational,' but are designed also with an 
eye for their appeal" (Rhetoric of Motives 685). To persuade 
an audience and to gain rhetorical "advantage," according to 
Burke, such an administrator understands that "nonverbal acts 
and material instruments themselves have a symbolic 
ingredient" and that"persuasion cannot be confined to the 
strictly verbal; it is a mixture of symbolism and definite 
empirical operations" (Rhetoric of Motives 684—85). For the 
Supreme Court, the persuasive mixture that John Marshall 
liked best combined the deliberative eloquence of his own 
words as Chief Justice and the issuance, in as many cases as 
possible, of a single opinion—the text enhanced by the sheer 
act of its single delivery and its public presentation of 
judicial and institutional unity. For the power and 
instrumental purposes of the Court, Marshall believed that 
one well-written opinion was more effective than a number of 
opinions (even if they were all "well-written" and even if 
the justices all voted the same). 
How Marshall achieved this striking effect in McCulloch 
v. Maryland, as in many other cases, is not entirely known. 
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Public presentations of institutional unity generate a need 
for secrecy, for the resolution of disagreements in private, 
hidden from public scrutiny, from official history, even from 
institutional memory. The modern Court's semi—secret rituals 
and deliberative processes seem wide-open when compared with 
the dark backdrop behind McCulloch. We do know that in 1819, 
in addition to Chief Justice Marshall, there were six 
Associate Justices serving on the Supreme Court: Bushrod 
Washington of Virginia, George Washington's nephew and 
Marshall's close friend, appointed to the Court by Adams in 
1798; William Johnson of South Carolina, a vocal and 
independent-minded Republican appointed by Jefferson in 1804; 
H. Brockholst Livingston of New York and New Jersey, another 
Jefferson appointee in 1806 and troubling brother—in—law to 
John Jay; Thomas Todd of Virginia and Kentucky, yet another 
Jefferson appointee who wrote 14 opinions in 19 years 
(1807—1826) on the Court4; Gabriel Duval1 of Maryland, a 
Madison appointee of 1812 who in 1787 had been selected but 
declined to attend the Constitutional Convention at 
Philadelphia; and Joseph Story of Massachusetts, also a 
Madison appointee of 1812, a youthful poet, Harvard man, and 
talented scholarly jurist. 
Beyond Marshall's report of a unanimous vote, virtually 
nothing is known about how these various justices approached 
McCulloch v. Maryland during the crucial days of oral 
argument and decision. We do not know how the opinion's 
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details may have been debated, or what compositional 
processes produced such an extraordinary document in such a 
short time. Biographers like Donald G. Morgan, writing on 
William Johnson, and R. Kent Newmyer, writing on Joseph 
Story, are reduced to speculation when it comes to discussing 
the roles of their subjects in one of the defining cases of 
constitutional law. Morgan relates that his "voluble South 
Carolinian remained silent" (116), and Newmyer describes 
Story's contributions to McCulloch as "lost in the secrecy of 
conference" (126).^ 
We do know generally, from G. Edward White's picture of 
the second stage (1812—1823) of the Court's "working life," 
that the justices all lived together in a boardinghouse, 
without their families, during the February—to-March 
sessions. In what is a wonderful example of the 
gentleman's—club conversation envisioned by Michael 
Oakeshott, the justices apparently dined together each 
evening as cases were being argued in court, holding informal 
case conferences both during and after dinner. Joseph Story 
seems to have been particularly fond of the sense of 
fraternity, the "frank and unaffected intimacy" of the closed 
boardinghouse life. White quotes from a letter by Story, 
written soon after joining the Court, which suggests 
something about the rhetorical dynamics of the justices' 
conversations: 
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[W]e are all united as one, with a mutual esteem which 
makes even the labors of Jurisprudence light. The mode 
of arguing causes in the Supreme Court is excessively 
prolix and tedious; but generally the subject is 
exhausted, and it is not very difficult to perceive at 
the close of the cause, in many cases, where the press 
of the argument and of the law lies. We moot every 
question as we proceed, and [our] familiar conferences 
at our lodgings often come to a very quick, and, I 
trust, a very accurate opinion, in a few hours. . . . 
(qtd. in G. Edward White 184—85). 
Marshall also projected a collegial picture of the 
justices at work behind the boardinghouse doors. Writing as 
"A Friend to the Union" in the Philadelphia Union just a few 
weeks after McCulloch. he responded to critics with this 
general description: 
The course of every tribunal must necessarily be, that 
the opinion which is to be delivered as the opinion of 
the court, is previously submitted to the 
considerationof all the judges; and, if any part of the 
reasoning be disapproved, it must be so modified as to 
receive the approbation of all, before it can be 
delivered as the opinion of all (Gunther 80—81). 
We can be fairly certain that the "opinion" submitted to the 
justices during Marshall1s tenure was oral rather than 
written. It would not be until the second half of the 
nineteenth century, as David O'Brien relates, that the Court 
would institute "the practice of circulating draft opinions 
for comments and changes before a final vote and 
announcement" (110). 
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A very different picture of the justices' internal 
culture of argument emerges from the comments of Thomas 
Jefferson and other critics of the Court. By Jefferson's 
enraged reactions we can tell, in fact, that the rhetorical 
shift away from seriatim opinions mattered, that it was more 
than just a question of the internal practices and 
preferences of the Court. Long an adversary of the 
Federalist John Marshall, as Charles Warren relates, the 
state—rights Republican Jefferson waged a persistent war to 
dilute, if not destroy, the Supreme Court's growing authority 
and nationalism (1: 652—85). Jefferson accused the Supreme 
Court of treating the Constitution as "a mere thing of wax" 
which the justices "may twist and shape into any form they 
please" and called the justices a "corps of sappers and 
miners, steadily working to undermine the independent rights 
of the states" (qtd. in Haines 520, 521). In the Court's 1819 
term alone, McCulloch v. Maryland was but one of three major 
nationalist opinions, along with Dartmouth College v. 
Woodward and Sturqes v. Crowninshield. which curtailed the 
powers of state governments in one way or another. 
Warren dates Jefferson's campaign against Marshall's 
single opinions of the Court from McCulloch's appearance in 
1819 (1: 654). Thoroughly frustrated, especially as five of 
the sitting justices had been appointed by Republican 
presidents, Jefferson bitterly criticized the justices for 
the "cooking up of a decision and delivering it by one of 
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their members as the opinion of the Court without the 
possibility of our knowing how many, who, or for what reasons 
each member concurred ..." (qtd. in Warren 1: 654). Both 
Jefferson and James Madison saw a forced return to writing 
seriatim opinions as one solution to what Jefferson described 
as Marshall's "practice of making up opinions in secret and 
delivering them as the orders of the Court" (qtd. in Warren 
Is 653). In the name of judicial reform, a variety of bills 
would be introduced in Congress during the 1820's, including 
provisions to require seriatim opinions (but none in fact 
succeeded). 
We can wonder whether Jefferson would have cared so much 
about rhetorical dynamics if the results of justices' 
decisions had been different, but his criticisms nonetheless 
deserve a hearing for what they contribute to understanding 
the Marshall Court's culture of argument and the generation 
of an opinion such as McCulloch v. Maryland. Jefferson's 
image of this process is comics 
An opinion is huddled up in conclave, perhaps by a 
majority of one, delivered as if unanimous, and with the 
silent acquiescence of lazy or timid associates, by a 
crafty Chief Judge, who sophisticates the law to his 
mind, by the turn of his own reasoning (qtd. in Haines 
518). 
To remedy this picture of deception and incompetence, 
Jefferson proposed to Associate Justice William Johnson in 
1822 that the South Carolinian encourage his fellow justices 
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to return to the practice of seriatim opinions and abandon 
the "habit of caucusing opinions" instituted for a time in 
England by Lord Mansfield and copied in America by Chief 
Justice Marshall: "That of seriatim argument shews whether 
every judge has taken the trouble of understanding the case, 
of investigating it minutely, and of forming an opinion for 
himself, instead of pinning it on another's sleeve." 
Official recording of seriatim opinions, Jefferson adds, 
would create "the best possible book of reports, and the 
better, as unincumbered with the hired sophisms and 
perversions of Counsel" (qtd. in Morgan 168—69). Such 
reports would also have provided evidence, of course, for 
Jefferson's impeachment schemes. 
Johnson's famous, often quoted reply to Jefferson does 
not share all of the elements of Jefferson's caricature, but 
neither does it vindicate Marshall or the Court's practices. 
Johnson relates his surprise, upon joining the Court years 
earlier in 1804, at finding the Chief Justice "delivering all 
the opinions in cases in which he sat," even when Marshall 
disagreed with the outcome, and the South Carolinian offers 
the following insight: 
But I remonstrated in vain; the answer was he is willing 
to take the trouble and it is a mark of respect to him. 
I soon however found out the real cause. Cushing was 
incompetent. Chase could not be got to think or 
write—Patterson [sic] was a slow man and willingly 
declined the trouble, and the other two judges [Marshall 
and Bushrod Washington] you know are commonly estimated 
as one judge (qtd. in Morgan 182). 
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Johnson then explains why he also, at least for a time, "bent 
to the current": 
Some case soon occurred in which I differed from my 
brethren, and I thought it a thing of course to deliver 
my opinion. But, during the rest of the session I heard 
nothing but lectures on the indecency of judges cutting 
at each other. .... At length I found that I must 
either submit to circumstances or become such a cypher 
in our consultations as to effect no good at all (qtd. 
in Morgan 182). 
Johnson did eventually have some effect on the justices' 
practice, going on to earn a reputation as the Court's "first 
dissenter" in face of the norm Marshall had established. In 
1819 in McCulloch v. Maryland, however, Johnson and the other 
justices remained silent, apparently in agreement that 
Marshall's single voice should speak for all. 
From the beginning the case of McCulloch v. Maryland was 
manipulated, as Charles Warren relates, as a "test case" by 
all parties (1: 506). Like Chisholm v. Georgia. McCulloch 
involved unresolved issues of federalism, state sovereignty, 
and states' rights—of attempting to define and clarify 
another aspect of the division of power between state 
governments and the Union. Also, like Chisholm. McCulloch 
was about money and bad faith, but James William "M'Culloch," 
cashier of the Baltimore branch of the second Bank of the 
United States, was a very different figure from Alexander 
Chisholm. Operating in the context of a broader, more 
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cynical and manipulative kind of economic war, McCulloch was 
a low—level cashier who was apparently conspiring with 
others—while the case was in progress—to embezzle enormous 
amounts of money from the Bank. The appearance of his name 
in this famous suit as the "plaintiff in error," representing 
the Bank of the United States, is one of those ironic quirks 
of history. 
The bad faith in this situation existed on both sides. 
The second Bank of the United States, incorporated in 1816 
with one—fifth of its shares controlled by the federal 
government, was "by far the largest corporation in America," 
possessing at one time $35 million in capital and branches in 
eighteen cities (Hammond, "Bank Cases" 33—34). The 
government, as Bray Hammond explains, found a "central bank" 
useful, some claimed necessary, as a public depository and 
fiscal agent and regulator (33). But the Bank quickly 
accumulated a record of what Warren describes as "reckless 
mismanagement, wild speculation in its shares, and fraudulent 
and unwarranted overloans" (1: 506). Hammond comments that 
in 1819 the Bank "came before the Supreme Court suing for its 
legality when its solvency was in doubt. It was a half—sunk 
creditor, harassed and harassing" (Banks 264). The state 
government of Maryland, on its part, was claiming the high 
ground of states' rights with regard to the power of 
taxation. Maryland officials were arguing hypocritically for 
mutual "confidence" between the states and the Union, while 
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at the same time targeting a tax intended literally to break 
the second Bank of the United States. 
In bringing the case to the United States Supreme Court, 
the representatives of the Bank were appealing lower state 
court rulings that would have effectually closed its 
Baltimore branch, and quite likely destroyed the entire 
institution (other states, such as Ohio, had passed similarly 
prohibitive measures). The legitimacy of a national bank, as 
would be argued before the Court, had been a controversial 
question since 1791 when the Secretary of the Treasury 
Alexander Hamilton had defended the establishment of the 
first Bank of the United States. Maryland was but one of 
several states in the southern and western regions who saw 
the bank as an "Eastern Monster"—large, powerful, corrupt, 
and unfairly competitive with smaller state banks, especially 
in a time of serious financial problems throughout the 
country, problems that would lead to the Panic of 1819 
(Baxter 170). 
Warren traces the quick unfolding of the case in 1818: 
in February, Maryland passed a deliberately prohibitive tax 
intended to stop the Bank's operations in the state; by May, 
McCulloch was charged with refusing to comply with the 
Maryland statute; by June, Maryland had won (of course) its 
case against the Bank in two of its own state courts—the 
County Court of Baltimore County and the Maryland Court of 
Appeals; and, by September 18, 1818 a "writ of error" 
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appeared on the Supreme Court1s docket appealing the lower 
court decisions. On Monday, February 22, 1819, seated in the 
newly restored basement courtroom of the Capitol, the 
justices began to hear the oral arguments in the case of 
McCulloch v. Maryland. Simultaneously, a "heated debate" was 
being conducted upstairs in Congress over whether to repeal 
the Bank's charter (Warren Is 509). The courtroom below the 
Senate was crowded, Joseph Story commenting that the "hall 
was full almost to suffocation, and many went away for want 
of room" (qtd. in Beveridge 4: 284). 
Unlike Georgia officials in 1793, Maryland's 
representatives had come to argue. Political hostility, 
suspicion, and ill feelings were just as intense between the 
state and federal governments, but there was no bill in the 
Maryland legislature threatening to hang federal marshalls as 
there had been in Georgia. More significantly for the United 
States Supreme Court, there was no directed silence in the 
courtroom, no one—sided conversation as Edmund Randolph had 
conducted in arguing Chisholm's position. Accepting its 
status as "defendant in error,Maryland did take up the 
gauntlet, putting its Attorney-General to work and hiring the 
best lawyers available. 
Because of the national interest and importance of 
McCulloch, the Court allowed three counsel to argue on each 
side. In what might best be described as a remarkable 
oratorical enactment of legal theater or legal spectacle, the 
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case was debated for nine days by six of the "greatest 
lawyers in the country" (Warren 1: 507). The second Bank of 
the United States was represented by the following counsel: 
Daniel Webster, perhaps the most famous statesman-orator of 
the times and "warm friend" to the bank that granted him 
generous fees and personal loans (Baxter 169); United States 
Attorney—General William Wirt, prominent lawyer and popular 
author of "The Letters of the British Spy," an intense 
literary man with a "florid imagination" (G. Edward White 
265); and William Pinkney, a brilliant diplomat, eloquent 
speaker, and "foppish" dresser who wore ballroom gloves to 
argue in court, considered the "greatest advocate of his age" 
(G. Edward White 242, 254). At the end of Pinkney's 
three-day oration, Joseph Story would write that he had never 
heard a "greater speech" in his whole life (qtd. in Baxter 
175). 
The state of Maryland was also represented by three 
prominent counsel: Joseph Hopkinson, a "learned" member of 
the Philadelphia bar who had argued successfully on Webster's 
side in the Dartmouth College case (Warren 1: 477); Walter 
Jones, a "legal genius" who served as United States attorney 
for the District of Columbia (Beveridge 4: 285; G. Edward 
White 289); and Maryland Attorney-General Luther Martin, at 
age seventy—one often intoxicated and "long, rambling, and 
exhaustive" in court, one of the original "Framers" of the 
Constitution and successful defender of Aaron Burr (G. Edward 
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White 238). It is important to understand the extent to 
which these lawyers carried on another of Oakeshott1s 
gentleman1s—club conversations, in various combinations and 
interactions with the justices over a number of years. But 
this conversation did not take place behind the justices' 
boardinghouse doors; rather, it was a public event of high 
drama, with an audience fully expecting to be entertained 
socially and intellectually (G. Edward White 203). 
Both sides had agreed to a statement of the facts, and 
the Court was thus asked to decide two constitutional 
questions: 
(1) Does Congress have the power to incorporate a 
bank? 
(2) If so, can the state of Maryland tax the branch 
of that bank operating in its territory? 
Webster argued these two questions for the Bank on the first 
day, Monday, February 22, followed by Hopkinson speaking for 
Maryland on February 23. Wirt then responded for the Bank on 
February 24, and Jones next spoke for Maryland on February 24 
and 25. Martin finished out the week by arguing for Maryland 
all day on Friday and Saturday, February 26 and 27. 
Pinkney's grand performance for the Bank lasted from Monday, 
March 1, through Wednesday, March 3. Amazingly, just three 
days later, on Saturday, March 6, Chief Justice Marshall 
130 
delivered his thirty—seven—page unanimous opinion "of the 
Court" (Warren 1: 507—10). 
Marshall's thirty—seven pages account for only about 
thirty per cent of the full printed text,of M'CULLOCH v. THE 
STATE OF MARYLAND et al., 4 Wheaton 316, as the case was 
officially recorded by Court Reporter Henry Wheaton. The 
remaining eighty—five pages consist of approximately seven 
pages of supplementary materials (contextual, explanatory, 
and technical) and seventy—eight pages of substantive 
condensations of the oral arguments addressed to the Court. 
As with Dallas, a close look is still needed to discern the 
basic divisions and components of the text: 
(1) Introductory Materials 6+ pages (316—322) 
Opinion Abstract 
History of Case 
Statement of Facts 
Maryland Law 
(2) Report of Oral Arguments 78 pages 
Webster (8+ pages) 
Hopkinson (22 pages) 
(322-400) 
Wirt (10 pages) 
(9+ pages) Jones 
Martin (5 pages) 
Pinkney (23 pages) 
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(3) John Marshall's Opinion 
(4) Judgment and Order 
37 pages (400—437) 
1 paragraph (437) 
For modern lay readers, the prose oddities of the text are 
not as marked as Dallas's reporting of Chisholm v. Georgia, 
but the pages still in no way invite general readers or 
suggest a public forum. What we get, instead, in the larger 
document is the appearance of a closed, dense, uninviting 
world of legal explication—for professional eyes only, as it 
were. 
In the midst of this world, Chief Justice John 
Marshall's single opinion is remarkably paradoxical in its 
rhetorical nature: it can be easily isolated from the larger 
document, and yet it is significantly embedded in it. It can 
be easily isolated from its larger technical context, on the 
one hand, because Marshall chooses not to speak the language 
of the law's professional culture. Unlike the legal 
technocrat John Blair in Chisholm v. Georgia. Marshall uses 
no terms such as ab in utile or coram non iudice. Neither 
does he argue by citing the authority of previous cases.7 
Rather, he writes what Newmyer calls a "state paper" (Supreme 
Court 44), especially in the first section, addressing in a 
beautifully written, deliberative, essay—like fashion the 
widest possible public audience. The persuasive effect of 
Marshall's "magisterial" style is striking, as Benjamin N. 
Cardozo describes it, creating the impression of a 
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stand-alone document in which we "hear the voice of the law 
speaking by its consecrated ministers" (10). It is little 
wonder that Marshall's text, unlike the varied seriatim 
opinions of the justices in 1793, was "reprinted in full by 
many newspapers throughout the country, irrespective of their 
concurrence in its doctrines" (Warren 1: 511). And, indeed, 
two hundred years later Marshall's opinion remains a 
touchstone text for students of constitutional law. 
But there is some degree of sleight—of—hand involved in 
Marshall's pose as national statesman and essayist. When we 
read the six oral arguments of the counsel representing the 
Bank and Maryland in conjunction with Marshall's opinion, we 
find a fascinating insiders' conversation taking place, with 
a considerable amount of borrowed material appearing in 
Marshall's "magisterial" pronouncements. In this regard, 
Marshall's text directly responds to the various voices of 
counsel, and his argument is dynamically embedded in the 
larger document. Almost all scholars note the borrowing but 
do not know what to do with this information. Newmyer 
comments most straightforwardly on the opinion: "Original it 
was not" (Supreme Court 45). Certainly, the question of 
Marshall's originality is interesting, but we should keep in 
mind that it is a modern question, one that takes on somewhat 
different dimensions in an older, oratorical culture. In the 
dramatic setting of the courtroom, Marshall read his opinion 
out loud to the very counsel from whom he borrowed, using 
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"we" throughout to emphasize his institutional role as the 
voice of the Court. Compare the collective ethos Marshall 
creates, as administrative rhetor, with Chief Justice John 
Jay's use of the singular "I" in Chisholm v. Georgia, as well 
as with Marshall's own use of "I" in anonymous public letters 
he wrote defending McCulloch against its critics in the 
spring and summer of 1819. In these amazing letters to the 
Philadelphia Union and the Alexandria Gazette (Gunther), 
Marshall quotes and supports his own words by pretending to 
be someone else quoting and supporting the institutional 
oracles of the Court. 
Perhaps more significant than the question of 
originality raised by Marshall's borrowing are questions of 
the Court's rhetorical dynamics. In the culture of argument 
the Chief Justice encouraged, who gets to say what to whom? 
The ruling in McCulloch v. Maryland was unanimous, but was 
the unanimity easily established or hard won among the other 
Supreme Court justices? Was there unanimous agreement to all 
the points of reasoning presented by Marshall in the opinion? 
What was the nature of the debate at the boardinghouse supper 
table? When Marshall's contemporary critics asked these 
questions, with undertones of Jeffersonian charges of 
deception, Marshall responded with three arguments in one of 
his anonymous letters to the Philadelphia Union. First, he 
states simply that the "opinion is delivered, not in the name 
of the chief justice, but in the name of the whole court" 
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(Gunther 80). Second, he insists (perhaps a little 
disingenuously) that throughout "the whole opinion, the chief 
justice never speaks in the singular number, or in his own 
person, but as the mere organ of the court" (Gunther 80). 
And, third, Marshall points to the reading of the entire 
opinion with all of the justices there in the courtroom, 
asking us rhetorically "to determine whether the judges of 
the Supreme Court, men of high and respectable character, 
would sit by insilence, while great constitutional principles 
of which they disapproved, were advanced in their name, and 
as their principles" (Gunther 80). 
But even if we are fully persuaded by Marshall's 
arguments, we still simply do not hear the voices of the 
other justices. What we do hear is a conversation 
masterfully orchestrated by the Chief Justice, with the six 
counsel arguing the case as his primary audience. It is a 
more complex version of James Iredell arguing with Edmund 
Randolph in the Chisholm case. When read in isolation, 
Marshall's text appears to address all citizens, indeed, to 
speak to the world and to history. When read with the oral 
arguments, the opinion engages in a complex, detailed 
insiders' exchange, with all the intellectual playfulness of 
Oakeshott's gentleman's club. Either way, the other justices 
do not openly participate. In the unfolding text of 
McCulloch v. Maryland, we hear the six arguments of Webster, 
Hopkinson, Wirt, Jones, Martin, and Pinkney—what Jefferson 
135 
would describe as "hired sophisms"—and Marshall's voice, 
claiming to be "the mere organ of the court" in his 
institutional role. 
Marshall divides the structure of his opinion into two 
distinct parts, paralleling the two constitutional questions 
posed to the Court, and prefaced by a one—paragraph exordium. 
Marshall's famous, often quoted introductory paragraph 
encapsulates the rhetorical paradox of the entire text: 
In the case now to be determined, the defendant, a 
sovereign state, denies the obligation of a law 
enacted by the legislature of the Union, and the 
plaintiff, on his part, contests the validity of an act 
which has been passed by the legislature of that state. 
The constitution of our country, in its most interesting 
and vital parts, is to be considered; the conflicting 
powers of the government of the Union and of its 
members, as marked in that constitution, are to be 
discussed; and an opinion given, which may essentially 
influence the great operations of the government. No 
tribunal can approach such a question without a deep 
sense of its importance, and of the awful responsibility 
involved in its decision. But it must be decided 
peacefully, or remain a source of hostile legislation, 
perhaps of hostility of a still more serious nature; and 
if it is to be so decided, by this tribunal alone can 
the decision be made. On the Supreme Court of the 
United States has the constitution of our country 
devolved this important duty (400—01). 
On the one hand, to an outside audience, these five 
eloquently crafted sentences represent the "grand style" so 
praised by Cardozo (12). James Boyd White sees this opening 
paragraph as a "claim for the judiciary itself," for the 
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competence and authority of the Court, and for the "reader's 
confidence in judicial reasoning of just the sort Marshall is 
about to demonstrate" (251). Indeed, Marshall's 
compositional clarity and logic, his Wilson—like flair for 
the dramatic, and his sense ofthe sound and rhythm of his 
sentences are admirable. To understand the effect, imagine 
the last sentence in the paragraph arranged in a more direct 
syntactical order: 
The constitution of our country has devolved this 
important duty on the Supreme Court of the United 
States. 
It is not surprising to find Marshall the master of the 
sentence, especially if he did, in fact, learn his rhetoric 
from reading Hugh Blair and Longinus—with their emphasis on 
taste, beauty, and the sublime, the literariness of their 
rhetoric, and their love of intricate, sentence—by—sentence 
effects. 
But to the insiders who actually gathered in the 
courtroom to hear Marshall read these words, and who had both 
argued and listened to the various conversations conducted 
that term, Marshall's exordium must have seemed like a set 
piece, a nice variation perhaps, but not much more than a 
formula familiar to all. The jurisdictional question, unlike 
Chisholm v. Georgia in 1793, was not a real issue for debate 
in McCulloch in 1819. The threat—of—hostility argument was a 
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commonplace of the times (remember Randolph's "fear of the 
federal arm uplifted"). And, perhaps most revealing, marked 
sentence—level similarities exist among various introductions 
composed by Marshall. Compare, for example, three sentences 
in the opening of McCulloch with similar statements in the 
opening of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, which Marshall 
delivered on the first day of the 1819 term, just weeks 
before the ruling in McCulloch: 
(1) McCulloch: 
The constitution of our country, in its most 
interesting and vital parts, is to be considered; 
the conflicting powers of the government of the 
Union and of its members, as marked in that 
constitution, are to be discussed; and an opinion 
given, which may essentially influence the great 
operations of the government. 
Dartmouth College: 
The validity of a legislative act is to be examined; 
and the opinion of the highest law tribunal of a 
state is to be revised: an opinion which carries 
with it intrinsic evidence of the diligence, of the 
ability, and the integrity, with which it was 
formed. 
(2) McCulloch: 
No tribunal can approach such a question without a 
deep sense of its importance, and of the awful 
responsibility involved in its decision. 
Dartmouth College: 
This court can be insensible neither to the 
magnitude nor delicacy of this question. 
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(3) McCulloch: 
On the Supreme Court of the United States has the 
constitution of our country devolved this important 
duty. 
Dartmouth College: 
On the judges of this court, then, is imposed the 
high and solemn duty of protecting, from even 
legislative violation, those contracts which the 
constitution of our country has placed beyond 
legislative control; and, however irksome the task 
may be, this is a duty from which we dare not 
shrink. 
After the introductory paragraph, Marshall presents the 
first major constitutional question: "... has Congress 
power to incorporate a bank?" (401). The Chief Justice 
devotes two—thirds of his opinion to this first question (24 
of 37 pages), arranging his points in a Wilson—style 
investigative order intended to carry his audience with him 
logically and dramatically step by step. To answer the 
question, Marshall uses Burke's proportional strategy as he 
patiently works his way through an examination of all 
relevant constitutional language, as well as structural 
elements and relationships seen as implicit or "implied" in 
the Constitution. The argument, in sum, is developed from 
the abstract to the particular, masterfully interweaving 
along the way theoretical principles, poetic evocations, and 
reasoning from pragmatic consequences.8 After arguing the 
background and history of the question, Marshall offers two 
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general premises: (1) that the authority of the Constitution 
comes from "the people," not the states; and (2) that the 
Union is a government of "limited" powers, but its 
"enumerated" powers are "supreme" over any conflicting state 
laws. If we grant Marshall these two premises, the argument 
is essentially over, whether we realize it or not.9 
Marshall next identifies the problem of interpreting the 
letter of the Constitution in this instance: Among its 
enumerated powers, the text of the Constitution is silent on 
the incorporation of a bank. But the "framers," Marshall 
argues, drew only the "great outlines" and left the Court to 
deduce the details: "In considering this question, then, we 
must never forget that it is a constitution we are 
expounding" (407). Having asserted the Court's right to 
"expound" the Constitution, Marshall proceeds to develop two 
points: (1) a general argument on means (incidental or 
implied powers) vs. ends (enumerated powers), concluding that 
incorporation is never an end in itself; and (2) a specific 
examination of the language of the Constitution's "necessary 
and proper" clause—that Congress has the power to "make all 
Laws which shall be necessary and proper" for executing its 
constitutional powers (Art. 1, sec. 8)—concluding, like 
Hamilton and Webster with an argument from consequences, that 
strict construction of the clause would make the federal 
government inoperable. Thus, closely following Webster's 
presentation of Hamilton's 1791 argument, Marshall argues 
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that Congress has the right to use all appropriate means to 
carry out its constitutional powers: 
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of 
the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, 
which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not 
prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of 
the constitution, are constitutional (421). 
Almost as an afterthought, Marshall throws in the 
statement that a corporation, and more specifically a bank, 
is an ordinary choice of "necessary and proper" means, a 
point already "sufficiently proved" by established usage and 
experience (421).10 He modestly disclaims any judicial power 
to rule on the degree of necessity, referring that question 
to Congress, and dismisses the existence of state banks as 
irrelevant. With twenty—four pages of his exploratory, 
investigative structure unfolded, Marshall finally arrives at 
his main claim, the judgment of the Court on the first 
constitutional question: 
After the most deliberate consideration, it is the 
unanimous and decided opinion of this court that the act 
to incorporate the bank of the United States is a law 
made in pursuance of the constitution, and is a part of 
the supreme law of the land (424). 
While no one following the opinion's reasoning could be 
surprised at the judgment, the first announcement of the 
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justices' unanimity on this controversial question was 
particularly dramatic—and frustrating for states' rights 
advocates. Virginian John Randolph complained about the 
effectiveness of Marshall's argument: "All wrong, all wrong, 
but no man in the United States can tell why or wherein" 
(qtd. in Cardozo 11). 
With a short, perfunctory transition, Marshall turns his 
attention from the constitutionality of the Bank of the 
United States and its Baltimore branch to the second 
question: "Whether the state of Maryland may, without 
violating the constitution, tax that branch?" (425). 
Marshall spends less time on this question, devoting only 
thirteen pages to his answer. The organization of the text 
is again investigative, with the main statement of the 
Court's judgment coming at the end, but it is not as closely 
or carefully structured as the Chief Justice's treatment of 
the first question. Given that the opinion was read in full 
on March 6, 1819, Marshall may have been literally running 
short of time when he composed this section—whether the 
opinion was actually written in the three days following the 
close of oral arguments (most difficult to believe) or it was 
"mooted" at the justices' boardinghouse table over the 
two-week course of the case, with Marshall writing as the 
arguments developed.11 
Marshall's argument in this second section follows a 
quirky, two—part pattern. In the first part, he argues from 
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what he calls "just theory" (430). He grants that states 
have taxing powers, but insists that they cannot be exercised 
where "repugnant" to the Constitution because of its 
"paramount character" (425). Marshall argues metaphorically 
that the constitutional fabric would be shredded without the 
"great principle" of supremacy over the states "so interwoven 
with its web, so blended with its texture" (426). Shifting 
to more explicit terms of argumentation, or meta—argument, 
Marshall claims that from this principle or "axiom" three 
"propositions are deduced as corollaries" (426): 
These are, 1st. that a power to create implies a power 
to preserve. 2d. That a power to destroy, if wielded 
by a different hand, is hostile to, and incompatible 
with these powers to create and to preserve. 3d. That 
where this repugnancy exists, that authority which is 
supreme must control, not yield to that over which it is 
supreme (426). 
Pausing to compliment his primary audience, Marshall remarks 
that these "abstract truths" have been questioned in this 
case, and "both in maintaining the affirmative and the 
negative, a splendor of eloquence, and strength of argument 
seldom, if ever, surpassed, have been displayed" (426). 
Marshall then proceeds to refute the "negative" position 
argued by Maryland's counsel, applying each of his 
corollaries to the second question in McCulloch. He handles 
the first corollary by simply proclaiming what has just 
become the law in the first section of the opinion: 
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The power of Congress to create, and of course to 
continue, the bank, was the subject of the preceding 
part of this opinion; and is no longer to be considered 
as questionable (426—27). 
There is a remarkable sense here of the text as instrument, 
of the delivery of the opinion as an institutional act which, 
once officially read, modifies or changes reality, even as 
author and audience move from one section to another within 
the text. The application of the second corollary—Webster's 
point that states might destroy the bank by exercising an 
absolute power of taxation—is dismissed as "too obvious to 
be denied" (427). And in applying the third corollary—the 
axiom of constitutional supremacy over conflicting state 
powers—Marshall presents his own short history of taxation 
and suggests an "intelligible standard" for determining the 
power of taxations that a state's power of taxation should be 
limited to "the extent of sovereignty which the people of a 
single state possess, and can confer on its government" 
(429). In essence, the part (the people of the state of 
Maryland) cannot be allowed to control a legitimate agency 
sanctioned by the whole (the people of the Union). 
The opinion at this point appears to come to an end. 
Marshall reports a resounding "no" by the justices in answer 
to the second question: 
We find, then, on just theory, a total failure of this 
original right to tax the means employed by the 
government of the Union, for the execution of its 
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powers. The right never existed, and the question 
whether it has been surrendered, cannot arise (430). 
But the opinion, in fact, does not conclude, not for another 
seven pages. With an awkward, quirky bit of cobbling, 
Marshall stops and appears to start his argument all over 
again: 
But, waiving this theory for the present, let us resume 
the inquiry, whether this power can be exercised by the 
respective states, consistently with a fair construction 
of the constitution (430—31). 
In disorganized fashion, Marshall adds points to arguments 
already made; refutes Maryland's claim that mutual 
"CONFIDENCE" between the states and the Union should govern 
the situation; incorporates Webster's argument from 
consequences or "parade of horribles" (if states may tax the 
bank, they can also tax the mail, the mint, etc.); gives his 
own interpretation of passages cited from The Federalist; and 
variously responds to bits and pieces of the oral arguments. 
Marshall has trouble concluding this section in much the 
same way that James Iredell and John Jay had problems with 
the endings of their opinions. The endings of judicial 
opinions seem to be particular points of compositional 
strain, perhaps caused by the intermix of oral and written 
modes, perhaps by the conflict between writers' instrumental 
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and deliberative purposes. Marshall keeps saying "no" in 
slightly different ways, repeating the Court's judgment on 
the second constitutional question at least three times. In 
the penultimate paragraph, he announces the justices' 
unanimity on this question: 
We are unanimously of opinion that the law passed by the 
legislature of Maryland, imposing a tax on the Bank of 
the United States, is unconstitutional and void (436). 
He concludes finally with a paragraph of repetition and some 
minor limitations of the ruling, offering what must have been 
unwelcome reassurances to Maryland and all states interested 
in the case. 
It is important for modern readers, trying to make sense 
of the text after 170 years, to keep in mind the sense of a 
speech occasion, of Marshall publicly reading his words to 
the audience in the courtroom, especially to the six counsel: 
Webster, Wirt, and Pinkney for the Bank; and Hopkinson, 
Jones, and Martin for the state of Maryland. At every stage, 
the various points of argument made by counsel are woven into 
Marshall's text, either in confirmation or refutation. When 
Marshall stated in the courtroom that the Constitution, by 
its very nature, could not "partake of a prolixity of a legal 
code" (407), Attorney-General William Wirt must have smiled, 
pleased that the Chief Justice liked his point well enough to 
incorporate it: "But to have enumerated the power of 
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establishing corporations among the specific powers of 
Congress, would have been to change the whole plan of the 
constitution . . . and load it with all the complex details 
of a code of private jurisprudence" (357). But Walter Jones, 
after arguing that the Constitution could in no way have 
intended to throw "the American people into one aggregate 
mass"(363), probably took little comfort from hearing 
Marshall's response: 
No political dreamer was ever wild enough to think of 
breaking down the lines which separate the states, and 
of compounding the American people into one common mass. 
Of consequence, when they act, they act in their states. 
But the measures they adopt do not, on that account, 
cease to be the measures of the people themselves, or 
become the measures of the state governments (403). 
To take a more extended example, Daniel Webster reasoned 
(followed by Wirt and Pinkney) that the historical debate 
over a- federal bank had already been "exhausted," going back 
to Alexander Hamilton in 1791, and the bank's existence 
should not be considered an "open question" (322—23). Jones 
counter—argued that it was still an open question, never 
having been tried before the Supreme Court: "The practice of 
the government, however inveterate, could never be considered 
as sanctioning a manifest usurpation. . . " (362). 
In presenting his own history and background of the 
question, Marshall directly incorporated Webster's argument: 
"It has been truly said that this can scarcely be considered 
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as an open question. . (401). And Marshall was obviously 
responding to Jones's counter—argument when he stated: 
It will not be denied that a bold and daring usurpation 
might be resisted, after an acquiescence still longer 
and more complete than this. But it is conceived that a 
doubtful question ... if not put at rest by the 
practice of government, ought to receive a considerable 
impression from that practice (401). 
Neither Webster nor Jones are named, and the text once again 
works simultaneously in two quite different ways. The 
agentless passives invite outside readers, especially the 
majority of readers who never examine the oral arguments, to 
construct generalized interpretations of Marshall's "voice of 
the law," a voice speaking in splendid judicial isolation. 
But to the original audience, the insiders gathered in the 
courtroom on that Saturday in 1819, each statement was a 
specific response to points in a complex legal conversation. 
We might describe it as a high—stakes adult version of the 
literary and debating societies so loved by 
nineteenth-century students. 
Chief Justice John Marshall, perhaps best described as 
"the justice as institutional dreamer," did solve the 
potential babble of judicial voices in seriatim 
opinions—avoiding the degeneration of argument into public 
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bickering and quarreling, into contradictory premises and 
unresolved claims. The nature of the conversation he 
created, however, is fraught with its own problems. 
Marshall's centripetal energy offered the Supreme Court the 
clarity of a single institutional voice, a monologic 
discourse satisfying in its unity and coherence. But the 
satisfaction we take in interpreting such closed, 
self—sufficient wholes, as M. M. Bakhtin implies, can be 
dangerous. Authoritarian systems always speak with single 
voices. In the Supreme Court justices' closed culture of 
argument, was the conversation regarding McCulloch v. 
Maryland a triumph of consensus or a failure of conformity? 
Try to imagine what a seriatim opinion in the case would have 
looked like, and how it might have affected the larger 
audience. Try also to imagine the modern Supreme Court led 
by someone of Marshall's all—absorbing presence and 
extraordinary rhetorical skills. Would we find ourselves 
returned to the Court's early nineteenth-century "golden 
age"? And would we be happy about it? 
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Notes 
McCulloch v. Maryland 
1 My main sources for the background and history of 
McCulloch v. Maryland, John Marshall, and the Marshall Court 
are Baker; Baxter; Beveridge; Currie, First Hundred Years; 
Friedman and Israel; Gunther; Haines; Hamilton, "Opinion on 
the Constitutionality of the Bank"; Hammond, "The Bank Cases" 
and Banks and Politics in America: Johnson, "Marshall"; 
Jones; Morgan; Newmyer, Justice Joseph Story and The Supreme 
Court under Marshall and Taney; O'Brien; Shevory; Stone et 
al.; Warren; G. Edward White; and James B. White, When Words 
Lose Their Meaning. 
^ There were some opinions "of the Court" issued before 
John Marshall and some seriatim opinions during his tenure 
(Warren 1: 654; G. Edward White 190—91). The "monolithic" 
quality of the Marshall Court was perhaps not quite as solid 
as it originally seemed and has been a subject for debate 
among historians (see Morgan, G. Edward White, Newmyer). But 
Marshall did write 547 of the Court's opinions during his 
thirty—four years; all of the other justices together only 
wrote 574 (G. Edward White 191). And he did work 
successfully to establish the preference for single opinions 
of the Court, and the justices' practice of writing seriatim 
was discouraged. 
3 See Beveridge (1: 57) and Baker (13) on the order of 
Marshall's early educational experiences. 
4 Todd apparently did not attend the Court's 1819 
session, either because of "personal affairs" or "illness" 
(Israel 410). For the February Term, 1819, Henry Wheaton 
reported: "Mr. Justice Todd was absent during the whole of 
this term from indisposition" (4 Wheat. 32). Sadly, for the 
modern student of McCulloch v. Maryland, it seems to make no 
difference whether he was there or not. 
5 In "Marshall, the Marshall Court, and the 
Constitution" (Jones 168—85), Morgan argued in 1956 that "a 
good modern biography" of Joseph Story was needed to help get 
at the truth of the "inner workings of the Marshall Court" 
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(183). In 1985 Newmyer's fine study appeared; ironically, 
however, it is no more able than Morgan's biography of 
William Johnson to reveal what these major figures actually 
contributed to McCulloch. 
® Technically, John James was also a "defendant in 
error" in McCulloch v. Maryland. According to Hammond, James 
was the "informer" who originally confronted McCulloch in the 
Baltimore office, with the intent of establishing that the 
cashier was breaking the new state law (and of collecting a 
portion of the penalty fees) ("Bank Cases" 30—31). Beveridge 
describes James as the "'Treasurer of the Western Shore'" (4: 
283). 
7 Newmyer points out that Marshall might have cited his 
own remarks on implied powers in United States v. Fisher 
(1805), as well as Joseph Story's opinion in Martin v. 
Hunter's Lessee (1816). David P. Currie provides a full 
discussion of links between McCulloch and Fisher (First 
Hundred Years 162—65). 
8 See Bobbitt for a good discussion of "structural 
argument" (74—92). Strauber explores Marshall's use in 
McCulloch of "consequentialist" reasoning (Shevory 137—58). 
James Boyd White admires Marshall's "poetic mode," in which 
language is used as "a way of creating the object of argument 
in such a way as to make argument itself unnecessary" (When 
Words 258). 
® Regarding Marshall's argument from the abstract to the 
particular in McCulloch, James Madison wrote to Virginia 
judge Spencer Roane: 
The occasion did not call for the general and abstract 
doctrine interwoven with the decision of the particular 
case. I have always supposed that the meaning of a law, 
and for a like reason, of a Constitution, so far as it 
depends on judicial interpretation, was to result from a 
course of particular decisions, and not these from a 
previous and abstract comment on the subject. The 
example in this instance tends to reverse the rule (qtd. 
in Warren Is 517). 
And regarding Marshall's rhetorical skill in working 
from premises to conclusions, Joseph Story relates this 
comment by Jefferson: 
151 
When conversing with Marshall, I never admit anything. 
So sure as you admit any position to be good, no matter 
how remote from the conclusion he seeks to establish, 
you are gone. So great is his sophistry you must never 
give him an affirmative answer or you will be forced 
to grant his conclusion. Why, if he were to ask me if 
it were daylight or not, I'd reply, "Sir, I don't know, 
I can't tell" (qtd. in Warren 1: 182). 
See Currie for a critique of Marshall's assumptions 
about the "propriety of the Bank itself" (First Hundred Years 
165). 
II Beveridge argues that Marshall could not have written 
an opinion so long or so excellent in such a short time: "It 
appears to be reasonably probable that at least the framework 
of the opinion in M'Culloch vs. Maryland was prepared by 
Marshall when in Richmond during the summer, autumn, and 
winter of 1818—19" (4: 290). But Baxter refutes this 
speculation, citing Marshall's extensive borrowing from the 
oral arguments, especially those of Pinkney and Webster 
(176—77). Note how the other justices, whatever the actual 
composing process may have been, do not even seem to figure 
in this historical puzzle. 
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PART TWO 
FOUR MODERN CASES 
In A Pragmatic Theory of Rhetoric, Walter H. Beale 
argues for the restoration of rhetoric as the theoretical 
center of the art of discourse in our culture and language. 
For Beale, the "openness and centrality" of rhetoric connect 
its principles with what have historically been key cultural 
and educational values—those of "diversity, pluralism, 
balance, civility, and the recognition of limits" (106). 
Within the larger framework of rhetorical discourse, Beale 
identifies deliberation as "the paradigmatic 'rhetorical' 
art," engaging writers in "matters of choice and value" as 
they attempt to "support opinions or theses about specific 
problems of policy, value, or understanding in human 
communities" (113-14). It is thus a theoretical compliment, 
perhaps not totally deserved, that Beale places Supreme Court 
opinions in the deliberative camp. More specifically, Beale 
characterizes the modern Court's majority opinions as 
"instrumental deliberation," essentially deliberative writing 
in an institutional context, official and formalized, the 
discourse itself serving as an instrument to carry out some 
action (122). 
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Beale's classification points to the generic tension 
inherent in Supreme Court opinions—the conflict between the 
functions of the texts as deliberative forums and 
governmental instruments, between the individual roles of 
justices and their collective institutional identity, and 
between the justices' multiple voices and the Court's single 
judicial voice in a culture of argument. The five seriatim 
opinions of Chisholm v. Georgia suggest some early 
assumptions about the importance of public deliberation among 
the justices and the expectation that each justice would be 
heard, at least on major issues before the Court. The 
composite Chisholm opinion is replete with diversity and 
pluralism, in form as well as content. Apparently no 
negotiation of texts took place: each justice fashioned his 
own piece of writing based on individual notions about 
purpose, audience, subject matter, and the appropriate 
composition of judicial opinions. 
The justices' rhetorical notions varied widely in 
Chisholm. and the cacophony or babble of voices can be 
confusing to readers. The whole effect, in sum, is 
centrifugal. But note the core assumptions about argument 
and audience in the overall structure of multiple or seriatim 
opinions. Each justice speaks individually and publicly; 
indeed, the obligation to explain each vote is crucial to 
what it means to be a Supreme Court justice. The emphasis is 
on persuasion, on winning the respect of listeners and 
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readers. The conversation in all its variety, good and bad, 
strong and weak, takes place in the open. The justices' 
voices are directed to adult citizens who, it is hoped, will 
value civility, balance, and the recognition of limits, both 
in interpreting the texts and in assessing what they all 
"amount to." The synthesis is left to us. 
The modern Supreme Court, following John Marshall's 
model in cases like McCulloch v. Maryland, places 
institutional emphasis on the production of a "majority" 
opinion, a single opinion collectively agreed to by at least 
five of the nine justices. The generation of "minority" or 
"plurality" opinions is viewed as an impractical nightmare by 
legal professionals. Marshall's early reshaping of the 
Court's dynamics of argument and audience reveals the 
pressure of some very different assumptions. In a hostile 
political world, where all audiences are potential enemies 
and any failure to assert or consolidate power becomes 
someone else's prize, the multiple voices of seriatim 
opinions work against the institutional effectiveness and 
power of the Supreme Court as guardian of the Constitution. 
As an example of the Court's single judicial voice, McCulloch 
v. Maryland is not so much "instrumental deliberation" as it 
is a rhetorically smart and practical "instrument" of 
government, all the smarter for its beautifully deliberative 
tone. Marshall's single text serves as a powerful engine 
"whose primary aim," as Beale describes instrumental 
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discourse, "is the governance, guidance, control, or 
execution of human activities" (94). James Boyd White is 
perhaps responding to this effect when he finds that 
McCulloch "seems to be less an interpretation of the 
Constitution than an amendment to it, the overruling of which 
is unimaginable. . . ." (263). 
While all justices speak publicly in seriatim opinions, 
the norm of the Marshall—style single opinion presents 
justices with a very different set of rhetorical dynamics and 
options. The main scene of judicial conversation moves to 
the secrecy of the case conference, where relationships are 
hierarchical and the obligation to persuade takes place 
privately among the justices. Whatever the vote in any one 
case, only one justice must speak in writing the majority 
opinion; the others may choose to speak publicly in separate 
opinions, or to negotiate the majority text privately, or 
even to remain silent altogether. In the realm of Marshall's 
administrative rhetoric, the overall forces are centripetal: 
the ideal is for the Court to speak with a unified 
institutional voice. The text must be able to command its 
audience, winning acceptance for decisions through the 
prestige and power of the institution. 
The values implicit in the single—text opinion are 
unity, order, certainty, efficiency, and authority. The 
stakes are considered too important among professional 
experts to trust the synthesis to public audiences. Thus, 
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the appearance in the modern Court of minority opinions, 
"concurring" or "dissenting," is always seen in some sense as 
a failure to achieve the ideal (or, worse, dissenting voices 
are patronized as passionate dicta). At best, separate 
opinions are tolerated as the unavoidable consequences of our 
expulsion from the institutional Garden of Eden.l Perhaps 
Marshall's real victory as administrative rhetor was in 
setting this single—text preference for the genre of the 
Supreme Court opinion. 
But what if we were to drop the single—text presumption 
and look afresh at some significant modern opinions? What if 
we examined the texts, keeping in mind the full range of 
generic possibilities represented by Chisholm v. Georgia and 
McCulloch v. Maryland? The following four modern opinions 
make especially interesting subjects for such an exploration: 
(1) the 1954 landmark opinion of this century, the school 
segregation cases decided as Brown v. Board of Education; (2) 
the 1971 Pentagon Papers case, New York Times Co. v. United 
States; (3) the 1974 Watergate Tapes case, United States v. 
Nixon: and (4) the 1978 reverse discrimination case, Regents 
of the University of California v. Bakke. 
By Marshall's ideal generic form, the single opinions of 
Brown v. Board of Education and United States v. Nixon should 
be successful texts, triumphs of consensus spun out of the 
Court's private culture of argument. Some justices in each 
case threatened to write separate opinions, but restrained 
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themselves in the end for the perceived good of the country 
and the Court. In contrast, again by Marshall's ideal 
generic form, the multiple opinions of New York Times Co. v. 
United States and Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke should be textual disasters, failures of confrontation 
in which the justices were unable to refrain from public 
displays of bickering and quarreling. In Brown and Nixon. 
the Court's judicial voice speaks in a single unanimous text. 
In the New York Times and Bakke cases, the justices' voices 
are virtually seriatim. 
Are the two single—text opinions, in fact, triumphs of 
consensus? And are the two multiple—text opinions failures 
of confrontation? Form alone will not give us answers to 
these questions. Analyzing the generic forms of these 
opinions will tell us a number of useful things about the 
historical development of judicial and rhetorical 
predilections, but it cannot fully explain matters of 
process, purpose, and substance. As Beale explains in 
discussing the principle of asymmetry in discourse, "form is 
not intrinsically 'locked into' meaning and can never in and 
of itself fully predict meaning" (17). If we were to allow 
that positive, successful processes of argumentation could 
result in seriatim as well as single opinions, then we would 
also need to consider the possibility that argument can 
fail—indeed, the Supreme Court's entire culture of argument 
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can disintegrate—in moments of textual unity as well as 
multiplicity. 
With these generic parameters in mind, I return to the 
question asked in the introduction to this study: Are the 
rising numbers of modern multiple—text opinions a healthy 
re—emergence of argument as reasoned debate and deliberation 
in a mature but increasingly complex and complicated society? 
Or, to ask the other side of the question, are these 
virtually seriatim opinions symptomatic of a breakdown, of a 
loss of national identity and consensus in our culture and 
community, resulting in a rising babble of conflicting voices 
engaged in bickering and dispute? In the justices' recovery 
of their individual voices, has the Court lost the power of 
its judicial voice? 
Some responses to these questions are offered in the 
following sections, which examine the four modern opinions in 
chronological order. All of these difficult, highly 
controversial cases have been extensively chronicled, 
analyzed, and puzzled over by modern commentators. If we 
look at their texts through rhetorical eyes, applying equally 
the generic possibilities suggested by both Chisholm v. 
Georgia and McCulloch v. Maryland, we may be able to 
understand better the opinions themselves and the culture of 
argument they constitute. 
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1. Brown v. Board of Education (1954): 
The Text as Least Tangible Denominator 
The unanimous decision in Brown et al. v. Board of 
Education of Topeka et al., 347 U.S. 483, announced on May 
17, 1954 by Chief Justice Earl Warren, is a prime candidate 
for the landmark case of our century. The justices spoke 
with a single voice in rejecting the practice of racial 
segregation in public schools and in definitively reversing 
any educational application of the Supreme Court's position 
of sixty years—the "separate but equal" doctrine established 
in the 1896 case of Plessv v. Ferguson. The high moral and 
legal drama of the case, however, is not matched by the 
rhetorical impact of the opinion's text. Many readers of 
Brown v. Board of Education, supporters as well as critics, 
professionals and nonprofessionals alike, have been puzzled 
by the blandness, indeed, the paucity of language and 
argumentation in the opinion itself.^ Chief Justice Warren 
deliberately created a generalized, plain—style, low profile 
text intended to form as "intangible" a target as possible 
for hostile audiences. It is a reticent performance at a 
great moment in the Supreme Court's history, suggesting a 
profound ambivalence among the justices about the Court's 
community of authors and audiences, the processes of 
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argumentation and public deliberation in a democratic 
society, and the efficacy and value of language itself. 
The single—text unanimity of Brown signals an emphasis 
on the instrumental functions of the opinion in the tradition 
of John Marshall's administrative rhetoric. The justices 
were well aware, as Richard Kluger relates, of the intense 
national interest and political explosiveness of the four 
cases which were decided together in 1954 as Brown v. Board 
of Education.^ The cases had been argued and reargued for 
two years, beginning in 1952, with literally thousands of 
pages of accumulated briefs and oral arguments (see Kurland 
and Casper, vols. 49—49A). The Court, in no hurry to commit 
institutional suicide, moved slowly and carefully. 
In the middle of this process Chief Justice Fred Vinson 
died, and California governor and former district attorney 
Earl Warren was appointed by President Eisenhower in the fall 
of 1953. Warren was present for the reargument of Brown on 
December 8, 1953, and he later described the "strange course" 
of the arguments made by plaintiffs' counsel Thurgood 
Marshall, who subsequently became an Associate Justice, and 
John W. Davis, the Pinkney—style counsel for the states: 
One might expect, as I did, that the lawyers 
representing black school children would appeal to the 
emotions of the Court based upon many years of 
oppression, and that the states would hold to strictly 
legal matters. More nearly the opposite developed. 
Thurgood Marshall made no emotional appeal, and argued 
the legal issues in a rational manner as cold as steel. 
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On the other hand, states' attorney Davis, a great 
advocate and orator, former Democratic candidate for the 
presidency of the United States, displayed a great deal 
of emotion, and on more than one occasion broke down and 
took a few moments to compose himself (Memoirs 287). 
Warren's appointment apparently assured that there would be 
no split decision, that a real majority of the justices would 
vote to overturn segregation, but the new Chief Justice "did 
not want dissents or concurrences if he could help it" 
(Kluger 683). 
It is quite fitting that Warren, his background 
administrative rather than judicial, should have focused on 
what he saw as the Court's overwhelming institutional need to 
speak on this issue with a single voice. At the case 
conference held on December 12, 1953, Warren strategically 
suggested a delay of the actual vote on Brown; "We decided 
not to make up our minds on that first conference day, . . . 
but to talk it over, from week to week, dealing with 
different aspects of it—in groups, over lunches, in 
conference. It was too important to hurry it" (qtd. in 
Kluger 683). While not literally behind closed boardinghouse 
doors, Warren's strategy of private, small—group 
conversations (over lunch rather than dinner) sounds 
remarkably similar to John Marshall's gentleman's-club 
culture of argument. Warren himself later characterized the 
justices' private deliberations as occurring "in the finest 
collegiate tradition" I Memoirs 2). 
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Kluger recounts, with speculation needed to fill many 
gaps, how Warren eventually won unanimity of vote and voice 
by five months of continuous, patient, low—key interaction 
with the other justices. In addition to Chief Justice 
Warren, eight Associate Justices were involved in the Brown 
decision: Hugo L. Black, Stanley Reed, Felix Frankfurter, 
William 0. Douglas, Robert H. Jackson, Harold Burton, Tom C. 
Clark, and Sherman Minton. A formal vote of all nine was 
taken sometime in February or March of 1954, apparently with 
eight justices in favor of ruling segregation 
unconstitutional and only Stanley Reed of Kentucky 
dissenting.^ As Warren began working on a draft of the 
majority opinion in April, some evidence suggests that he may 
have been worried about possible concurrences from 
Frankfurter and Jackson, as well as Reed's dissent. But in 
the end the Court's private culture of argument reached 
unanimous resolution, with various factors contributing to 
Warren's goal, including Jackson's heart attack, an agreement 
to separate the ruling (Brown I) from the decree (what would 
become Brown II in 1955), and an understanding that a gradual 
rather than immediate dismantling of segregation would be 
ordered (Kluger 657—99). 
To what extent was the actual text of Brown, the 
language and argumentation, negotiated by the justices? The 
answer, according to Bernard Schwartz, seems to be that the 
justices made only "minor stylistic changes" once Warren's 
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draft was circulated (457). Of course, the draft came after 
a long series of private conversations, and we have no way of 
really knowing how much of the spoken language of those 
conversations found its way into Warren's written text. With 
the proliferation of interviews, publication of memoirs, and 
availability of papers, letters, and notebooks, we have 
learned more in retrospect than the original audience for 
Brown could have known, certainly more than we will ever be 
able to retrieve concerning McCulloch v. Maryland. But what 
we have learned about the actual composition of the text 
itself tends to highlight the role of Earl Pollock, one of 
the Chief Justice's law clerks, rather than the participation 
of the other justices. 
The original draft of Brown, prepared sometime during 
the last part of April, was composed in Warren's own 
handwriting, in pencil, on nine pages of a yellow legal pad 
(Schwartz 448). The rough draft is essentially in the form 
that the final opinion takes, as Schwartz comments, but 
without some passages of supporting material, details of case 
citations, and footnotes. Warren asked his law clerks—Earl 
Pollock, William Oliver, and Richard Flynn—to each write a 
draft, based on the Chief Justice's rough draft, over the 
first weekend in May. According to Schwartz, Pollock's draft 
had the most influence on revisions of the text during the 
following week, especially the separation of the District of 
Columbia case from the four state cases and the addition of 
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the controversial references to "psychological knowledge" and 
"modern authority" (the famous or infamous footnote 11 was 
added by Richard Flynn). A fairly complete printed draft of 
Brown was delivered to the other justices on Saturday, May 8. 
Finally, a last printed draft with small changes suggested by 
Pollock and the justices was circulated on May 13 and 
unanimously agreed to by the Court at its case conference on 
Saturday, May 15 (Schwartz 445—60). 
The text of Brown v. Board of Education, as almost all 
commentators have noted, is short and plain, its plainness 
more a result of the general than the concrete. Like John 
Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland, only Chief Justice Warren 
speaks for the Court; unlike Marshall's long, rich rhetorical 
performance, Warren's actual words occupy only about six of 
Brown's thirteen pages. Readers of twentieth-century volumes 
of United States Reports no longer encounter the "hired 
sophisms" of counsel, only a list of their names, but the 
presentation of texts continues to assume an audience of 
legal professionals, with fixed expectations of titles, 
summaries, headnotes, extensive footnotes, and so forth. The 
textual components of Brown break down as follows: 
(1) Title and Abstract 
(2) Record of Counsel, Briefs, 








(3) Warren's Opinion 10 pages (486—496) 
(Footnotes 4+ pages) 
Brevity is a trait associated with instrumental texts, 
but Warren was in no sense a legal technician or 
essentializing strategist in the tradition of John Blair or 
William Cushing. In retrospect, Warren attributed the 
brevity of his opinion to rhetorical considerations of 
audience: 
It was not a long opinion, for I had written it so it 
could be published in the daily press throughout the 
nation without taking too much space. This enabled the 
public to have our entire reasoning instead of a few 
excerpts from a lengthier document (Memoirs 3). 
While the opinion was still in draft, Warren commented to the 
other justices that he had composed it "on the theory" that 
it "should be short, readable by the lay public, 
non—rhetorical, unemotional and, above all, non—accusatory" 
(qtd. in Schwartz 448). No one, of course, would have wished 
it to be needlessly long and repetitive, or confusing and 
unreadable, or biased and inflammatory. But were these the 
only alternatives? 
The key word "non-accusatory" turned out, unfortunately, 
to govern Warren's compositional choices. Two principles 
drive the text that was actually produced: Warren's strong 
conviction that the Court must speak with a single judicial 
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voice and the fear felt by all of the justices of public 
reaction in the South, of a possible threat to the authority 
of the Supreme Court as an institution (Rohde and Spaeth 
200—01). Warren was thus bending over backwards rhetorically 
for two audiences, trying not to offend Justice Reed and 
others in the Court's private culture of argument, as well as 
trying not to shame Southerners directly and publicly in a 
text to be published "in the daily press throughout the 
nation." 
Warren is more successful with his plain—style 
objectives than he is with the odd, general structure of the 
text. He begins with a calm, matter—of—fact recitation of 
the history and background of the four cases, stating in the 
second sentence that "a common legal question justifies their 
consideration together in this consolidated opinion" (486). 
He does not, however, formulate the question at this point. 
Rather, he continues to trace the history of the cases, 
speaking in very general language about "minors of the Negro 
race" and "segregation," along with setting up general lines 
of argument relating to the Fourteenth Amendment's "equal 
protection of the laws" and the "separate but equal" doctrine 
of Plessv v. Ferguson (487—88). On the fourth page of the 
opinion, Warren is still tracing the history of the cases, 
explaining the "inconclusive" results of the reargument 
concerning the 1868 adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment 
(489). In effect, Warren despairs of establishing either 
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"the letter" or "the spirit" of the Constitution in this 
context (489). 
Warren shifts to a history of public education and of 
potentially relevant Supreme Court cases. He contrasts the 
lack of public education in the past, especially in the 
South, and its very different "status" in the present, 
concluding that "it is not surprising that there should be so 
little in the history of the Fourteenth Amendment relating to 
its intended effect on public education" (490). Warren then 
briefly surveys the Supreme Court's handling of early 
Fourteenth Amendment cases, the 1896 case of Plessv v. 
Ferguson. subsequent cases involving but not directly 
questioning the "validity" of Plessv's "separate but equal" 
doctrine, and "more recent" graduate school cases (490—92). 
All of this inquiry is in effect a negative search, 
extensively documented by law-clerk footnotes. 
Note that Warren has yet to state the question 
specifically, and a first—time reader is likely to assume 
that all of this is essentially preliminary material, a full 
narratio setting up what is expected to be a much longer 
text. The transition finally comes on page 492: 
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock 
back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 
1896 when Plessv v. Ferguson was written. We must 
consider public education in the light of its full 
development and its present place in American life 
throughout the Nation" (492—93). 
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The concreteness of the "clock" metaphor is a welcome relief 
after pages of plain but generalized prose, heavy with 
prepositional phrases, and technical footnotes. Warren opts 
for what Charles A. Miller calls "ongoing history" rather 
than "intent history," history as process rather than history 
as event or command (26). "Today" becomes a key word as the 
Chief Justice makes the case that public education, "where 
the state has undertaken to provide it," has become so 
important and so valuable that it is now "a right which must 
be made available to all on equal terms" (493). 
At this point, roughly three-^and-a—half pages into the 
six pages of actual text (not including footnotes), Warren 
finally poses the question of his argument and immediately 
answers it: 
We come then to the question presented: Does segregation 
of children in public schools solely on the basis of 
race, even though the physical facilities and other 
"tangible" factors may be equal, deprive the children of 
the minority group of equal educational opportunities? 
We believe that it does (493). 
Teachers of writing may perhaps smile to recognize this odd 
construction—neither investigative nor classical, neither 
climactic nor anti—climactic—as the burying of the thesis in 
the middle of the text. Warren carries to an extreme, either 
implicitly or explicitly, his own assumptions about the 
conditions he must meet in order to produce a successful 
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piece of discourse in this situation. In an intriguing 
contrast, he relates in his Memoirs the drama of reading 
Brown aloud on May 17, 1954, and the "wave of emotion" that 
swept the courtroom when he added "unanimously" to his oral 
delivery of the opinion: "We unanimously believe that it 
does" (3). The word "unanimously" appears nowhere in the 
text. 
Having posed the central question and given an answer, 
Warren supports the Court's claim with a page—long paragraph. 
He cites two related cases, Sweatt v. Painter and McLaurin v. 
Oklahoma State Regents, in which the Court had ruled that 
"intangible considerations" at the graduate level made 
segregated schools unequal. He links those cases to Brown by 
making an a fortiori argument (an argument from the stronger 
case): 
Such considerations apply with added force to children 
in grade and high schools. To separate them from others 
of similar age and qualifications solely because of 
their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to 
their status in the community that may affect their 
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone 
(494). 
This passage is as close as Warren comes to an emotional 
appeal. Even here, however, it was toned down somewhat by 
the deletion of "little" before "hearts and minds" (Schwartz 
455). 
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Warren's supporting paragraph is further developed, as 
Schwartz explains, by two additions by law clerk Earl 
Pollock: (1) a long quotation from the lower court's opinion 
in the Kansas case (no judge's name given), which comments on 
the "detrimental effect" of legal segregation on "colored 
children"; and (2) a confusing reference to Plessv. 
"psychological knowledge," and "modern authority": 
"Whatever may have been the extent of psychological 
knowledge at the time of Plessv v. Ferguson, this 
finding is amply supported by modern authority. Any 
language in Plessv v. Ferguson contrary to this finding 
is rejected (494). 
To the first sentence law clerk Richard Flynn added what 
became the much debated "footnote 11" listing authors and 
studies from the social sciences (Schwartz 457—58), all of 
which caused James Reston to declare in the New York Times 
that the "Court's opinion read more like an expert paper on 
sociology than a Supreme Court opinion" (14). 
Much later, Warren dismissed the matter as "only a note, 
after all," Flynn described his citations as "obvious" 
choices with no method to the order of their listing, and 
Pollock explained the reasoning behind his two sentences: 
It seemed to me that the most noxious part of Plessv was 
the notion that, if Negroes found segregation a "badge 
of inferiority," that was sort of in the eye of the 
beholder. I was looking for a way to part company and 
to say that, whatever the situation in the 1890's, we 
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know a lot more about law in society than we did then 
(qtd. in Schwartz 458). 
The added passage and the subsequent controversy over the use 
of sociology and psychology as evidence, essentially another 
twist of the "Brandeis brief," have been argued and reargued 
by numerous commentators. Why did Warren and the other 
justices allow such a hot—button passage to remain in a text 
intended to keep everyone calm? Brown was not a hurried 
opinion, and certainly Warren and the justices all approved 
the final text, thus accepting the responsibilities of 
authorship, at least at some level. 
If we ask what voices are included in this textual 
conversation—who actually gets to say what to whom—then we 
are confronted with a problem of what Joseph Vining calls the 
"authenticity" of the text. In The Authoritative and 
theAuthoritarian. Vining expresses concern for the late 
twentieth-century transformation of Supreme Court opinions 
from authentic texts to bureaucratic writing, from the 
"unified mind" of a person speaking to the mechanical outcome 
of a composite institutional process, as if the Court like 
other governmental agencies had established its own 
opinion—writing department (9—15). Vining argues that texts 
"exert their authority over us and command our respect and 
serious attention only to the extent that we hear a person 
speaking through them. Their authority rests on the sense of 
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mind behind them" (14). This is a perfect description of the 
powerful effect created by John Marshall in McCulloch v. 
Maryland. For Vining, modern Supreme Court opinions have 
lost this authority: 
Now opinions too often seem things written by no one at 
all. . . . they are things of patchwork which seem, on 
their face, to express the institutional process of 
their making rather than the thinking, feeling, and 
reasoning of the author and those persuaded with him 
(12). 
Of course, 1954 is not the late twentieth—century, and 
I am focusing on only a small passage of Brown. A multitude 
of other Supreme Court texts would make better examples of 
bureaucratic writing. Looking back, however, at the 
tremendous attention paid to this one passage and the swirl 
of consternation, analysis, and debate across the country, I 
find Vining's thesis illuminating. How could such a 
disjunction occur in the rhetorical transaction between 
writer and reader? Reston and subsequent respondents to this 
passage in Brown made the natural assumption that Warren, 
with the approval if not the active participation of the 
other justices, used the evidence of "modern authority" as an 
integral component of the decision—making process and final 
judgment. In other words, readers like Reston took every 
line of the short text seriously, including the footnotes. 
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Warren executes one last transition in the text, moving 
to a full instrumental statement of the justices' decision: 
We conclude that in the field of public education, the 
doctrine of "separate but equal" has no place. Separate 
educational facilities are inherently unequal. 
Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others 
similarly situated for whom the actions have been 
brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, 
deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed 
by the Fourteenth Amendment (495). 
The reader hungers for amplification of the first two 
sentences, for clear thought and powerful language to inform 
and enrich the Court's great moment of courage. The choice 
of the adverb "inherently" is especially provocative. But by 
the third sentence, Warren has completed his transition into 
the rhetoric of bureaucracy, and the rest of the text focuses 
only on technical matters—dispositions, class actions, and 
decrees. 
In the opinion's last paragraph, Warren concludes by 
explaining why no decree accompanies the Court's ruling in 
Brown and ordering further argument for the next term to 
determine "appropriate relief." The ending sounds very much 
like John Blair suggesting the wording for a court order at 
the end of his Chisholm opinion. As Warren deals with 
instructions in a business—like fashion, we do hear John 
Marshall's voice in one sentence: "We have now announced that 
such segregation is a denial of the equal protection of the 
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laws" (495). It is the same sense of the text as instrument, 
of the opinion as a public institutional act which, once 
delivered, changes reality even as the text progresses from 
one part to another. 
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2. New York Times Co. v. United States (1971) 
The Pentagon Papers Cases 
The Text as Open Debate or Frenetic Parody? 
The 1971 Pentagon Papers case, New York Times Co. v. 
United States, 403 U.S. 713, provides a revealing public 
snapshot of the justices' internal culture of argument. 
Dramatically informed by the context of the Vietnam War 
protest and the seriousness of First Amendment issues, the 
entire episode lasted only seventeen days. In contrast to 
the Court's slow, careful approach to Brown v. Board of 
Education, the quickness with which the justices moved in the 
New York Times case is commonly cited as the reason for their 
issuance of a multiple—text opinion, resulting "more by 
happenstance than by design" (Rohde and Spaeth 189). Serving 
on the Court at the time were Chief Justice Warren E. Burger 
and Associate Justices Hugo L. Black, William 0. Douglas, 
William J. Brennan, Potter Stewart, Byron R. White, Thurgood 
Marshall, John Marshall Harlan, and Harry A. Blackmun. The 
justices simply did not have time to negotiate a 
Marshall—style majority opinion, so they delivered a short 
per curiam opinion, an unsigned technical opinion by the 
Court, and all nine members of the Court wrote separate 
opinions—six concurring and three dissenting. 
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We thus get to hear the individual voices of the 
justices debating around the conference table, as it were, 
and the composite of ten opinions is virtually seriatim in 
form. Instead of the collective, institutional blandness of 
the Court's judicial voice in Brown, the justices in New 
York Times engage in an active public conversation with 
strong feelings strongly expressed, the "open debate and 
discussion" so prized as a constitutional principle by 
Associate Justice Douglas (724). But Chief Justice Burger 
was not at all pleased with such open deliberations, 
criticizing the "frenetic haste" of the whole process and 
calling the result a "parody of the judicial function" 
(749,752). The rhetorical dynamics of the opinion were 
apparently embarrassing to the Court's closed culture of 
argument, at least to some justices, but the multiple voices 
are fascinating to outside readers in both serious and 
humorous ways. As an audience, we find ourselves adult 
citizens, pleased at the opportunity to synthesize and assess 
the deliberation of the justices, and at the same time we 
cannot help but be curious children, amused by an unexpected 
glance behind the judicial curtain. 
The case originated with the publication of excerpts 
from classified government documents on June 13, 1971 in the 
Sunday edition of the New York Times.^ Daniel Ellsberg, at 
one time a Pentagon official, had given the Times a copy of 
"top secret" studies of the Vietnam War and the thirty—plus 
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years of American involvement in Indochina, works that had 
been assembled by theDefense Department in 1967 and 1968 at 
the request of Robert McNamara. Included in the materials 
were forty—seven volumes of text and source documents, 
designated as "History of U.S. Decision—Making Process on 
Vietnam Policy," and a summary of a 1965 volume entitled 
"Command and Control Study of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident" 
(Kurland and Casper 71: 7). The Times published more on 
Monday, June 14, and Tuesday, June 15, by which time the 
government (i.e., the Nixon administration), claiming dire 
threats to national security, was granted a temporary 
restraining order and moved for a preliminary injunction in a 
lower federal court. By Friday, June 18, the Washington Post 
was also publishing excerpts from the secret documents and 
was similarly restrained. 
The situation was explosive, given the anguished public 
debate over Vietnam, the suggestions of governmental 
deception revealed in the secret documents, and the 
extraordinary prior restraint placed on the free press—the 
New York Times and the Washington Post. Both governmental 
actions moved quickly through the lower courts, with 
"jittery" judges worried variously about the execution of 
prisoners of war, on the one hand, and the death of the First 
Amendment, on the other. By Thursday, June 24, the Supreme 
Court had received petitions, and on Saturday, June 26, the 
justices heard oral arguments in the combined cases, New York 
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Times Co. v. United States and United States v. Washington 
Post Co. Solicitor General Erwin N. Griswold argued for the 
United States, Alexander M. Bickel for the New York Times, 
and William R. Glendon for the Washington Post. As the 
record of the oral argument amusingly demonstrates, none of 
the legal participants in this drama had had time actually to 
study the briefs or the "top secret" documents themselves, 
including the counsel who were arguing on both sides and the 
justices who were asked to decide fundamental questions of 
national security and freedom of the press (Kurland and 
Casper 71: 213—61).^ 
Just four days later, on Wednesday, June 30, the 
justices delivered their 6—3 decision in favor of the 
newspapers, ruling that the government had not met the "heavy 
burden" of justifying prior restraint. The three-paragraph 
per curiam opinion, appearing first in the text after the 
conventional syllabus, is a pure piece of instrumental 
discourse: precedents are abruptly quoted; directions are 
given, with various lower court actions "affirmed," 
"reversed," "remanded," or "vacated"; and the Court's 
judgments are commanded to "issue forthwith" (714). The full 
fifty pages of the text of New York Times Co. v. United 
States divide into the following sections: 
(1) Syllabus 







(3) Black concurring 5+ pages 
(with Douglas) 
(4) Douglas concurring 4+ pages 
(with Black) 
(5) Brennan concurring 2+ pages 
(6) Stewart concurring 3 pages 
(with White) 
(7) White concurring 
(with Stewart) 
10 pages 
(footnotes 4+ pages) 
(8) Marshall concurring 7+ pages 
(9) Burger dissenting 4+ pages 
(10) Harlan dissenting 6+ pages 
(with Burger & Blackmun) 










The dominant impression for readers is one of diversity 
and plurality in both style and content. We hear a 
multiplicity of personal voices as the justices speak to each 
other and the public in seriatim form. Indeed, the personal 
pronoun "I" appears over sixty times throughout the texts. 
Two interesting elements, however, make this modern generic 
version of a multiple—text opinion different from Chisholm v. 
Georgia. First, the deliberation is interactive. The 
justices are not engaged merely in th6 composition of 
intersecting monologues: they know everyone's vote as they 
write, and they have obviously read drafts of each other's 
opinions. Some of the justices join with each other, and 
some make specific references in their texts to the texts of 
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other "Brethren." Second, unlike the reverse seniority 
practiced in Chisholm (no matter what the vote), there is a 
logical pattern to the order of texts, with the six 
concurring justices speaking first, followed by the three 
dissenting justices. 
After the institutional discourse of the per curiam 
opinion, the fireworks begin on page 714, with the First 
Amendment absolutism of Hugo L. Black's concurring opinion, 
joined by William O. Douglas. A populist Alabama Democrat, 
reader of the classics, and New Deal liberal appointed by 
Roosevelt in 1937, Black reveled in the opportunity to stand 
on the free press principles challenged in this case.7 The 
text of his opinion, with its straight—to—the—point, 
anti—climactic structure, suggests the essentializing, 
plain—language strategy of John Blair, but without Blair's 
interest in legal technicalities. Black announces in his 
first sentence that the government's case should have been 
dismissed without any hearing. The second sentence conveys 
his position clearly and strongly: "I believe that every 
moment's continuance of the injunctions against these 
newspapers amounts to a flagrant, indefensible, and 
continuing violation of the First Amendment" (714—15). 
Black's text incorporates a variety of voices, including 
concurring justices Douglas and Brennan; "some members of the 
Court" who have chosen to dissent, with whom Black is 
obviously annoyed; Solicitor General Griswold; Chief Justice 
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Charles Evans Hughes; the Founding Fathers and the Framers; 
and, most extensively, James Madison. Arguing against any 
interpretation that would restrict the First Amendment, Black 
combines his faith in plain language with an obvious 
confidence in the importance of historical context, the kind 
of love of history demonstrated by James Iredell: 
I can imagine no greater perversion of history. Madison 
and the Framers of the First Amendment, able men that 
they were, wrote in language they earnestly believed 
could never be misunderstood: "Congress shall make no 
law. . . abridging the freedom. . . of the press. . . ." 
Both the history and the language of the First Amendment 
support the view that the press must be left free to 
publish news, whatever the source, without censorship, 
injunctions, or prior restraints (716—17). 
The New York Times and Washington Post, in fact, had filled 
their roles precisely, according to Black, with "courageous 
reporting" intended to thwart just the sort of governmental 
deception that would send people "off to distant lands to die 
of foreign fevers and foreign shot and shell" (717). Black 
ends with a close look at the word "security," rejecting the 
government's amorphous definition of the term and insisting 
on the "real security" of the people's constitutional right 
to freedom of the press. 
William 0. Douglas, joined by Black, also uses an 
essentializing strategy in presenting his argument. Another 
Roosevelt appointment from 1939, Douglas was an equally 
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strong advocate of individual liberties and freedom of 
speech, a justice who combined expertise in finance and 
corporate law with a passionate devotion to the environment 
as a widely published and controversial writer, international 
traveler, and conservationist.8 Douglas begins by stating 
his agreement with the per curiam opinion, then presents his 
confirming argument in two short sentences: 
It should be noted at the outset that the First 
Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law. . . 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." That 
leaves, in my view, no room for governmental restraint 
on the press (720). 
The rest of Douglas1s text refutes in a professional fashion, 
similar to John Blair's approach, the arguments presented by 
Griswold and the government. Douglas's "moreover" additions 
are listed in a string—like sequence, with numerous 
one—sentence paragraphs. He conducts a negative search of 
various congressional statutes; dismisses the classified 
documents as "all history, not future events"; cites 
precedents concerning the burden of proof in prior restraint 
situations, including the voice of Chief Justice Hughes in 
Near v. Minnesota: and refers readers to various writers on 
issues of free speech. Toward the end of his paratactic 
structure, Douglas explains concisely why he so values free 
speech: "Secrecy in government is fundamentally 
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anti—democratic, perpetuating bureaucratic errors. Open 
debate and discussion of public issues are vital to our 
national health" (724). 
William J. Brennan, an Eisenhower appointee of 1956 and 
strong supporter of the "passive liberties," contributes a 
short two—page opinion intended to affect interpretation of 
the Court's actions and to ward off future problems.^ 
Brennan's anti—climactic structure conveys a single message: 
I write separately in these cases only to emphasize what 
should be apparent: that our judgments in the present 
cases may not be taken to indicate the propriety, in the 
future, of issuing temporary stays and restraining 
orders to block the publication of material sought to be 
suppressed by the Government (724—25). 
Not at all tempted to write an essay, Brennan simply drives 
home, in general agreement with Black, the "error" of the 
lower courts in granting in the first place "any injunctive 
relief whatsoever, interim or otherwise" (725). Unlike 
Black, Brennan does allow for a narrow type of exception for 
prior restraint, citing Schenck v. United States and Near v. 
Minnesota. The country must be "at war," and the government 
must prove that publication would "inevitably, directly, and 
immediately" cause harm to troops or transports (726—27). 
Black, Douglas, and Brennan appear to have had little 
trouble composing their opinions; at least the texts in their 
thesis—first structures convey a sense of certainty and 
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confidence about the issue at stake and what they feel to be 
the appropriate decision. Potter Stewart, on the other hand, 
constructs an investigative, hypotactic text reflecting a 
cautious process of inquiry, with the statement of his 
position saved for a James Wilson—style last, sentence: "I 
join the judgments of the Court" (730). Stewart, another 
Eisenhower appointee from 1958, Midwestern pragmatist, and 
Hotchkiss—Yale Republican, unfolds his argument as a 
d i l e m m a . A t  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  t h e  o p i n i o n ,  j o i n e d  b y  B y r o n  
R. White, Stewart sets up an X—yet—Y conflict between the 
importance of an "enlightened citizenry" and the need for 
"confidentiality and secrecy" in national defense and 
international relations. 
Stewart resolves this dilemma by placing the 
"responsibility" for assuring appropriate security "where the 
power is"—i.e., the problem belongs to the executive branch 
(728). The justice then delivers a mini—lecture on duty, 
wisdom, and the value of "avoiding secrecy for its own sake" 
in dealing with such responsibility: "For when everything is 
classified, then nothing is classified. ..." (729). 
Stewart delineates the functions that Congress and the courts 
may perform, with attention to procedures and criminal laws, 
and he hints that some of the documents he has seen may be 
dangerous. He is unable, however, to "say that disclosure of 
any of them will surely result in direct, immediate, and 
irreparable damage to our Nation or its people" (730). His 
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careful balancing and sorting act completed, Stewart renders 
his judgment. 
Byron R. White, joined by Stewart, writes an equally 
cautious and qualified opinion. A 1962 Kennedy appointment, 
former clerk to Chief Justice Vinson, and Deputy Attorney 
General, Colorado football star "Whizzer" White turned out to 
be.a surprise conservative on the Court.^ White presents 
his reluctantly concurring decision in the very first 
sentence: "I concur in today's judgments, but only because of 
the concededly extraordinary protection against prior 
restraints enjoyed by the press under our constitutional 
system" (730—31). Cautioning that there may be circumstances 
that would permit prior restraint, and that some of the 
secret documents will do damage, White goes on to reason 
that, nevertheless, the government has not met the "heavy 
burden" of proof required, especially in the "absence of 
express and appropriately limited congressional 
authorization" (731). 
Unlike Black's hints of governmental deception, White's 
attitude toward the government's position is trusting: "It is 
not easy to reject the proposition urged by the United States 
and to deny relief on its good—faith claims in these cases 
that publication will work serious damage to the country" 
(733). White presents himself here as the careful, reluctant 
jurist, analyzing claims of executive "inherent powers" and 
reviewing congressional guidance from the Espionage Act of 
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1917 and the Criminal Code, all replete with detailed 
footnotes. He concludes his anti—climactic structure by 
sliding almost imperceptibly into semi-menacing obiter dicta. 
putting the newspapers "on full notice" and warning them 
that, while he cannot sanction prior restraint in this 
situation, he would have no trouble with upholding criminal 
convictions. Then, almost as if in a literal conversation 
and unable to revise what he has just said, he backs 
awkwardly out of his text by qualifying his warning: "I am 
not, of course, saying that either of these newspapers has 
yet committed a crime . . ." (740). 
Thurgood Marshall's text is the sixth and last in the 
sequence of concurring opinions. The cool counsel in Brown 
v. Board of Education and liberal activist, Marshall was 
appointed by Johnson in 1967 as the Court's first 
African—American justice.12 Like Potter Stewart, Marshall 
creates a climactic, investigative text that begins with a 
statement of the government's contention and ends with a 
James Iredell—style rejection of judicial activism: "It is 
not for this Court to fling itself into every breach 
perceived by some Government official nor is it for this 
Court to take on itself the burden of enacting law, 
especially a law that Congress has refused to pass" (747). 
Sounding a little like James Wilson, Marshall begins by 
redefining the "ultimate issue" as "whether this Court or the 
Congress has the power to make law" (741). Of course, as 
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soon as Marshall has formulated the question in this way, we 
know what the final answer will be. Taking Younqstown Sheet 
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer and the concept of the separation of 
powers, Marshall explores the roles of the three branches of 
government, focusing particularly on what Congress has done 
and has declined to do and citing various cases, statutes, 
and studies along the way. After rejecting what he sees as 
judicial activism, Marshall ends with a final pragmatic 
sentence, suggesting appropriate orders for the lower courts 
in instrumental fashion. 
With the next text, the dissenting opinion of Chief 
Justice Warren E. Burger, the judicial conversation moves 
from the deliberate, determined exposition of Thurgood 
Marshall to an extraordinary sense of alarm. Burger, a 1969 
Nixon appointment and conservative Minnesota Republican, was 
clearly unhappy with even hearing this case in June of 1971, 
but for quite different reasons from those of Hugo L. 
Black.13 Burger starts calmly enough, describing the 
justices' common ground on prior restraint and insisting that 
"little variation among the members of the Court" exists on 
this issue (748). But he also insists that the factors in 
this situation are not simple and shifts quickly to what he 
sees as a "collision" between "a free and unfettered press" 
and "the effective functioning of a complex modern 
government" (748). 
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By the second paragraph, Burger's growing anger is 
apparent in his use of repetition: 
These cases are not simple for another and more 
immediate reason. We do not know the facts of the 
cases. No District Judge knew all the facts. No Court 
of Appeals judge knew all the facts. No member of this 
Court knows all the facts (748). 
He questions why the Court is in this position in the first 
place, and then he launches an extended attack on the speed 
with which the whole affair has unfolded—the "unseemly 
haste," "hectic pressures," "unjudicial haste," "frenetic 
haste," "precipitate action," "unwarranted deadlines," 
"frenetic pressures," "needless pressure," and "arbitrary 
deadlines" (748—52). As an alternative to "all this 
melancholy series ofevents," Burger calls for "thoughtful, 
reflective deliberation" and "orderly litigation" (749, 751). 
In an obvious reference to Black, Burger dismisses First 
Amendment absolutism and lectures the New York Times on the 
responsibilities of great newspapers and the "duty" to report 
"stolen property or secret government documents": "That duty, 
I had thought—perhaps naively-was to report forthwith, to 
responsible public officers. This duty rests on taxi 
drivers, Justices, and the New York Times" (751). Burger 
concludes by agreeing "generally" with his co-dissenters, 
Harlan and Blackmun, and with White's warning about criminal 
prosecution, but the Chief Justice expresses such a state of 
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distress that he cannot "reach the merits" of the case (752). 
He simply wants it to go back to the lower courts. His final 
sentence sums up his disgust: "We all crave speedier judicial 
processes but when judges are pressured as in these cases the 
result is a parody of the judicial function" (752). 
In the second of the three dissents, John Marshall 
Harlan, joined by Burger and Blackmun, continues the theme of 
"unseemly haste," but in a somewhat more controlled manner. 
Appointed by Eisenhower in 1955, Harlan was the grandson of a 
Supreme Court justice, Wall Street lawyer, and intense hard 
worker who loved technical procedures and judicial 
restraint.14 Harlan begins by quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
Jr.'s famous remark about great cases ("great cases like hard 
cases make bad law"), and then he details an hour—by—hour 
chronology of the case's "frenzied train of events," labeling 
the Court "almost irresponsibly feverish" in this situation 
(752—53). Disgusted with the lack of procedure, Harlan 
patiently lists seven questions that the Court should have 
considered and, with a tone of resignation, states his 
judgment in the middle of the opinion: "Forced as I am to 
reach the merits of these cases, I dissent from the opinion 
and judgments of the Court" (755). 
Harlan presents his reasoning in "telescoped form," 
talking in terms of lower court actions, proper procedures, 
and limits on the Supreme Court's powers in regard to the 
executive branch (755). He quotes Chief Justice John 
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Marshall on the power of the President, George Washington on 
the need for secrecy in foreign affairs, and Justice Robert 
H. Jackson on restrictions of the judicial role. Not 
surprisingly, Harlan emphasizes his disapproval of the lower 
courts' lack of "deference" to the "conclusions of the 
Executive" (758). And he ends with a call for the 
Secretaries of State and Defense to testify on national 
security and gives directions (what he would do, if he were 
in the majority) for the lower courts: "Pending further 
hearings in each case conducted under the appropriate ground 
rules, I would continue the restraints on publication" 
(758-59). 
The third dissent and final text in New York Times Co. 
v. United States, the opinion of Harry A. Blackmun, combines 
the tone of Burger's alarm over "unseemly haste" with 
Harlan's patient concern with proper procedures. Nixon's 
third nominee for the Supreme Court in 1970 (after the 
rejections of Haynesworth and Carswell), the recently 
appointed Blackmun, a Minnesota conservative and close friend 
of Burger, brought to the Court in 1971 a dislike for 
judicial activism, absolutism, and societal permissiveness. 
The justice who would be the author of Roe v. Wade was not an 
ideologue, however, and his dissenting opinion in the New 
York Times case hints that, if proper and orderly procedures 
had been followed, he might have decided the issue otherwise. 
He constructs an anti—climactic text, matter-of—factly 
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joining in the conversation with the other justices: "I join 
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN in his dissent. I also am in substantial 
accord with much that MR. JUSTICE WHITE says, by way of 
admonition, in the latter part of his opinion" (759). 
Also using Holmes's "great cases" quotation, Blackmun 
deplores the "strain" and "sensationalism" of the entire 
situation, criticizes the New York Times for what he sees as 
hypocrisy, and laments the lack of "careful deliberation" in 
the various courts (759, 761). Sounding rather like Chief 
Justice John Marshall declaring that "it is a constitution we 
are expounding," Blackmun calls for a proportional strategy 
of constitutional interpretation: 
The First Amendment, after all, is only one part of an 
entire Constitution. Article II of the great document 
vests in the Executive Branch primary power over the 
conduct of foreign affairs and places in that branch the 
responsibility for the Nation's safety. Each provision 
of the Constitution is important, and I cannot subscribe 
to a doctrine of unlimited absolutism for the First 
Amendment at the cost of downgrading other provisions. 
First Amendment absolutism has never commanded a 
majority of this Court (761).16 
Feeling that the cases, the issues, and the courts "deserve 
better," Blackmun details what he thinks is needed to 
consider the matter properly and ends with a strong warning 
to the press. Convinced that some of the secret documents 
could do harm, he figuratively shakes his finger at the two 
newspapers, reminding them of their "ultimate 
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responsibilities to the United States of America" and the 
"sad consequences" which they may bring about (763). 
Chief Justice Burger, despite his dissenting position, 
delivered the opinion of the Court on June 30, 1971. 
Afterwards, he insisted that the justices had been "actually 
unanimous," that the dissents had been over procedure, not 
substance.*7 Are the multiple voices heard in New York Times 
Co. v. United States positive instances of healthy debate or 
negative signs of institutional disintegration? We certainly 
get Vining's strong "sense of mind" behind each text, of 
people speaking with a variety of human reactions ranging 
from celebration to outrage. And the Court did survive, at 
least for that year. Perhaps the answer depends, at least in 
part, on how comfortable we are with thinking of justices as 
people, and of valuing their Supreme Court opinions as 
rhetorically significant texts. 
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3. United States v. Nixon (1974) 
The Watergate Tapes Case: 
The Text as Judicial Privilege 
In New York Times Co. v. United States, the explosive 
1971 Pentagon Papers case, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger 
added a revealing footnote to his dissenting opinion. The 
footnote draws an analogy between what Burger saw as the 
President's "inherent power" to classify sensitive materials 
and the Supreme Court's unspoken right to "establish and 
enforce the utmost security measures for the secrecy of our 
deliberations and records" (752). Three years later, in the 
even more explosive context of the 1974 Watergate Tapes case, 
United States v. Nixon. Chief Justice Burger returned to the 
same theme, this time in the main text, comparing the 
"expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his 
conversations and correspondence" with the "claim of 
confidentiality of judicial deliberations" (708). The 
multiple—text opinion in the New York Times case opens to 
public view, in one instance at least, the Court's closed 
culture of argument. But the unanimous single—text opinion 
delivered by Burger in United States v. Nixon ironically 
preserves the "confidentiality of judicial deliberations," 
pretending to offer readers a Marshall—style text as the 
united institutional voice of the Court. In fact, the 
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opinion is an odd, fragmented, multiple—authored text filled 
with unreconciled voices. 
The Watergate scandal began in the summer of 1972, as 
David M. O'Brien explains, with an attempted break—in at the 
Democratic party headquarters, located in the Watergate 
apartment complex in Washington, D. C.*® The burglars, 
planning to install secret listening devices, were working 
for Republican President Richard M. Nixon's personal campaign 
organization, the Committee to Re—elect the President 
(CREEP). Through a deliberate cover-Hip, Nixon and his aides 
were able to "appear" as surprised and shocked as everyone 
else at this illegal activity, and Nixon went on to win a 
second presidential term that November. The cover—up 
unraveled, however, during 1973 and early 1974 through the 
efforts of many different actors involved in this 
simultaneously petty and grand political drama, until the 
summer of 1974 when the Supreme Court ruled on the White 
House's claim of executive privilege, the House of 
Representatives prepared articles of impeachment, and 
President Nixon was forced to resign. As John Brigham 
comments, the "events of Watergate evolved from mystery 
theater to morality play with the Supreme Court slipping from 
neutral observer to the side of the angels as the identity of 
the angels became clear" (49). 
The actors involved in the plot's unraveling included 
the following: John Sirica, a federal district court judge 
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who tried the burglars and pressed determinedly for public 
disclosure; Sam Ervin, a North Carolina senator who chaired 
the Select Committee on Presidential Activities; John Dean, a 
presidential counsel who "kissed and told" a lot, if not all, 
to Ervin's committee; Alexander Butterfield, an 
administration employee who revealed that Nixon had 
ironically "bugged" his own office; Archibald Cox, a special 
prosecutor who, upon refusing to accept Nixon's compromise 
offer on releasing taped conversations, was fired by Robert 
Bork in the "Saturday Night Massacre," along with Elliot 
Richardson and William Ruckelshaus; and Leon Jaworski, Cox's 
replacement, who pursued the release of Nixon's "Watergate" 
tapes all the way to the Supreme Court. 
The Court became a key factor in the Watergate scandal 
on May 31, 1974, when the justices agreed to hear United 
States v. Nixon, an appeal by special prosecutor Jaworski, 
who had been frustrated in his attempt to subpoena from the 
administration various documents and tapes of conversations 
recorded in the White House. Two months before, a federal 
grand jury had indicted administration aides and had secretly 
named Nixon as an unindicted co-conspirator.A September 
trial had been scheduled, and Jaworski was particularly 
interested in obtaining Nixon's tape—recorded conversations. 
Simultaneously, the House Judiciary Committee also wanted the 
tapes for its hearings on impeachment. Eight justices were 
involved in hearing the case; Chief Justice Burger and 
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Associate Justices William 0. Douglas, William J. Brennan, 
Potter Stewart, Byron R. White, Thurgood Marshall, Harry A. 
Blackmun, and Lewis F. Powell, Jr. The ninth justice, 
William H. Rehnquist, disqualified himself, apparently 
because of his former position in Nixon's Justice Department. 
The justices scheduled oral argument for July 8, 1974, with 
Jaworski representing the United States and James St. Clair 
serving as Nixon's counsel. 
As the transcript of the oral argument shows, Nixon's 
counsel, claiming executive privilege and citing the 
separation of powers, was careful not to be pinned down on 
the basic issue of the Court's authority to decide whether 
Nixon had to hand over the tapes (Kurland and Casper 79: 
837—915). Other hints of possible defiance, if the Court 
were to rule against Nixon, carried implications of a truly 
dangerous constitutional crisis, with the justices at center 
stage, now fearing a threat to their authority and the 
viability of their own institution (Rohde and Spaeth 201—03). 
Sixteen days later, on July 24, 1974, Burger delivered the 
Court's unanimous 8—0 ruling, insisting in the tradition of 
John Marshall that it was the Court's responsibility to "say 
what the law is," and that the President was not protected by 
his claim of absolute, unreviewable executive privilege. 
O'Brien describes concisely the effect of the Court's 
unanimous opinion: 
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The announcement was dramatic and devastating for the 
President. Later that day, the House Judiciary 
Committee began televized debates on the exact wording 
of its articles of impeachment. Two weeks later, on 
August 8, 1974, Nixon resigned (222). 
During those sixteen days between oral argument and 
announcement, what happened in the Court's closed, private 
culture of argument? At the time, of course, the 
"confidentiality of judicial deliberations" so important to 
Burger was preserved, supporting a kind of judicial privilege 
for the justices even as they were limiting the President's 
claim of executive privilege. In retrospect, however, we do 
know a fair amount about the dynamics of argumentation that 
resulted in the odd text of United States v. Nixon. Like 
other famous cases that have passed into the category of 
"history," such as Brown v. Board of Education, the Nixon 
case has been illuminated over the years by the proliferation 
of interviews, reminiscences, papers, and so forth. 
O'Brien draws on the papers of William J. Brennan to 
trace the private deliberations of the justices and the final 
text that was negotiated. The unanimous vote was apparently 
not a problem, but the generation of the opinion was. In the 
best tradition of John Marshall's administrative rhetoric, 
Burger had assigned the opinion to himself as Chief Justice, 
only to find that the other justices had problems with the 
degree of "deference" shown to Nixon in early drafts 
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(219—21). The justices (and their law clerks) worked 
intensively on various sections of the text, engaging in a 
series of textual and personal exchanges—drafts, 
counter—drafts, composite counter—drafts, memoranda with 
suggested revisions, proposals for alternative sections 
orsubsections, small—group conversations of the justices in 
various combinations, and strategy sessions with justices' 
law clerks. 
Through this process of negotiation, a single text was 
finally assembled, according to O'Brien, with different 
justices in effect writing different sections: 
Blackmun's work became incorporated in the statement of 
facts. The first section, on matters of jurisdiction, 
reflected Douglas's work. The second, on 
justiciability, was a compromised version of drafts by 
Burger and Brennan. The third, dealing with subpoenaing 
the President, drew on White's early work. Powell, 
Stewart, and Brennan had a hand in drafting various 
parts of the final section, on judicial review of claims 
to executive privilege (221). 
This is apparently what happened, although we will never know 
for certain how accurate the account is (Thurgood Marshall is 
oddly missing from the composition process altogether). The 
text of the opinion is marked off in sections matching the 
purported division of labor: 
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(1) Syllabus 






Statement of Facts (4 pages) 
I. Jurisdiction (2 pages) 
II. Justiciability (5 pages) 
III. Rule 17 (c) (5+ pages) 
IV. The Claim of Privilege (13+ pages) 
Untitled subsections A through E 
But when we examine the opinion as recorded in United States 
Reports, UNITED STATES v. NIXON. PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES. ET AL.. 418 U.S. 683, we find only that Chief Justice 
Burger, joined by all the participating justices, "delivered 
the opinion of the Court" (686). 
If we really want to understand who is saying what to 
whom, then we find ourselves on the horns of a dilemma. On 
the one hand, if we accept at face value the designation of 
Burger as author, then we naturally say "Burger argues," or 
"Burger intends," or "Burger constructs his text in one way 
or another." But Burger was apparently not the author in any 
meaningful sense. If we assume, on the other hand, that the 
text was patched together by multiple authors, unidentified 
in any specific passage, then we are forced into expressions 
such as "the text argues," or "the institution intends," or 
"the Court constructs its text in one way or another." But 
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people argue, have intentions, and construct texts—not texts 
themselves (that is an absurdity), not institutions, not even 
the Supreme Court of the United States.^ Thus, United 
States v. Nixon is, in one sense, a Marshall—style 
single—text opinion, an example of the Court's judicial voice 
serving an instrumental purpose. But it is very different 
from the strong deliberative voice of McCulloch v. Marvland, 
different from Brown v. Board of Education as well. If we 
attempt to read the text by projecting a "fictional" 
institutional author, by assuming that the text possesses the 
usual traits that make texts readable, give them cohesion, 
and so forth, then we will find ourselves puzzled by the 
imagined writer's ineptitude and shifting tones, styles, and 
voices. 
There is a mechanical orderliness to the text, typical 
of unsynthesized collaborative efforts of this sort. The 
imagined author (the collective text?) raises a series of 
questions in each section, analyzing each in investigative 
fashion and providing an answer at the conclusion of each 
respective section. After a highly technical, business—like 
rendition of the case's history, an almost deadpan narrative 
in its tone, the "threshold" question of jurisdiction is 
presented first: Is this case properly before this court? 
There is talk of "appealable" orders, "timely" filings, and 
"finality" requirements, replete with case and code 
citations, all leading to an affirmative answer at the end. 
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But note the following sentence as an example of the 
authorship problem: 
To require a President of the United States to place 
himself in the posture of disobeying an order of a court 
merely to trigger the procedural mechanism for review of 
the ruling would be unseemly, and would present an 
unnecessary occasion for constitutional confrontation 
between the two branches of the Government (691—92). 
Is this Burger speaking with deference towards the President, 
or is this Douglas speaking with a satirical grin? 
The second section concerns issues of justiciability and 
intra—branch disputes. Two related questions are posed: (1) 
Does the Special Prosecutor have standing to bring this 
action? (2) Is a justiciable controversy presented for 
decision? With an eight—line string citation, reminiscent of 
the Court's late nineteenth—century style of opinion writing 
(Pratt), the collective text works its way through to "yes" 
on both questions, with rejection of "mere" assertions, 
"surface" inquiries, and "theoretical" possibilities. There 
is much talk of consistency, of being "bound" by the "force 
of law," along with another voice characterizing the 
President as "steadfast" in his "assertion of privilege 
against disclosure of the material" (697). 
The third section, entitled "Rule 17 (c)," deals with 
legal technicalities concerning the subpoena duces tecum, an 
order to produce specified materials, in this case in the 
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context of a federal criminal proceeding. The question is 
posed—whether the requirements of Rule 17 (c) have been 
satisfied—and the special prosecutor's actions are examined 
in terms of "burdens" to be carried and "hurdles" to be 
cleared. There is more talk of "deference" to the President 
interjected: 
In a case such as this, however, where a subpoena is 
directed to a President of the United States, appellate 
review, in deference to a coordinate branch of 
Government, should be particularly meticulous to ensure 
that the standards of Rule 17 (c) have been correctly 
applied (702). 
The answer given, finally, is a careful "yes." 
The fourth section, entitled "The Claim of Privilege," 
is the longest (13—plus pages) and obviously most significant 
part of the 31-page opinion. Two questions are presented: 
(1) Does the separation of powers doctrine preclude "judicial 
review of a President's claim of privilege"? (2) If not 
"absolute" executive privilege, can the President claim 
privilege over the subpoena duces tecum? The answer to both 
questions is "no," but the prose is muddy, the organization 
confusing, and the explanations for the justices' judgments 
are apparently disappointing, even for readers trained in the 
law. Here is Philip Bobbitt's assessment of United States v. 
Nixon: 
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In contrast to other weak doctrinal opinions, the Tapes 
Case has been charitably treated by commentators. Yet I 
venture to say that it is the worst set of doctrinal 
arguments—the least convincing, the most easily 
refuted, brief but repetitious, bombastic but 
unmoving—one is likely to encounter in the recent 
volumes of the United States Reports (212). 
Reading his own judicial analysis into the opinion, Bobbitt 
goes on to argue that the Court's decision was nevertheless 
successful in serving an "expressive function," conveying "a 
national goal captured by the cliches 'a government of laws, 
not men' and 'equal justice under law'" (217). 
Ironically, John Marshall is quoted several times in 
this opinion (in fact, one passage is quoted twice, the 
second time introduced as if the first). While not every 
justice can write like John Marshall, the Supreme Court's 
Shakespeare, the text of United States v. Nixon represents an 
extraordinarily poor performance, however the 
responsibilities of authorship are explained. Several of the 
justices participating in the case have reputations as good, 
competent writers. But the collective text in this 
situation, patched together out of the justices' private 
culture of argument, is a failure. At a dramatic moment in 
the life of the Court, we cannot help but look for the clear 
thought and deliberative character of a Marshall or a John 
Jay. Instead, we get a mechanical, muddied text, written by 
all and none. 
204 
4. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978) 
The Text as Living Thought or Lawyers1 Document? 
If the single judicial voice in Brown v. Board of 
Education was a reticent performance at a significant moment 
in the Supreme Court's history, then the justices' multiple 
voices in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke. 
the 1978 reverse discrimination case, represent quite the 
opposite.22 For 156 pages, the justices write profusely in 
various combinations, "concurring in part and dissenting in 
part," as they publicly explain their brokered decision. 
There was no majority opinion for this famous case in which 
Allan Bakke, a white male, challenged the minority "quota 
system" for admission to the Medical School of the University 
of California at Davis. After months of private 
deliberations and exchanges of draft opinions, the justices 
issued a plurality opinion—i.e., a series of separate 
opinions, no one of which had the support of a majority of 
the justices. 
The multiplicity of the justices' voices cannot be 
attributed to the "frenetic haste" of time pressures, as in 
New York Times Co. v. United States. The justices literally 
had as much time as they wanted to work through to a 
determination of the Bakke case. But they apparently did not 
respond to the centripetal pull of the Court as an 
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institution in the tradition of John Marshall's 
administrative rhetoric, perhaps because there was no direct 
sense of threat to the authority of the Court, as had existed 
in Brown and United States v. Nixon. Quite the contrary, the 
justices in Bakke speak diversely and in great detail, 
fulfilling their individual roles in a variety of different 
ways. Unlike Earl Warren and the other justices in Brown, 
the justices in Bakke obviously felt no ambiguity about the 
Court's community of authors and audiences, the processes of 
argumentation and public deliberation, or the value of 
language itself. In this pluralistic, centrifugal 
performance of opinion writing, the problem for general 
readers arises with the justices1 identification of the 
Court's community of authors and audiences, and thus in the 
nature of appropriate language and argumentation chosen to 
persuade this community. The justices' diverse opinions and 
deliberations are made public, but the "public" audience to 
whom they speak appears to be another closed culture of 
argument, that of legal professionals and scholars. 
In the 1970s reverse discrimination was an issue waiting 
for an appropriate case. As Bernard Schwarz relates in 
Behind Bakke: Affirmative Action and the Supreme Court. Allan 
Bakke was a white male who twice applied and was twice denied 
admission, in 1973 and 1974, to the Medical School at the 
University of California at Davis. The Medical School had 
one hundred openings each year, with sixteen spots reserved 
206 
for minority applicants. Bakke sued, pointing to minority 
applicants who had been admitted with lower grade-point 
averages and MCAT (Medical College Admission Test) scores 
than he had. Bakke claimed that he had been discriminated 
against on the basis of race in violation of (1) the equal 
protection guaranteed to all citizens by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, (2) a similar protection in California's state 
constitution, and (3) Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 
In the state courts Bakke's challenge was eventually 
successful, although the issue was apparently decided on 
complex grounds that avoided dealing directly with 
constitutional questions. After much debate the University's 
regents voted to appeal, and the case was accepted in 
February of 1977 for review by the United States Supreme 
Court. 
By October 12, 1977, when the justices heard the oral 
argument, an extraordinary amount of national interest in the 
Bakke case had developed. Well over 1,500 pages of briefs 
and related materials had been generated by a vast array of 
organizations and groups interested in the case in one way or 
another (see Kurland and Casper, vols. 99, 100). According 
to Schwartz, the justices were also intensely focused on the 
case, "immersing" themselves in discussions and preparing 
memoranda in advance: "Justice Brennan, in particular, wrote 
some of his 1976 term opinions with Bakke in mind" (42—43). 
In the oral argument, Archibald Cox represented the 
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University, Wade H. McCree, Jr., United States Solicitor 
General argued as amicus curiae (friend of the court), and 
Reynold H. Colvin represented Bakke. Chief Justice Warren E. 
Burger heard the case, along with Associate Justices William 
J. Brennan, Potter Stewart, Byron R. White,Thurgood Marshall, 
Harry A. Blackmun, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. 
Rehnquist, and John Paul Stevens. 
Schwartz details a fascinating series of 
"behind—the—scenes" interactions among the justices as they 
attempted to negotiate their opinions in the months following 
the oral argument. As in the Brown and Nixon cases, this 
information about the justices' private culture of argument 
was not available to the general public on June 28, 1978, 
when the Bakke opinion was delivered. In retrospect, we know 
that the justices engaged in a "deluge" of memoranda 
throughout the prolonged decision-making process, arguing a 
multiplicity of legal issues and doctrines in highly 
technical legal language (Schwartz 99). Burger and Rehnquist 
were at one end of the judicial spectrum, ready to support 
Bakke from the start; at the other end, Brennan and Marshall 
were determined to uphold the University's admissions 
program. This left five "undetermined" justices in the 
middle: White, Blackmun, Stevens, Stewart, and Powell. The 
justices slowly sorted themselves into various voting blocks, 
but continued to argue over the legal grounds of their 
respective decisions, their quarrels spilling over into 
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negotiations on the writing of other opinions.23 At the end 
of April, 1978, they were still amazingly unsure themselves 
of what the outcome of the case was going to be. 
The "logjam" in deciding the Bakke case, as Schwartz 
describes it, was broken in May with Blackmun's vote—joining 
Brennan, Marshall, and White—to uphold the University's 
admissions program using their readings of Title VI and the 
Fourteenth Amendment as justification. These four votes 
reversing the state court's decision were exactly balanced by 
the four votes of Burger, Rehnquist, Stewart, and Stevens, 
who wanted Bakke admitted, also using Title VI to affirm the 
state court's decision. "Justice Powell," Schwartz reports, 
"was for affirmance on the ground that the Davis program 
violated equal protection, but for reversal of the California 
holding that race could never be considered as a factor in 
admissions programs" (136). Powell was subsequently assigned 
to write the Court's "judgment" (not the "opinion of the 
Court"), and the other justices busily negotiated their own 
statements. 
As recorded in United States Reports, REGENTS OF THE 
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA v. BAKKE. 438 U.S. 265, this curious 
opinion captures in print the strategic processes of the 
justices' deliberations. The long text of the opinion breaks 
down into the following components: 
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(1) Syllabus 4 pages 
(2) Powell Opinion 55 pages 
Judgment of Court (3 paragraphs) 
Sections I—VI 
(with various A-D subsections) 
Appendix (Harvard College 
Admissions Program) 
(3) Opinion of Brennan, 
White, Marshall, & 
Blackmun 
(concurring/dissenting in part) 
55 pages 
(4) White Opinion 
(5) Marshall Opinion 
(6) Blackmun Opinion 
(7) Stevens Opinion 
joined by Burger, 
Stewart, & Rehnquist 













For all this generation of words—Erasmus's copia. if not his 
golden stream—the meaning of these texts and the 
significance of the case remain arcane. The newspaper 
headlines ranged from various versions of "Bakke won," to 
"the University won," to "everybody won," to "nobody won" 
(Schwartz 151—52). The personal result for Bakke was that he 
was admitted to the Medical School. College 
affirmative-action admissions programs found in the decision 
an approval of the "goal" of diversity based on multiple 
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factors, including race, so long as specific numbers or 
"quotas" were not set. 
The seriatim conversation in the text of Bakke has 
little in common with Chisholm v. Georgia or even New York 
Times Co. v. United States. A passage in Powell's opinion 
encapsulates the problems of listening in on the justices1 
deliberations. Powell, a technical procedurist and pragmatic 
holder of the "lawyer's" seat on the Court^4, claims that the 
"language of [section] 601, 78 Stat. 252, like that of the 
Equal Protection Clause, is majestic in its sweep: 
"No person in the United States shall, on the 
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded 
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any program or 
activity receiving Federal financial assistance" (284). 
The idea behind this piece of instrumental discourse is 
certainly noble in its intention, but is the language 
"majestic in its sweep"? Powell immediately follows with 
this statement of his own intentions: 
The concept of "discrimination," like the phrase "equal 
protection of the laws," is susceptible of varying 
interpretations, for as Mr. Justice Holmes declared, 
"[a] word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, 
it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly 
in color and content according to the circumstances and 
the time in which it is used." Towne v. Eisner. 245 
U.S. 418, 425 (1918). We must, therefore, seek whatever 
aid is available in determining the precise meaning of 
the statute before us. Train v. Colorado Public 
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Interest Research Group. 426 U.S. 1, 10 (1976), quoting 
United States v. American Trucking Assns., 310 U.S. 534, 
543-544 (1940) (284). 
The contrast is extraordinary between Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
Jr.'s beautifully expressed notion of language as "the skin 
of a living thought" and Powell's surrounding technical 
discourse, a document that speaks only to lawyers as it 
dissects "levels of scrutiny" in extended detail. Powell 
does indeed pursue "precise" meanings in his 55—page 
opinion—elaborately,relentlessly, endlessly—with massive 
footnotes, multiple case and code citations, and numerous 
quotations of legal scholars.^5 ironically, the justice even 
quotes Archibald Cox on the Court's role in "expounding the 
Constitution" (299). 
A good portion of Bakke is written in this fashion, in 
what Robert F. Nagel calls the "formulaic style," an approach 
to writing that encourages justices to engage in "tireless, 
detailed debate" and to compose judicial opinions as if they 
were law review articles (121). Quoting Michael Oakeshott, 
Nagel describes this style as "an impressive display of the 
rationalist's preference for knowledge that is 'susceptible 
of formulation in rules, principles, directions, maxims . . 
." and that "emphasizes carefully framed doctrine expressed 
in elaborately layered sets of 'tests,' 'prongs,' 
'requirements,1 'standards,' or 'hurdles'" (121). As an 
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example, Nagel analyzes a section of Brennan's opinion in 
Bakke, criticizing the text for its formulaic 
"compartmentalization" and simplification of complex moral 
issues (151—52). Despairing of the justices' understanding 
of "conversation as a political art" and their relationship 
to "general culture," Nagel asks some important questions 
about the Court's community of authors and audiences: 
The less immediate, but more basic question, then, is 
why Justices and scholars have not been more 
dissatisfied with the awkward and degraded way of 
talking that has developed naturally along with the 
Court's instrumentalist role. Why are those who want 
the Court to intervene with wisdom and effectiveness in 
the culture not dismayed by a communicative style that 
isolates the Court from the governed and from their 
ordinary experiences and understandings? (154) 
But not all of Bakke is composed in Nagel's formulaic 
style. Two of the separate opinions, one by Marshall and one 
by Blackmun, use plain—style language to reach a larger 
audience. While it is always difficult to assess the amount 
of law—clerk drafting, both of these opinions appear to speak 
personally and directly. Marshall, having joined Brennan's 
long opinion, did not need to write separately, but he 
obviously felt compelled to talk about what he saw as the 
sacrifice of "genuine equality" for some legal notion of 
"abstract equality" (398). Marshall begins at the beginning, 
recounting the history of slavery and its effects on 
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African—Americans, and ends by focusing on the irony of the 
Court's decision: 
While I applaud the judgment of the Court that a 
university may consider race in its admissions process, 
it is more than a little ironic that, after several 
hundred years of class-based discrimination against 
Negroes, the Court is unwilling to hold that a 
class—based remedy for that discrimination is 
permissible" (400). 
While other justices present detailed analyses of "levels of 
scrutiny," Marshall speaks powerfully to core moral issues. 
Blackmun, having also joined Brennan's opinion, did not 
need to write separately, but he apparently felt equally 
compelled to add some personal comments "on the edges of the 
central question" (406). In a sort of plain-style staccato, 
Blackmun strings together a small sequence of observations 
that speak to the intersections of law, society, and 
morality. Here, for example, is Blackmun commenting on 
Powell's Harvard model (an admissions program with "goals" 
but not "quotas"): 
I am not convinced, as MR. JUSTICE POWELL seems to be, 
that the difference between the Davis program and the 
one employed by Harvard is very profound or 
constitutionally significant. The line between the two 
is a thin and indistinct one. In each, subjective 
application is at work (406). 
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And on the dilemma of reverse discrimination: 
In order to get beyond racism, we must first take 
account of race. There is no other way. And in order 
to treat some persons equally, we must treat them 
differently. We cannot—we dare not—let the Equal 
Protection Clause perpetuate racial supremacy (407). 
Blackmun ends by posing the "ultimate question" of Bakke: 
"Among the qualified, how does one choose?" (407) He answers 
curiously, intriguingly, almost like a poet, by quoting three 
passages: two from John Marshall on "expounding" the 
Constitution in McCulloch v. Maryland: and one from Woodrow 
Wilson, declaring that the Constitution is "not a mere 
lawyers' document" but a "vehicle of life, and its spirit is 
always the spirit of the age" (408). Bakke was a difficult 
case for Blackmun, a decision that could not be reached 
merely through legal technicalities and academic 
proficiencies. He concludes with a cryptic, provocative 
explanation of his three quotations or "precepts": 
These precepts of breadth and flexibility and 
ever—present modernity are basic to our constitutional 
law. Today, again, we are expounding a Constitution. 
The same principles that governed McCulloch's case in 
1819 govern Bakke's case in 1978. There can be no other 
answer (408). 
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In "The Logic and Rhetoric of Constitutional Law," a 
classic essay written early in the twentieth century, Thomas 
Reed Powell argues for the importance of judges' individual 
voices. He insists that "the fact that judges disagree, and 
freely express the reasons for their disagreement, should add 
to our confidence in their labors rather than detract from 
it" (92). For Powell, confidence does not reside in the 
Court's judicial voice, in a collective institutional voice 
pretending to be human: 
We have nine judges instead of one, twelve jurors 
instead of one, because we know that human judgment is 
fallible and because we wish by increase of numbers to 
decrease the margin of error. Though when our passions 
are strong we sometimes forget that out of a multitude 
of counsel cometh wisdom, our enterprise of democracy is 
an expression of our abiding faith that the erring 
thoughts of individuals are best controlled by the full 
play of competing opinions (92—93). 
Of course, the justices of the Supreme Court cannot function 
in a "goldfish bowl." No one can. People in institutions 
will always develop an informal private culture for 
exchanging ideas, debating choices, and working towards 
solutions. Perhaps what is dangerous, and potentially 
destructive for the Court, is to be found in the formal 
elaboration and official sanctioning of an internal, secret, 
private culture of argument—a rhetorical culture that Warren 
E. Burger felt was a constitutionally protected judicial 
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privilege. The Constitution is silent on how justices should 
interact, or even if they should do so at all. It is also 
silent on the writing of judicial opinions, in whatever 
generic form. We need to remember that we have made up all 
of this as we have gone along. 
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Notes 
Four Modern Cases 
1 Corso provides a good survey of traditional attitudes 
concerning minority opinions (184—226). For a fresh, 
interesting approach to concurring opinions, see Ray, "The 
Justices Write Separately; Uses of the Concurrence by the 
Rehnquist Court." 
2 For commentators with a rhetorical focus, see Dunbar 
and Cooper, "A Situational Perspective for the Study of Legal 
Argument: A Case Study of Brown v. Board of Education"; 
Hunsaker, "The Rhetoric of Brown v. Board of Education: 
Paradigm for Contemporary Social Protest"; and Prentice, 
"Supreme Court Rhetoric." 
3 The Brown case from Kansas was "consolidated" with 
three similar cases: Briggs v. Elliott from South Carolina; 
Davis v. County School Board from Virginia; and Gebhart v. 
Belton from Delaware. A fifth case, Boiling v. Sharpe from 
the District of Columbia, was decided separately. 
4 Kluger reports that Reed "apparently" dissented (694). 
But Warren makes a special point at the beginning of his 
Memoirs of denying that any dissenting votes were ever 
formally cast (2). 
^ Background and sources for New York Times Co. v. 
United States include the following: Cox; Currie, Second 
Century; Friedman and Israel, vol. 5; Kelly et al.; Kurland 
and Casper, vol. 71; O'Brien; Stone et al. 
6 The entire oral argument for the case lasted for two 
hours and thirteen minutes. Unlike the grand oratorical 
performances of Daniel Webster or William Pinkney, the modern 
version of oral argument before the Supreme Court challenges 
counsel to think quickly and speak concisely in intense 
exercises of dialectical give-and-take. In what surely 
echoes Marshall's administrative rhetoric, the transcripts of 
these oral arguments identify counsel by name but not 
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necessarily the justices. When a speaks, he or she is 
usually identified as "THE COURT." 
7 See Frank, "Hugo L. Black," and Dunne, "Hugo L. 
Black." See Frank, in particular, for a discussion of 
Black's membership in the Ku Klux Klan. 
® See Campbell; Countryman; Frank, "William 0. Douglas"; 
and Rodgers. 
9 See Friedman, "William J. Brennan," and Lewin, 
"William J. Brennan." 
See Israel, "Potter Stewart," and Friedman, "Potter 
Stewart." 
H See Israel, "Byron R. White," and Friedman, "Byron R. 
White." 
see MacKenzie, "Thurgood Marshall," and Clark, 
"Thurgood Marshall." 
13 See MacKenzie, "Warren E. Burger," and Norman, 
"Warren E. Burger." 
14 See Dorsen, "John Marshall Harlan." 
15 See Pollet, "Harry A. Blackmun." 
16 Bobbitt calls this approach to constitutional 
interpretation "structural argument," drawing on the work of 
Charles Black. See also an interesting discussion by Tribe 
and Dorf on "dis-integrative" and "hyper-integrative" ways of 
reading the Constitution. 
17 New York Times. 6 July 1971: 16. 
Background and sources for United States v. Nixon 
include the following: Bobbitt; Brigham; Cox; Currie, Second 
Century; Friedman and Israel, vol. 5; Kelly et al.; Kurland 
and Casper, vol. 79; O'Brien; Stone et al. 
I9 Seven Nixon associates were indicted: John N. 
Mitchell, H. R. Haldeman, John D. Ehrlichman, Charles W. 
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Colson, Robert C. Mardian, Kenneth W. Parkinson, and Gordon 
Strachan. 
20 The amusing account of the Nixon deliberations in 
Woodward and Bernstein's The Brethren certainly adds weight 
to Burger's concern about losing judicial confidentiality, 
especially as Burger himself is made to look like an 
incompetent fool. While The Brethren is unquestionably 
interesting and fun to read, I have tried to avoid using 
information from this popular book without substantiation 
from other sources and documented accounts. The very 
popularity of such a tell—all work, filled with law clerks' 
gossip, suggests some of the problems with closed cultures of 
argument in democratic societies and what Brigham calls "the 
cult of the court." 
21 we do in fact write phrases such as "the essay 
presents," "the article deals with," "the editorial takes a 
stand on." But these are largely figurative conventions of 
language. Try saying "the book deliberates. ..." See Ong 
for an interesting discussion of oral vs. written modes and 
books as "objects" or "containers" of knowledge. 
22 Background and sources for Regents of the University 
of California v. Bakke include the following: Bobbitt; 
Currie, Second Century; Friedman and Israel, vol. 5; Kelly et 
al.; Kurland and Casper, vols. 99, 100; Nagel; O'Brien; 
Schwartz, Behind Bakke: Stone et al. 
23 According to Schwartz, Blackmun, who was the last 
justice to make up his mind about Bakke, quarreled with 
Brennan over Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Commission, a 
case dear to Blackmun's heart, that Brennan was dragging his 
feet on. At an April case conference, Blackmun "attacked" 
Brennan, insisting that he "would not vote in Bakke until 
Brennan voted in Baldwin" (127). 
2^ See Neuborne, "Lewis F. Powell, Jr." 
25 Despite Powell's interest in precise meanings, he 
dismisses the differences between racial "goal" and "quota" 
as a "semantic distinction" that is "beside the point" and 
insists on the more general term "classification" (289). See 
Block on some other terms defined by Powell in his opinion. 
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